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


**PRESIDENTIAL FOREIGN POLICY  
AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO MEDIA  
AND PUBLIC OPINION**

by

**Nancy B. Burgoyne**

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment  
of the requirements for the degree of  
Doctor of Philosophy  
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For Barbara Hinckley

Who inspired me to take the road less travelled,  
and whose influence made all the difference.

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## **CHAPTER I**

### **INTRODUCTION**

The relationship between the Presidency and the media has often been considered the fundamental building block of public opinion. The potential for an isolated foreign policy disaster to effect a President's overall approval rating is a shadow which hangs over the decision making process in every administration. To measure the power of the President in relationship to the media, it is essential to examine and compare original presidential policy with the interpretation of the policy by the media, and the positive or negative tone of reporting which influences the opinions of the American public. Changes in public opinion serve to demonstrate, in part, the relationship of the executive to the press. Manifestations of presidential manipulation of the media, in an attempt to influence the effects of the press on public opinion, must be considered within the context of various foreign policy stages.

The movement and relationship of presidential foreign policy, media coverage, and public opinion will be the topic of this dissertation. Theories dealing with the way opinions on international issues are influenced, as well as

a study considering the rates of change among the executive, media, and the public, will be considered in the dissertation with the theoretical foundation for argument stemming from the works of Mark Hertsgaard and Nicholas Berry.

The central hypothesis of this study is the notion that the Carter and Reagan Presidencies experienced similar treatment from the press during the shaping and implementation of foreign policy. Both Administrations, it will be argued, moved unhampered and free of the effects of negative press in the initial phases of emerging foreign policy events. If the foreign policy-making process is broken down and the role of the media and public opinion are analyzed, there are clearly times in which both Administrations made policy in a relatively unhampered, or even favorable context. According to Berry, it is not until a foreign policy objective has failed that presidential manipulation of the press is attempted.<sup>1</sup> The forthcoming work will make a case for the idea that the foreign policy arena is dominated by the President, regardless of who is filling the office in the initial phases of a new foreign policy. The point at which the media becomes critical of a policy and the length of time it takes for the public to

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<sup>1</sup>Nicholas O. Berry, Foreign Policy And The Press, (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1990), p. 146.

reflect negative or positive attitudes in the opinion polls, it is anticipated, will differ with various Administrations. Special attention will be given to any evidence of alterations or additions to the original presidential foreign policy objectives which would suggest the impact of the media and the public on the original policy initiative.

There are basically two principal schools of thought concerning the power of the President to influence the media. Mark Herbstgaard's work represents the body of research which views the President as the controller and manipulator of the media. Hertsgaard's analysis of the Reagan Presidency portrays the media as being beholden to the President's wishes. The terms "teflon president" and "palace court presidency" were coined in response to Reagan's seeming ability to avoid drops in public approval ratings in the face of criticism and negative media coverage. Further, it has been suggested that the Reagan Administration masterfully manipulated the press in its favor.

The competing view portrays the President as a victim of an independent, powerful press.<sup>2</sup> These theorists view the interests of the media and its power in relationship to the President in adversarial terms. Michael Ledeen

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<sup>2</sup>Walter Lippman, The Phantom Public, as quoted in Irving Crespi, Public Opinion, Polls, and Democracy, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989), pp. 10-11.

summarizes the position of those who view the press as the "fourth branch of government" when he writes:

The media's suspicion of our government, combined with their limited understanding of the world at large, has a devastating effect upon our foreign policy. Suspicious as they are of American intentions, and bolstered by court rulings that seem to give the press license to seek out and publish any and all governmental secrets, the media damage our ability to design and conduct good policy in ways they rarely imagine.<sup>3</sup>

The theory which appears to be best suited to breaking down the complexity of the executive and media relationship in the foreign policy making process originates from Nicholas Berry's theory. In response to traditional approaches Berry writes:

The schools of thought that hold that reporters are either active participants or passive puppets in foreign policy do not hold up. The key to this study's attack on both schools is the treatment of foreign policy in stages. No other study on the interaction between the press and foreign policymakers starts with that distinction between the press and foreign policymakers. Without it, the two schools of thought are plausible. A disposition to see the press as either active or passive can be supported by plenty of evidence.<sup>4</sup>

This study will apply the breakdown approach in the early stages of an event by tracking the tone of the media. Not only is this approach a more complete model for the

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<sup>3</sup>Michael Ledeen, "Public Opinion, Press Opinion, and Foreign Policy," Public Opinion, August/September 1984, p. 7.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid., p. 143.

explanation of media and presidential relations, but it is also conducive to further expansion and other comparative presidential studies.

This research will analyze the Carter Presidency and first term of the Reagan Administration. The Carter Administration will be examined since it is perceived to be an extreme example of a weak Presidency. Changes in media portrayal, as well as public opinion on issues of foreign policy, are set within the context of low overall opinion and public confidence that typifies the Carter years. This is an example of a Presidency in which the press functions apart and many times in an adversarial relationship to the Administration. If Berry's theory is accurate, similarities in presidential power and its relationship with the media at the initial stages of an emerging foreign policy should be found in both the Carter and Reagan Administrations. The Carter Administration will make a strong case in support of Berry's theory since many argue that the media generally portrayed the Carter White House in negative terms. The Carter Administration will provide a good representation of the school of thought which sees the media as operating apart from the President as a "fourth branch of government."

The Reagan Administration will be selected since it represents what Hertsgaard and others perceive as the epitome of an Administration which dominated and controlled

the press. It is felt by many that this Presidency turned the media into presidential puppets in order to control public opinion.<sup>5</sup> This is a gross oversimplification, and like preceding Administrations, the Reagan Presidency was not immune to occurrences of negative press opposing a new foreign policy in the evaluation stage. Perhaps negative press was better controlled and the media more successfully manipulated. This could be a topic for future analysis and study of presidential leadership styles once this study is complete.

Terms such as the "Teflon President" and the palace "court press" are used by theorists such as Hertsgaard to convey an image in the Reagan Administration of a press dominated by the Executive. Hertsgaard writes that since Reagan was a culmination of business and elite interests, media executives backed Reagan and filtered the coverage of the Administration in order to present the President in the most positive light.<sup>6</sup>

Hertsgaard asserts that Reagan maintained control of the press by limiting access, planning ahead, repeating the same one or possibly two messages frequently, maintaining an offensive, talking about the issues which the President

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<sup>5</sup>Mark Hertsgaard, On Bended Knee, (New York: Schocken Books, 1989), p. 347.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid.

wanted to address, and controlling the flow of information.<sup>7</sup>  
On the subject of the contrast between the two Presidencies  
being considered, Lou Cannon writes:

Carter's interests were so broad that he often seemed to lack focus, even in private conversation. Reagan's range was narrow, but his agenda was compelling. He wanted to get on with the business of cutting domestic government spending, reducing income taxes and building up the military. All other policies seemed to him beside the point.<sup>8</sup>

Carter believed that he brought a new mandate with him for a revamping of foreign policy. He was coming from a different party than his predecessor and had a genuine commitment to change the foreign policy of the country.<sup>9</sup> Basically three fundamental patterns occurred in the Carter image of the international system:

Originally . . . Carter administration policy makers perceived a very complex international system made up of a multitude of important issues and actors. The Carter team attempted to maximize international peace and co-operation in an effort to build a global community. In the second and third years as the Carter administration's image of the international system was subject to increasing challenges, its perception of a complex world was modified and intraadministration differences became greater. By 1980 the Carter administration's image of the international system had completely altered. The

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<sup>7</sup>Ibid., p. 20.

<sup>8</sup>Lou Cannon, President Reagan: The Role of a Lifetime, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991) p. 105.

<sup>9</sup>M. Glenn Abernathy, Dilys M. Hill and Phil Williams, The Carter Years, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1988) p. 56.

original image of a complex global system was disavowed and supplanted with an image of a fragmented international system in which the pursuit of global security became dominant.<sup>10</sup>

Perhaps the biggest reason for this change was the realization, resulting from the Carter Administration's cumulative experiences over time, that factors existed which the White House had little or no control over, such as the behavior of other states. Over time, the Carter Presidency came to recognize that policy does not take place in a vacuum.

While there was a sharp distinction in the management styles and foreign policy ideology and objectives between the Carter and Reagan Presidencies, the application of Berry's theory should yield similarities in the manner in which the media reports an emerging policy. The Carter and Reagan Administrations represent both ends of the media spectrum or the executive-media relations which the above schools identify and which Berry argues is too broad. If the policy process is broken down into four stages, according to Berry's theory, it would be anticipated that both of these diverse Administrations would experience similar media treatment during the onset of a new policy.

To further and expand the argument, public opinion will be monitored in relationship to executive policy and media's

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<sup>10</sup>Ibid., p. 66.



portrayal of that policy. Media will also be analyzed in order to sample the frequency as well as tone of news stories appearing in the New York Times over the course of an event.

**Berry's Four Stages of the Foreign Policy Process and a Proposal for Broadening the Database and Argument**

Nicholas Berry's contribution of breaking down the process of foreign policy-making is a very useful concept for further analysis. The first stage of the foreign policy process is the formulation stage. The Administration defines the role the United States will play. The policy is introduced to the press and subsequently the American people during this phase. At this point the press is doing its best to gather the details of the policy. The second stage is the execution stage. In both of these stages the primary focus is on the articulated policy initiatives and actions of U.S. officials. Berry writes:

Reporters, not being analytical scholars, accept the assumptions and consensus of the foreign policy establishment. These assumptions define the nature of the foreign threats and opportunities the United States faces and the role of the United States in the world. By accepting the assumptions, reporters are disposed to accept the particular foreign policies that address those threats and opportunities as officially designated.<sup>11</sup>

Berry would stretch this theory to include any foreign policy event regardless of the occupant of the oval office.

In order to test this theory, the Carter and the Reagan

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<sup>11</sup>Berry, p. xiii.

Administrations will be selected. An assessment of the media's neutrality as well as the identification of differences within media coverage will be the main focus in the formulation and execution stages. It is at this point that an investigation of the press will begin. The New York Times will be examined to determine whether the media remains unbiased and is merely reporting and informing the public. The use of two diverse Administrations will allow for possible negative or positive trends in the media to surface. If Berry's theory is correct, it should make no difference whether the media is reporting Carter's or Reagan's foreign policy. It would be assumed that at this stage the media would be offering an unbiased account of events. This work will analyze the frequency, length and tone of articles appearing in the New York Times.

If media is simply reporting the facts as they emanate from the White House, it would be expected that public opinion would also remain unchanged. If any change did occur, the research would anticipate that there would be a rally-round-the-flag phenomenon whereby public approval would slightly increase.<sup>12</sup> However, if Berry's theory is correct, the formulation and execution stages will most likely result in little if any changes in opinion. An

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<sup>12</sup>John E. Mueller, "Presidential Popularity From Truman to Johnson," American Political Science Review, March, 1970, p. 21.

overall neutral trend in the tone of the media is expected.

With a comparison of the Carter Administration and the Reagan Presidency, an analysis of public opinion poll data and content analysis of the print media will be used to explore the plausibility of the idea that the press is neutral at the early stages of the foreign policy process.

Again, Berry writes:

To a far greater extent than with domestic politics, the press is at one with the foreign policy establishment. The press's main task is to inform its readers what the government wants foreign governments to do or not do, how the government intends to bring about that result, and what its early moves are. Its focus is on getting the facts. As a result, the government need only act in foreign policy and explain what it is doing in order to get its story out. Manipulation of the press is not necessary in the formulation and execution stages of foreign policy. The president and foreign policy officials naturally put the best light on their policies both to generate support and to inform the public, Congress, pressure groups, and press about what is going on. But in the formulation and execution stages of foreign policy, the administration seeks policies that work. When it believes it has correct policies, they are, in general terms and with the exception of covert operations, honestly and descriptively stated.<sup>13</sup>

If the above statement is true, than this study would anticipate support of both Administrations in the early phases of a policy. The above supposes that the President is in control of the policy process and disseminates information at the outset of a policy.

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<sup>13</sup>Berry, p. xiii.

After policy has been formulated and implemented, the next phase in the process is identified as the outcome stage. According to Berry, it is the longest stage, because clashes between states are more complex than the time it takes the U.S. as a single actor to synthesize a foreign policy stance. The outcome stage is the time in which evaluation of the policy occurs. Since the media now has had the time to assemble specialists, an analysis of the policy ensues. According to Berry, the media becomes negative only if the policy is judged to be a failure. Failed policy then stimulates an attempt by the President to manipulate the media. Policy is judged unsuccessful in the event the policy did not meet the goals and objectives outlined in the earlier formulation and execution stages. As to the effectiveness of press manipulation by the President, Berry states:

Successful press manipulation in foreign policy is a myth. This knowledge will not stop officials from trying, but it should eventually convince them to change policies that the press reports as going down the tubes.<sup>14</sup>

Unlike Hertsgaard, who believes that Reagan controlled the press at all times, Berry argues that there is no need for manipulation of the media unless the foreign policy in question fails. Despite Reagan's "teflon" image, Berry argues:

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<sup>14</sup>Ibid., pp. 146-147.

. . . when policy fails, editors rarely defend a discredited foreign policy consensus. They expect reporting to be inconsistent with Washington's foreign policy.<sup>15</sup>

Berry reasons that the existence of negative press, at this stage, discredits the traditional theory which views the press as an extension or puppet of the White House:

If editors constrained the reporters to stay with the administration's failed policy in the outcome stage, then that would force the reporters to be policy players and part of the story. But editors do not do that, for if they did we would not have gotten the results we did in our five cases.<sup>16</sup>

The prevalence of negative press is sufficient evidence, Berry reasons, to make a case for the independent nature of the media.

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<sup>15</sup>Ibid., p. 142.

<sup>16</sup>Ibid.

## A Critique of Berry's Work and Possible Challenges for This Study

Berry argues that in the early stages of a policy, specifically the formulation and execution stages, the White House is trying only to get the elements of the foreign policy right. He ignores the possibility for biases at the beginning of the policy itself. Poll data will be used to evaluate the overall approval rating of a President at the beginning of a particular foreign policy and general presidential support and approval will be evaluated during the implementation and evaluation stages of the policy process. The famous Gallup question, "Do you approve of the way (Carter or Reagan) is handling his job as President?" will be useful in providing an overall context and framework for the climate in which a specific foreign policy is being introduced. According to how the question is answered by the public, there could be a difference in the way a policy initially appears in the press.<sup>17</sup>

Berry uses five case studies which are selected from the New York Times Index. The sample size is limited and the analysis of only a single policy in each of five Administrations is hardly conducive to any extrapolations of

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<sup>17</sup>Miroslav Nincic, "The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Politics of Opposites," World Politics, Vol. XL, No. 4 July 1988.

generalized patterns. He assumes that all foreign policy can be lumped together. He does not distinguish between different types of policy which makes his work problematic. He also uses includes "successful" foreign policy, leaving the effects of "unsuccessful" policies to mere speculation. This dissertation will expand the study to include all significant U.S. policy towards the U.S.S.R., in an effort to overcome these restrictions. The criteria used to identify "significant" will be discussed below.

The polices themselves will not be labeled "successful" or "unsuccessful" since this is far to subjective and biased. Further, Berry does not define a general guideline for evaluating policy on this bias and the terms are essentially meaningless.

This study will totally disregard this process of evaluation and instead concentrate on the tone of the press throughout the duration of the policy process. An emphasis will be placed on the initial period of an event in an effort to evaluate the extent of media bias as manifest in the overall tone of news stories.

One major problem in Berry's study is that it does not control for the time at which a foreign policy occurs during an Administration. Furthermore, the coalition of minorities thesis which argues that gradual decline in presidential popularity is inevitable, is a factor in this



analysis.<sup>18</sup> The Carter Administration and the first term of the Reagan Administration will be examined in their entirety. Mueller claims that upon taking office, the "honeymoon period" typifies the presidential media and public relations for the first year. In the first year, before the disenfranchisement of interest groups and the media, the press is overly positive toward the new Administration.<sup>19</sup> It also could be a period in which an Administration is more concerned with settling-in than with the idea of international conflict. However, it was discovered, the first year of an Administration is not a time for a lot of foreign policy activity.

Berry's selections of policy issues are not only limited, but they are also not random enough. To address this problem, the study will examine all significant new emerging U.S. foreign policy towards the U.S.S.R. These cases will be defended as reasonable samples of U.S.-Soviet policy based on the fact that the selection process included all events which were covered with at least twenty front page articles in the Times. This should help to overcome the qualitative differences.<sup>20</sup> Also, by only exploring

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<sup>18</sup>Mueller, "Presidential Popularity From Truman to Johnson," pp. 18-25.

<sup>19</sup>Ibid.

<sup>20</sup>Lee Sigelman, "A Reassessment of the Two Presidencies Thesis," The Journal of Politics, Vol. 41, 1979, p. 1197.

U.S.-Soviet policy, we will address the intrinsic difficulty inherent in the comparison of too few cases scattered globally, which is a definite limitation of Berry's research.

The analysis of Soviet issues is useful since it would be expected that opinions would be easier to identify and track in regards to the U.S.S.R. as opposed to other areas of the world. The underlying assumption is that the public is more likely to be aware of the U.S.S.R., and that the Gallup surveys have a comparatively larger amount of poll data concerning public opinion toward this area.

The print media will sample the message which many Americans are receiving in the initial stages of a new foreign policy as well as the evaluation of that policy.<sup>21</sup> The number of stories along with the length and tone allocated to a policy should present an interesting correlation with changes in public opinion. If Berry's theory is accurate, then biases in the tone of the media will not arise until the policies are in the evaluation stage. This should hold true for the Carter as well as the Reagan Administrations.

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<sup>21</sup>It is also possible to include a sample of electronic media such as a study of the CBS evening news. This is a possibility which was discussed at the outset of this project and was deleted in an effort to make the dissertation manageable. Perhaps this is research that can be added and pursued at a later time.

The potential also exists that a new policy will be met with a negative reaction on the part of the media and public in the initial "non biased" stages of an Administration. The possibility that public opinion drops before evaluation of the policy occurs will be explored and could prove detrimental to both the original hypothesis and Berry's theory. There is a chance that a policy may suffer from negative media and public opinion in the initial phase of an event even if the policy is ultimately a success. This occurrence would be in direct opposition to Berry's assertions that successful policy is always responded to with positive press requiring no manipulation on the part of the President. For Berry, "successful" seems to imply that policy objectives are carried out. He glosses over the intrinsic value and substance of a particular policy and assumes the preconceived opinions and biases of the media as well as the public do not interfere.

The study will not choose policy based on success. In fact the ultimate evaluation of a particular policy's success or failure will not be useful to this study. This research is limited to the initial reactions in the media to an event. If the overall tone of the media is neutral or even positive at the beginning of a foreign policy, then this phenomenon will give credibility to the central hypothesis.

Foreign policy is an ongoing process and another problem may be that the policy which is finally articulated and pursued by the executive may not be the policy which was initially formulated and implemented. It would appear that early changes in the White House policy may be greatly impacted by media as well as public opinion. To argue this possibility, there will have to be alterations and inconsistencies in the original policy when compared to subsequent policy.

### Limitations of the Study

This project will establish criteria and examine all events which meet the outlined requirements for the study. These requirements will be discussed in the methodology section of this paper. The number of events which are suitable for consideration is limited to five. Admittedly the number is small; however, the events were selected on the basis of established criteria. This stringent adherence to a list of criteria for all events provided a means for eliminating other events which would have biased the study. The selection of events is designed to address some of the shortcomings found in Berry's work. By limiting the events to two Administrations, examining more than one event, and contemplating policy limited to U.S.-Soviet relations, it is anticipated that this work will be able to create stronger support for the hypothesis.

Since foreign policy does not take place in a vacuum, it must be acknowledged that a multiplicity of factors combine to affect the policy decisions made by leaders. The problem of issue linkage, meaning separate events exerting influence over the event being studied, greatly impacts the President, media, and public opinion. Foreign policy issues, no matter how diverse, combine to varying degrees to create a climate in which unrelated events affect the

decision making process as well as reactions in the media and the public.

Another limitation of the study is the role of foreign policy and its significance in terms of public opinion. It is difficult to acquire large amounts of data since foreign policy is not the principle topic of interest to the public. While public opinion polls will be utilized in this study, it remains a fact that it is the economy, not foreign policy, which exerts the greatest effect on the public's assessment of the President as well as the perceptions of the public as to how well the country is running.<sup>22</sup>

As a result of the perceived apathy amongst the public, the study selected Soviet policy, reasoning that if the public did have opinions concerning foreign policy, they would be most likely to be found on the subject of the relationship existing between the two global superpowers. With an increasing military budget, the build-up of nuclear arms, and the ecumenical strategy of "containment" establishing the foundation of U.S. policy towards the U.S.S.R., the underlying premise of this paper is the assertion that if the public had any opinions about U.S. foreign policy, it would be in regards to the most commonly

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<sup>22</sup>Edward Tufte, Political Control of the Economy, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1978), chapters 1 and 2.

agreed upon and most dangerous "enemy".

This study encounters obstacles in comparing events. Since each event is unique and occurs within a distinct context, a potential problem arises in the comparison of trends and the extrapolation of generalities from a multiplicity of circumstances. This was a major shortcoming of Berry's since the events considered covered a variety of geographical regions, times, and Administrations. He also included only policy "successes". This study will attempt to survey all policy falling within the established criteria regardless of its ultimate outcome. No event was chosen on the basis of whether or not it was a "success" or a "failure". This is a perceived flaw with Berry's work which makes the selection and the evaluation of events far too subjective.

The use of the New York Times as a measure of media treatment, as well as media's attitude towards an Administration, may generate controversy; however, it is defensible on the grounds that it is the most complete and authoritative American paper covering foreign policy.<sup>23</sup> Moreover, it is the core source of network television news stories and sets the agenda as well as the priorities in the

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<sup>23</sup>S. Robert Lichter, Stanley Rothman, and Linda S. Lichter, The Media Elite, (Bethesda, Ma.: Adler and 'Adler, 1986), pp. 2-3.

American media.<sup>24</sup>

We must question whether it is the man, or the circumstances with which a President finds himself faced that determine public opinion as well as media's treatment of his policy. Is high public approval and positive media coverage a function of an absence of challenging events in the foreign policy arena? Or, is a positive tone in the media and the public a manifestation of an intrinsically superior decision-maker or at the very least a skillful manager of the press? It has been argued that some Presidents are just lucky. Certainly the challenges and the pressures that vary from one Administration to another could account somewhat for the "success" which a President enjoys.

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<sup>24</sup>Ibid.



## Conclusion

This work will hypothesize that the Carter and Reagan Presidencies experienced similar relations with the media and moved unhampered and independent of the effects of a negative press in the initial phases of an emerging foreign policy. The hypothesis is designed to refute the Hertsgaard school of thought which views the relationship of the Reagan Administration and media as one in which the media were nothing more than executive puppets. The hypothesis should also discredit the theory of an estranged press operating in opposition to the Administration as a fourth governmental branch. The study is organized conceptually around the work of Nicholas Berry; indeed, it is in fact his breakdown of the foreign policy process into stages which led to the analysis necessary to measure press activity as well as changes in public opinion concerning a policy.

The extent to which an Administration functions free of restraint by the press in the early stages will be tested using the Carter and Reagan Administrations. Through the examination of the tone of the press as well as fluctuations in overall public opinion Berry's theory will be tested and expanded. If Berry's theory is accurate, fluctuations of public opinion will not occur until the evaluation phase. Any media and public opinion repercussions to policy in the

formulation and implementation stages would be a rally-round-the-flag response, which Berry does not address.

This study is important to subsequent work as the power of the executive may be further explored. While Berry argues that in the formulation and implementation stages policy is clear, concise, and formulated to the best of the ability of the Administration, he assumes it is "intrinsically good policy". Unlike his appraisal of domestic policy, Berry assumes that the President has a "free hand" in the foreign policy making process in the early stages. The role of the press and the public appears nominal if policy is executed before the public is able to editorialize and offer opinions. It is the "free-hand" notion which this study will test.

Another issue for further work is the issue of covert activity. If a President is given consistently "poor" reviews of policy, or if the policy is intrinsically more often than not bad policy, do executive foreign policy initiatives become increasingly covert activities in an attempt to bypass a relentlessly negative press for whatever reason. These are ideas which cannot perhaps be completely answered, but could be possible avenues for future work. Further, it can be argued that some policy-makers are innately more capable in regards to the creation of policy. It is also possible that some are better at manipulating the

press and minimizing damage control in response to negative press in the evaluation stage of an unsuccessful policy.

The dissertation will begin by breaking down the Carter and Reagan Administration's Soviet foreign policy by coding the tone of the media. The effects of the press on public opinion in the evaluation stage and modifications in the initially articulated White House policy throughout all of the stages will be researched. An attempt will be made to refute the overly simplified traditional schools of thought concerning the relationship between the President and the media. It is anticipated that the findings will support the hypothesis in both Administrations in the initial stages of the foreign policy making process.

## CHAPTER II

### METHODOLOGY

The Carter and the Reagan Presidencies were reviewed over both Administrations' first terms. The Congressional Quarterly Almanac along with the Chronicle of the 20th Century were used to identify the major events involving U.S.-Soviet relations during the periods of 1977 through 1980 under the Carter Administration and 1981 through 1984 under the Reagan Administration. Events had to be of a duration of sufficient length that there was time to witness changes in the media, as well as to allow for the Administration to alter policy over the course of the event. Thus, events had to be of at least a six week duration. Although events may extend over a very long time period, analysis was limited to one year. Also, if news coverage dropped off substantially, the analysis was concluded. The event had to appear at least twenty times on the front page of the New York Times.

After the events were identified, the New York Times Index was used. Instead of choosing various articles covering the event from the New York Times Index, as Berry did, all front page articles were copied from the front page

and considered in this study.<sup>1</sup>

Content analysis was then done on these articles. As was pointed out by Berry, the use of the New York Times, ignoring other print and electronic media, is justified by the fact that the Times is widely read by those who deal with foreign affairs and is well indexed.<sup>2</sup> Furthermore, other news media often rely on the Times for their information:

In shaping the agenda, the most prominent print organizations are the most powerful. The New York Times is preeminent for international politics, the Washington Post for domestic politics, and the specialized Wall Street Journal for economic matters. . . .Other media take their cues from these organizations. Even the television networks get most of their stories from these print media.<sup>3</sup>

A simple three-point scale was used to code the Times articles. The reader coded each paragraph by reading the paragraph then considering the following question: "How does this paragraph reflect on the President's policy, support, and overall ability to lead?" Then a numerical value was assigned to each paragraph: -1 for a negative paragraph, 0

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<sup>1</sup>Nicholas O. Berry, Foreign Policy and the Press, (New York: Greenwood Press, 1990). p. xvii.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p.xv.

<sup>3</sup>Susan Welch, John Gruhl, Michael Steinman, and John Comer, American Government, (St. Paul: West Publishing, 1992), p. 237. See also S. Robert Lichter, Stanley Rothman, and Linda S. Lichter, The Media Elite, (Bethesda: Adler and Adere, 1986), p. 11.

for a neutral article, and +1 for a positive paragraph.

Each article coded is listed in the Appendix, along with the total number of paragraphs, and the number of neutral, positive, and negative paragraphs. In addition, quotes from or synopses of the articles are included.

For each article the number of positive as well as negative paragraphs were totaled for each article, and this number was then divided by the entire number of paragraphs found in each article.

For instance, if an entire article was composed of 26 paragraphs with 5 positive paragraphs (+5) and 3 negative paragraphs (-3), the number of positive paragraphs was added to the negative paragraphs in an article  $[(+5) + (-3)]$  and the total was divided by the entire number of paragraphs in the article  $[(+2)/(26)]$  thus deriving a bias score of 0.0769.

These bias scores had a possible range of (-1) to (+1). Note that a large number of neutral paragraphs in relation to biased paragraphs lowers the score, so that one or two biased paragraphs in a long article do not lead to as high a score as would these same biased paragraphs in a short article.

A sample of the articles was sent to a second coder, who applied the same criteria to the articles, with no knowledge of the original coding scores. This is detailed

in the coder reliability section of the Appendix (see Appendix G). The results of this second coding were very similar to the primary article scores, and serve to validate the scores.

The bias scores were then graphed in chronological order according to the date on which the article appeared in the Times. These graphs are included in the figures at the end of each chapter. There are two figures associated with each event. The first is the "Reader Observation Chart" (see Figures 1,3,5,7, and 9). These figures show a graph of the relative bias scores for each article over the course of the event.

Also marked on the graph are the dates on which significant policy statements or changes were noted. These were taken from a qualitative analysis done independent of the bias scoring for the articles, and were not, therefore, concerned with the subjective response of the press to the issues involved. In other words, this qualitative analysis deals only with content, not tone.

The other figure in each chapter is a graph of public opinion data taken from Gallup Polls, based on the question: "Do you approve or disapprove of the way [Reagan or Carter] is handling his job as President?" The greatest difficulties in this measurement stemmed from the obvious generality of the question. Also, rarely did the polls

occur on the days where significant bias score or policy shifts were observed. An attempt to use issue-specific polls would have limited the study also since these were rarely available, and it would have therefore been impossible to compare issue specific polling with much success or credibility. However, where Gallup data existed on the specific event, it was incorporated into the conclusion.

An attempt was made to apply quantitative methods to the data. An analysis of variance was applied, using the computer program SYSTAT<sup>4</sup> This is detailed in Appendix H. Although it was possible to divide the data into statistically separable groupings, it did not add to the study, and was not considered appropriate for evaluation of the hypothesis.

In an effort to further probe the media for positive and negative trends, an analysis of article titles was executed. It was hoped that there would be a correlation of shifts in the titles of articles corresponding to the bias scores as well as the reader observation charts. Their relationship was found to be spurious and therefore was of no value in drawing further conclusions.

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<sup>4</sup>Leland Wilkinson, SYSTAT: The System for Statistics, (Evanston: SYSTAT, 1989), Ver. 4.0.



## CHAPTER III

### THE FAILURE OF THE SALT II TREATY

#### Introduction

Signed by President Carter in May of 1979, the SALT II treaty became a foreign policy catastrophe at home. The signing of the treaty signified the culmination of six years of negotiations. SALT II was an example of a foreign policy which transcended Administrations. In many respects it was an extension of the 1972 SALT I treaty, negotiated under the Nixon Administration, which placed a ceiling of 200 antiballistic missiles on the United States and the Soviet Union.

The summit meeting between President Carter and Soviet leader Brezhnev was the first since late 1974. Theoretically, the treaty signing was a chance to reverse the strained relations of the cold war by limiting medium range weapons and framing an agenda and guideline for future communication between the two super powers. Before the signing even occurred, there were indications that the Carter Presidency would be in for a difficult battle with the press, the Senate, and the American people.

The failure of the Administration's policy had to do not only with the treaty being considered, but it also was

impacted by a variety of world situations which made the Senate, press, and public uneasy. Many events which were out of the Administration's control influenced the treaty's progress. While the President, not the Senate, ratifies treaties, a President must have the consent of two-thirds of the Senate. However, it was through the media that the Senate, rather than the President, was portrayed as being in charge of the direction of the United States' foreign policy. It was this overall weak portrayal of the Administration that ultimately destroyed this particular foreign policy of the Carter Presidency.

Until the invasion of Afghanistan, it would appear that the Carter Administration believed negotiation and open dialogue to be the preferred policy towards the Soviet Union. Detente was a concept which was frequently found in the lexicon of the Administration's rhetoric. It appeared that members of the Carter Administration genuinely wanted arms control and through a general policy of detente, they set out to fulfill their objective.

While pursuing arms control policy, the Administration was also forced to pacify those in the military, as well as the Congress, who believed that the Carter Administration with SALT II was accelerating the decline of the military strength of the United States. As a result, paradoxes and inconsistencies emerged. The MX system was a superb example

of just one of the many compromises which would be made by the Administration in an effort to salvage its foreign policy. The development and deployment of the MX system was a concession made to the hawks before the signing of the treaty occurred. Before the process came to an end, the Administration would finish with a trail of compromises and concessions surrounding the treaty which were ultimately ineffectual in winning support for the policy.

### Policy Response

The manner in which the Administration's foreign policy was reported in the Times followed the pattern expected by the hypothesis. A great deal of the preliminary reporting by the media was merely descriptive. Initially the tone of the articles seemed neutral or in many instances in support of the President. Much of the space devoted to the early reporting in the Times contained background information, a historical context for viewing the situation, the details of the treaty, and what it would mean to the United States in terms of disposal and production of long range missiles.

The treaty-making process was one which transcended Administrations. Upon taking office in 1977, the Carter Administration attempted to alter previous negotiation tactics by endeavoring to negotiate lower ceilings on bombers and missiles. A summit meeting was canceled as a result of the treaty being unfinished.<sup>1</sup> After compromise on both sides, an agreement was reached. The final treaty, signed by the two leaders in May of 1979, was to run until 1985. It was organized around the concept of parity, imposing reductions of missiles and bombers on both sides to 2,400 within six months and 2,250 later. The treaty

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<sup>1</sup>"President Lands in Vienna to Meet With Brezhnev and Sign Arms Pact: Moscow Warily Optimistic," New York Times, 16 June 1979, p. A1.

attempted to limit each side to no new missiles. The agreement was also crafted to include overall improvement in U.S.-Soviet relations, by promoting further arms talks, test ban freezes, and efforts to apply detente to all areas of the globe.<sup>2</sup>

The first problem arising for the Administration occurred ahead of the signing of the treaty in Vienna where the summit had been convened. For more than six years, one of the major obstacles to negotiation had been the issue of the Soviet bomber capable of striking targets in the United States. Opposition was reported not only from military officials in the U.S. but also from NATO. The contention was that the Backfire bomber, as the U.S. military referred to it, should be included in the category of long-range weapons and therefore be limited under the treaty.<sup>3</sup>

Brezhnev issued a letter promising that the production of the Tu-22M Soviet bomber would remain fixed at its current production rate of thirty per year.<sup>4</sup> However, the President signed the treaty and departed for the United States with the issue of the bomber unresolved.

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<sup>2</sup>"U.S. and Soviets Sign Strategic Arms Treaty: Carter Urges Congress To Support Accord Ceremony In Vienna," New York Times, 19 June 1979, p. A1.

<sup>3</sup>"Brezhnev Letter on Soviet Bomber Is Said to Lack Desired Assurances," New York Times, 17 June 1979, p. A1.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid.

Like Nixon in June, 1972, Carter addressed a joint session of Congress within a half hour after returning to the U.S. It was in front of the Congress that he elaborated on the dual nature of U.S. foreign policy being the maintenance of a strong defense and the pursuit of arms control. He stated that the

. . . treaty reduces the danger of nuclear war. .  
. by placing equal limits on each side's nuclear arsenal; it makes future competition safer and more predictable, it slows and even reverses the momentum of the Soviet arms buildup and it allows the United States to concentrate on building up conventional and allied forces. The treaty enhances our ability to monitor Soviet Actions .  
. . and it leads directly to the next step in controlling nuclear weapons.<sup>5</sup>

An article two days later indicated that the Joint Chiefs of Staff supported the treaty. However, this support was predicated on the Carter Administration's promise to develop and deploy the MX missile system.<sup>6</sup> Furthermore, Congressional opposition became more apparent as the Senate Armed Services Committee opened hearings on the case. Members of the Senate suggested that the ratification resolution written by the Senate call for Brezhnev's assurance that production of the Backfire bomber not be increased, and that the U.S.S.R. agree not to use the bomber

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<sup>5</sup>"President, Warning of Arms Race, Sets Theme for Debate on the Pact," New York Times, 19 June 1979, p. A1.

<sup>6</sup>"Joint Chiefs Said to Assure Carter of Support for Treaty with Soviet," New York Times, 20 June 1979, p. A1.

as an intercontinental weapon. That is when the opposition began to escalate in the press.<sup>7</sup> Congress started to question the Administration regarding the advisability of the treaty with respect to many areas of national security.

Perhaps one of the biggest concessions called for was the one first articulated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. While they endorsed the treaty, the support was conditional on increased military expenditures. Increasingly there developed a connection between a raise in military spending as called for by the Joint Chiefs and members of Congress and the prospects for a two-thirds majority consent by the Senate.<sup>8</sup>

Some Senators also argued that although the treaty significantly limited the weight and the number of warheads, the new missiles developed by the Soviets were more accurate and reliable than those included in the treaty.<sup>9</sup> This argument occurred as other Senators cautioned that although the Soviets may have the military advantage in one class of weaponry, that did not automatically give them overall military superiority. Realistically the treaty was

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<sup>7</sup>"Hearings on Arms Treaty Opening as Chances for Reservations Grow," New York Times, 9 July 1979, p. A1.

<sup>8</sup>"Joint Chiefs Support Arms Treaty But Urge Higher Nuclear Spending," New York Times, 12 July 1979, p. A1.

<sup>9</sup>"Some Senators Say an Arms Pact Loophole Aids the Soviets," New York Times, 18 July 1979, p. A1.

concerned with only one part of the country's defense system; however, it was portrayed by the press, as well as the majority of the Senate subcommittee and expert testimony, as the only determinant of military strength.<sup>10</sup>

From the middle of July, the debate moved from one which questioned the treaty to one which demanded increased military spending in return for consent to the treaty. It is at this point that the President appeared increasingly powerless. The Administration's compromises with members of Congress grew. This constant bargaining for the treaty further weakened the overall image of the President.

One of the voices most critical of Carter's treaty was that of former Allied Supreme Commander in Europe Alexander Haig. He cautioned that the Senate should do nothing until the flaws of the treaty could be worked out and future military spending outlined.<sup>11</sup> It became clear that the President was no longer in control of policy and that concessions in the form of policy linkage to military spending would have to be made. The Times began to write as if the treaty and increased military spending were the same inseparable foreign policy package under discussion. In point of fact, there was a built-in connection and

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<sup>10</sup>"Vance and Brown Defend Arms Pact At Senate Hearing," New York Times, 10 July 1979, p. A1.

<sup>11</sup>"Haig Urges Delay on Arms Treaty In Senate Till 'Flaws' Are Resolved," New York Times, 27 July 1979, p. A1.



ultimately the Administration had to recognize it.<sup>12</sup>

The most illuminating section of the piece was a further quote by Vance which stated that

. . . the executive branch had heard a warning given last week by Senator Nunn that he would vote against the treaty unless there was a significant spending increase.<sup>13</sup>

From this point on the debate raged with little or no direction from the White House. The Administration merely reacted to the dispute when it became necessary.

Shortly after this, Henry Kissinger also tied the treaty to an increase in the military budget by suggesting that the President be required to submit an increased military budget to Congress before the Senate's vote on the treaty.<sup>14</sup> This is a case in which it could be argued that the policy outcome did not resemble the original intentions of the Administration, nor could the Carter Administration have foreseen all of the negative repercussions of the treaty as the policy was being formulated.

While the debate continued to rage, the Administration faced another foreign policy situation which greatly affected the treaty. In September 1979, Senator Frank

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<sup>12</sup>"Vance Tells Senate 3% Arms-Funds Rise Remains Essential," New York Times, 31 July 1979, p. A1.

<sup>13</sup>Ibid.

<sup>14</sup>"Kissinger Suggests Senate Link Treaty To More Arms Funds," New York Times, 1 August 1979, p. A1.

Church's office announced that there was evidence of Soviet combat troops in Cuba. While the events unfolded over the following days, the existence of these troops was used by opponents in the Senate to question again the passage of SALT II. Those against the treaty blamed inferior American intelligence and cutbacks in surveillance for the Cuban crisis.<sup>15</sup>

International events outside of the President's control impacted the image as well as the policy options of the Administration. The media conveyed the growing perception that Carter was soft on foreign policy and was somehow giving the Russians a military advantage by entering into the treaty and choosing the policy he did in Cuba. Increasingly the treaty's passage was tied to events in Cuba and military spending. It became clear in this case that foreign policy does not take place in a vacuum and that the interplay of foreign events as well as domestic influences does exert control on presidential options.

In an attempt to appear tough on foreign policy, the President reiterated his commitment towards the development and deployment of the MX system. He claimed that the MX would be the " . . . last missile system of enormous

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<sup>15</sup>"Vance Tells Soviet Its Troops In Cuba Could Imperil Ties: Threat To Arms Pact," New York Times, 6 September 1979, p. A1.

destructive power that we will ever have to build."<sup>16</sup> The MX policy was insufficient to convince the Congress, media and public to support the SALT II treaty.

The newspaper down-played backing for the treaty: in fact the articles were written in such a way as to undermine even minimal support. In an effort to reverse the "confidence crisis" and adopt a tougher image, Carter accepted an increase in the military budget by the end of November.<sup>17</sup> There were also reports in the Times that the Administration negotiated privately with Sam Nunn and Henry Kissinger to change arms spending so the Senate would vote for the Administration's treaty.

The ultimate factor which was in part responsible for the failure of SALT II was the hostage situation in Iran. While the Administration was a victim of circumstance, this event, combined with the issue of Soviet troops in Cuba, produced a political and public environment which adversely impacted the treaty. Articles on the progression of the treaty were sprinkled with allusions to Iran. The events in Iran spilled over into the articles on the treaty and thus, like the Cuban disaster, produced a context and a framework

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<sup>16</sup>"President Chooses Mobile Missile Plan: To Elude Soviet Attack, 200 MX's Would Be Put In Western U.S.," New York Times, 9 September 1979, p. A1.

<sup>17</sup>"Carter Accepting Substantial Rise In Arms Budget," New York Times, 29 November 1979, p. A1.

which conveyed an image of presidential weakness. The Senate ultimately asked the President to delay the debate until after the presidential election.<sup>18</sup> The reasoning was that failure to approve the treaty in the Senate would weaken the President in the eyes of world leaders and hamper his ability to conduct foreign policy abroad. Furthermore, the Senate continued to express strong concern about the erosion of U.S. military strength and provisions of the treaty.<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>18</sup>"19 Senators Ask Carter for Delay On Arms Treaty: Letter Said to Recommend Bolstering of U.S. Forces," New York Times, 17 December 1979, p. A1.

<sup>19</sup>Ibid.

## Analysis

The Carter Administration carefully planned the management of the anticipated criticism of the SALT II treaty well before it was an issue. The Administration's response was so carefully planned that Gerald Rafshoon, the White House communications director wrote:

Each morning this office will review the news summary, the network summary, the Post, the Times, the Wall Street Journal, and the Star, (and the magazines weekly) for stories of major criticism. For each criticism requiring a response we will identify the most appropriate responder. We will then call the staff contact (someone who has a continuing relationship with the responder) and ask them to request the response. We may or may not suggest the general line of the response depending upon the circumstance.<sup>20</sup>

Even with careful management on the part of the executive, the role of the Senate continued to present a challenge. Although only the President can ratify a treaty, the Senate must give its consent and it was this withholding of approval which allowed the Congress to control the SALT II debate. Pressure from the Senate, along with its demands for increased military spending, led the President to make domestic concessions to gain approval for his foreign policy. Soon increased military spending and the future of SALT II merged into one indistinguishable policy.

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<sup>20</sup>"Rafshoon Gathers List of Carter Advocates," New York Times, 3 May 1979, p. A20.

Furthermore, Soviet troops in Afghanistan and the hostage crisis in Iran combined to demonstrate that in some instances international events and crises, while unrelated, have the potential to significantly limit and compromise the foreign policy choices of a President.

The Carter Administration's SALT II agreement was never officially approved by Congress. However, admittedly the unratified treaty was followed by both the U.S. and U.S.S.R. for years afterward. For the purposes of this study the numerous negative reactions from the media and public, along with Congress's refusal to ratify this agreement, were reported by the media to be a foreign policy failure for the Carter Administration.

There is evidence from the memoirs of the President to suggest that the President himself knew that getting the Senate to ratify the SALT II treaty would be every bit as difficult as the actual treaty negotiations with the Soviets had been. On April 25, just short of a month before the signing of the treaty was to take place in Vienna, the President addressed the American Newspaper Publishers Convention in New York. He launched his offensive well before the real attacks began.<sup>21</sup>

Regardless of the President's efforts, this event

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<sup>21</sup>Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President, (New York: Bantam Books, 1982) pp. 239-240.

turned into a continual bargaining process between the President and Congress. The successful passage of the SALT II Treaty became closely linked to increases in the defense budget. The Times reports that

In what appeared to be an effort to insure more support for the strategic arms treaty, Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance said today that it was 'essential' to uphold a commitment to the atlantic alliance to increase military spending by 3 percent annually.<sup>22</sup>

The article continues,

The Executive branch had heard a warning given last week by Senator Nunn that he would vote against the treaty unless there was a significant spending increase.<sup>23</sup>

Perhaps one of the best titles in the Times which captured the predicament of the President was one which appeared shortly after the above article on August 3, 1979. "3 Senators Demand Pledge From Carter on Arms-Fund Rise: Nunn, Jackson and Tower Call Pact Flawed Without Such Vow-- Kissinger Repeats Stand." If Carter had been able to transcend the Congressional opposition in this event and successfully implement the treaty, then his compromise with Congress would have most likely made him a "master" statesman in the media. However, since he was led by Congress and was unable to achieve the Administration's

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<sup>22</sup>"Vance Tells Senate 3% Arms-Funds Rise Remains 'Essential'," New York Times, July 31, 1979, p. A1.

<sup>23</sup>Ibid.

desired end, the policy suffered from an overall very negative tone in the media.

Congress played a very significant role in this event. Not only did the Congress question the policy itself, through committee hearings, calls for budget increases, discord over the events in Cuba, an uneasiness over the Russian backfire bomber, and lastly Iran; the Congress also linked and tied many policies and conditions to the initial treaty. The treaty became dependent on a multiplicity of interests, and expanded into new areas of policy as a result of increasing Congressional demands. This policy was an easy target for Congress. They could grasp the issue, as could the public, and very visibly and easily give the appearance of doing something. Furthermore, the interests of the Defense department mushroomed into a discussion for increased military funds. Even before the budget had been increased, military personnel disagreed as to how extra funds would be allocated. This is reflected in a Times article covering the SALT II agreement describing how the not-yet-decided-upon eventual military budget should be spent.<sup>24</sup>

There were also other international foreign policy issues occurring outside of the Soviet Union which impacted

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<sup>24</sup>"President Weighing Five-Year Increase in Military Outlays: Orders a Review Of Budget," New York Times, 10 August 1979, p. A1.



the treaty. Iran is an example of an event which appeared to have nothing to do with SALT II, but became linked to the treaty. The mention of the Americans being held hostage in Iran surfaced at times very awkwardly and seemingly out of context in the press articles covering the treaty process. Eventually it was the crisis in Iran which allowed the President to give in to Congress by linking his proposed 4.5% increase in defense spending to the need for a strong nation. However, in that same article the Times finds the action to be extremely transparent stating:

President Carter, apparently in an effort to build broader Senate support for the treaty to limit strategic arms, today proposed a five-year increase in the military budget of 4.5 percent a year.<sup>25</sup>

The events in Cuba also produced an effect on the fate of the SALT II Treaty. There was even speculation that as a result of inadequate defense funds, the United States was unable to detect the Soviet combat forces in Cuba. The Times writes:

The adequacy of American intelligence concerning Cuba was questioned today by Senator Howard Baker the minority leader, after testimony on the subject by Mr. Vance. He said the United States was paying the price of "reduced surveillance" and trimming back of the CIA by the Carter

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<sup>25</sup>"President Calls for 4.5% Increase in Military Budgets for Five Years," New York Times, 13 December 1979, p. A1.

administration.<sup>26</sup>

The underlying reason for this continual undermining of the President's foreign policy towards the Soviet Union stemmed from a basic lack of overall confidence in the Administration's ability to appear tough towards the Russians. The coding process detected a recurring uneasiness from the press in response to Carter's SALT II policy coming mostly in the form of reporting the Congressional opposition which was increasingly prevalent. It also is an indication that the public was uncomfortable with what was going on with Carter's policies. Overall the Times created an impression, at least for the reader, that the only support for the Treaty was from within the limited walls of the White House.

Congress remained unconvinced as to the advisability of the treaty as well as Carter's overall leadership ability in the foreign policy realm.<sup>27</sup> Congress seemed to be a fair reflection, at times, of the public's opinion. The use of Congress as an indicator of public opinion, along with other measures, is suitable since the Congress, in many instances,

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<sup>26</sup>"Vance Tells Soviet Its Troops In Cuba Could Imperil Ties: Threat To Arms Pact-- Church Sees No Likelihood of Its Passage if Force Remains on Island," New York Times, 6 September 1979, p. A1.

<sup>27</sup>"19 Senators Ask Carter for Delay On Arms Treaty: Letter Said to Recommend Bolstering of U.S. Forces," New York Times, 17 December 1979, p. A1.

tends to mirror constituent interests on important, highly visible issues.<sup>28</sup> This being the case, analysis of Congressional responses and opinions in reaction to White House policy is an excellent way to reveal, in part, the attitude of the public.

Just as the hypothesis had anticipated, the overall tone of the media initially was in support of the President. This positive period lasted from June 15, 1979 to July 18, 1979. Eleven articles appeared before the overall tone of the media became negative. Of the eleven articles, only three were negative in tone. The tone of the other eight were either positive or neutral. During this period, the Times acted as Berry had predicted. The press had gathered and reported the information as it occurred with very little criticism or reports of opposition. By the twelfth article dated July 12, 1979, a call for increased military spending is initiated by the President's own Joint Chiefs of Staff. Interestingly, this is also the beginning of an increase in a negative tone in press coverage.

The article with the most negative tone followed on July 18, 1979. This article dealt with the opinion of some Senators who believed that loopholes in the treaty actually aided the Soviets. They argued that the Soviet Union had

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<sup>28</sup>Woodrow Jones and K. Robert Keiser, "Issue Visibility and the Effects of PAC Money," Social Science Quarterly 68 (March 1987): 170-76.

five intercontinental missiles already under development which would not be affected by the treaty and could be deployed. Although the new systems would have to conform to size and weight specified under the treaty, this new generation of missiles was believed to be more reliable, accurate and easier for the Soviets to maintain.<sup>29</sup> It was the fear of Russian superiority which formed the foundation of thought in the minds of all of those opposing the treaty. It was from this fear that calls for defense increases emerged.

Starting July 18, 1979, the reader observation chart shows an overall negative direction in media tone. Over the next five months front page articles covering the event became less frequent and the overall negative tone in the press became increasingly prominent. Also the Carter Administration was forced to make increasing concessions to those who opposed the treaty. Eventually, not only was a 5% budget increase approved, the President embarked upon the MX missile system in an effort to display to the Congress, public and media a tougher image, all in the quest for the ratification of the SALT II Treaty.

When the reader observation chart is analyzed, it is evident that the bulk of policy initiatives and changes

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<sup>29</sup>"Some Senators Say an Arms Pact Loophole Aids the Soviets," New York Times, 18 July 1979, p. A1.

occured after September 9, 1979. As the media's tone was becoming increasingly negative, the activity from the White House was also increasing. It can be speculated that as criticism in the press increased, the Administration responded to the pressure with a public response in the form of an increase in policy and policy changes. In fact, of the six changes observed by the coder, five of them occurred at the time when the media's tone was overall very negative. Twenty-three of the thirty-five articles occurred at this time. By far the most remarkable and unexpected observation of this negative period was the fact that only two of the articles had a positive tone. The first occurred on September 9, 1979 when a front page article of the Times reports, "President Chooses Mobile Missile Plan To Elude Soviet Attack: 200 MX's Would Be Put In Western U.S." The second positive article occurs on October 7, 1979 with an article titled "President and Pontiff Issue a Plea at White House for World Peace: After Meeting Privately With Carter, John Paul Calls For Arms Limitations-- Big Mass In Mall Today."

The President spoke directly on only two occasions over the course of this event. The first time occurred on June 19, 1979 when the President went before the House. The speech had an overall theme of the dual nature of U.S. foreign policy--"to seek arms control accords and to

maintain a strong defense, so strong, he said, that no potential adversary could be tempted to attack us."<sup>30</sup> The second time the President spoke directly on the issue occurred with the announcement of the MX system.<sup>31</sup> This was a surprising finding since the study anticipated that Carter would be far more accessible to the press in an effort to bolster his failing image as the United States foreign policy leader.

Going into this event, the public approval ratings of the President on May 31, 1979 recorded approximately 38% overall approval of the Carter Administration. On June 10, 1979, approval ratings had declined by almost eight points. While both of these polls admittedly occur shortly before the event, it is significant to note that a downward trend was well underway just prior to the incident.

By June 21, 1979, only a week after the reader identified the initial front page article, the Gallup polls continued to decline to a low of approximately 27% overall approval of the Carter Administration's performance. This level did not change a week later when measured. The Gallup polls then reveal an upward trend in public opinion.

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<sup>30</sup>"President, Warning of Arms Race, Sets Theme for Debate on the Pact." New York Times, 19 June 1979, p. A1.

<sup>31</sup>"President Chooses Mobile Missile Plan To Elude Soviet Attack: 200 MX's Would Be Put In Western U.S.," New York Times, 9 September 1979, p. A1.

Although there was one drop in the polls which occurred on November 15, 1979, the overall movement of the polls shifted in an upward direction.

This is significant since it could suggest that the public was not influenced by the media's negative coverage of the SALT II event. The difference between the media and the public was not a result of the public not being informed. When polled the end of June, 82% answered yes when ask if they had read about SALT II.<sup>32</sup>

Interestingly as the overall tone of the media continued to decline into December, the Gallup Polls displayed a substantial increase to almost 40% in approval ratings on December 6, 1979 when the last poll for this event was sampled. Perhaps the public possessed the capacity to independently evaluate the Presidency apart from the overall tone of the media in this instance. However, it is more likely that other foreign policy events, such as those in Iran, had monopolized attention as well as gained some approval from the public.

The SALT II treaty was also unique in that it transcended Administrations due to the fact that it took six years to negotiate. Also, public discussion had been raging two years previous to the President's endorsement of the

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<sup>32</sup>George H. Gallup, The Gallop Poll: Public Opinion 1979, (Wilmington: Scholarly Resources, 1982), p. 195.

treaty. Many in the Congress, public and media had obviously formed ideas and opinions in anticipation of the signing of the treaty. This process is not accounted for by Berry since he argues that part of the reason a President has more power in the instance of foreign policy making is because unlike domestic politics, there is no conflict and controversy surrounding the beginning of an event.<sup>33</sup>

Once again in this event, the historical past is used in the beginning of the process in an attempt to equate it with what has gone before. This summit between Carter and Brezhnev was contrasted to the sharp dialogue between John F. Kennedy and Nikita S. Khurshchev in 1961.<sup>34</sup> There was also the link with President Nixon and the first strategic arms limitation agreement of 1972.<sup>35</sup> Even Carter's speech before the House was likened, in the Times, to that of President Nixon when he addressed a joint session of the House less than a half-hour following a return from his initial meeting with Soviet leader Brezhnev.<sup>36</sup>

It is out of the scope of this work to determine

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<sup>33</sup>Nicholas O. Berry, Foreign Policy and the Press, (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1990), p. 147.

<sup>34</sup>"Brezhnev and Carter Begin Vienna Parley in Friendly Discord," New York Times, 17 June 1979, p. A1.

<sup>35</sup>"President, Warning of Arms Race, Sets Theme for Debate on the Pact," p. A1.

<sup>36</sup>Ibid,



whether "successful" policy, or presidential policy which ultimately remains intact, is intrinsically less subject to Congressional opposition, or whether the success of a policy rests on the ability of the statesman to make the necessary concessions to advance his policy agenda. On the issue of defense spending Ralph G. Smith writes:

. . . congressional defense spending shows a consistent sensitivity to the security concerns in the international environment. When the administration seems to respond correctly to such stimuli, Congress follows its lead; yet Congress will balk when the administration seems to have read the international situation incorrectly.<sup>37</sup>

It could be argued that when too many concessions and compromises are made by a President the policy which emerges does not represent the original intentions of an Administration. Conversely, if presidential success in respect to policy-making is evaluated in terms of a leader's ability to persuade and compromise, then again the SALT II policy clearly failed. Carter eventually endured a 5% defense increase, as well as untold criticism, and ultimately a refusal of the Senate to entertain even a vote on the treaty. When the Carter Presidency is evaluated in this event, both his ability to persuade as well as to craft a policy that could ultimately be implemented with the aid of compromise was poor.

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<sup>37</sup>Ralph A. Smith, The President, the Congress and the Making of Foreign Policy, (New York: University of Oklahoma Press, 1994), p. 178.

John Anthony Maltese later wrote:

In the end, the efforts were for naught. Any hopes that the SALT II treaty would be ratified were dashed when Soviet troops invaded Afghanistan on 27 December 1979. The treaty never went to a Senate vote, but both the United States and the Soviet Union continued unofficially to honor the terms of the treaty. Once again, events had intervened to prevent Carter from achieving victory. He later wrote that the failure to ratify the SALT II treaty "was the most profound disappointment" of his presidency."<sup>38</sup>

Without a doubt, the Carter Administration's fight for the ratification of SALT II was one of the very most difficult for this Presidency. Carter himself later wrote:

The lobbying campaign we mounted throughout the nation during the next few months made the Panama Canal treaty's effort pale in relative insignificance. Thousands of speeches, news interviews, and private briefings were held. The personal and political interests of each senator were analyzed as we assessed the prospects of the ultimate vote for SALT II. It was obvious that we faced formidable opposition.<sup>39</sup>

In fact the opposition was so formidable that the Administration was unable to ultimately overcome defeat.

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<sup>38</sup>John Anthony Maltese, Spin Control, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1994) p. 175.

<sup>39</sup>Carter, p. 262.

## Reader Observation Chart

### THE FAILURE OF THE SALT II TREATY




Figure 1--Reader Observation Chart

Dates on which the reader observed policy changes:

June 15, 1979	Start of observation period.
June 19, 1979	President stresses dual nature of arms policy.
July 31, 1979	Administration calls for 3% increase in arms funding.
September 9, 1979	Announcement of mobile missile deployment plan.
September 19, 1979	A military budget is approved by the Senate with an increase greater than had been requested by the President.
November 29, 1979	President Carter accepts the Senate's increase in military spending.
December 13, 1979	Administration calls for a 4.5% military increase, which is linked to events in Iran.
December 17, 1979	End of observation period.


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## Gallup Poll Data

### THE FAILURE OF THE SALT II TREATY



**Figure 2--Gallup Poll Data**

Gallup poll data, based on question: Do you approve or disapprove of the way Carter is handling his job as President?<sup>40</sup>

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<sup>40</sup>Gallup, p. 180-195.

**CHAPTER IV**  
**THE CUBAN BRIGADE**

**Introduction**

The events surrounding the discovery of a Soviet combat brigade in Cuba appear to have caught the Carter Administration off guard. This is an instance in which inaction became the policy of the Carter Administration, while the Congress as well as the press attempted to advance policies of their own. It would appear that the Administration's tactic of "leaking" possible policy initiatives, in what is assumed to be an effort to sample congressional as well as public and media reactions, gave the appearance of a President who was unable to respond with a solid foreign policy initiative.

Of the five events included in this study, this event was surrounded with the most overall negative tone in the media. Even the discovery of the "crisis" itself was initially overstated and poorly defined by the Administration. In the press, there was the sense that not only was there a lack of agreement between the state department and various other agencies in the executive branch as to how the United States should respond, but also that the White House inaccurately appraised the situation at

the very outset of events. The Carter Administration overreacted in its assessment of the severity of the problem and was ultimately forced to retract much of its earlier public comments in the media.

The events in Cuba cannot be separated from the domestic climate which continued to be filled with news on the dispute over the SALT II agreement. The approval of the treaty constantly appeared in articles devoted to the events in Cuba. The Congress began to use the Russian presence in Cuba as proof that since the Soviets had intervened in the United States' sphere of influence, it was not in the best interest of the United States to agree to the SALT II treaty.<sup>1</sup> Some of those opponents in the Senate who were most critical were senators of the President's own party. For example, Senator Frank Church of Idaho, who was already faced with a tough reelection campaign, was quick to side against the President as the Administration continued its silence and was portrayed as "soft" towards the Soviet Union.<sup>2</sup>

Reports concerning the existence of a Soviet brigade in Cuba began to circulate in early July of 1979. In Washington there were rumors that the State Department had

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<sup>1</sup>"Vance Tells Soviet Its Troops In Cuba Could Imperil Ties: Threat to Arms Pact," New York Times, 6 September 1979, p. A1.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid.

identified a headquarters for a Soviet combat brigade. Senator Richard Stone, a Democrat from Florida, began to ask for further details. By the end of July, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance had sent a letter to Stone restating that the United States, in an earlier commitment made by President Carter, would prevent the Soviets from establishing a military base in the hemisphere. Vance added that at the time there was no reason to suspect a Soviet military presence in Cuba. However, the Senator was promised that U.S. surveillance of the area would be intensified.<sup>3</sup>

On August 17 the Administration believed it had pictures to prove the existence of a combat brigade conducting maneuvers with armored components, artillery, and infantry. On August 27, 1979, intelligence officials confirmed the existence of such a unit and the information was leaked to the press. Upon learning that the information was about to be made public, the State Department informed the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The leader of the Committee, Senator Frank Church, was notified on August 30 and immediately went public with the information.<sup>4</sup>

The event, while comparatively shorter than the other incidents contained in this study, is significant and worth

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<sup>3</sup>"Carter Plans Latin Command and Steps Up Watch On Cuba: Opposes 'Return To Cold War'," New York Times, 2 October 1979, p. A1.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid.



consideration because of the immense front page coverage it generated. Although the "crisis" spanned only six weeks, the story occupied the front pages constantly. In fact, it would be impossible to fully comprehend the overall state of U.S.-Soviet relations at this time without consideration of the impact that this event played on the broader atmosphere and context of superpower relations.

### Policy Response

At the time Soviet military personnel were discovered in Cuba, the Carter Administration was experiencing a generally low confidence level, from the public and the Congress, in regards to the White House's overall ability to conduct foreign policy. U.S.-Soviet relations were being impacted by attempts on the part of the Senate Armed Services Committee to challenge the SALT II agreement. The treaty was awaiting introduction to the floor from the Committee. The treaty, which had been signed in May, was under sharp attack from not only the Republicans, but also from the Democrats in the House and Senate. The Carter Administration had received conditional support for the treaty from the Joint Chiefs of Staff with a subsequent call for an increased military budget.<sup>5</sup>

It was during this period that the Senate Armed Services Committee was hearing testimony on the advisability of the treaty that events in Cuba came to light. Alexander Haig, at that time freshly retired as U.N. General of Special Forces, and other experts, including Henry Kissinger, all appeared to regard the treaty with a certain amount of skepticism and reservation as they offered opinion

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<sup>5</sup>"Joint Chiefs Support Arms Treaty But Urge Higher Nuclear Spending," New York Times, 12 July 1979, p. A1.

to the committee.<sup>6</sup> The media seemed guardedly optimistic about the chances for the passage of the treaty. Mostly, the media seemed full of warnings arguing the inevitability of the United States falling drastically behind in the arms race if the Carter Administration did not act to raise the military budget substantially.

The Carter Administration was battling not only for the passage of the treaty but also struggling with the overall lack of public and Congressional confidence in its ability to conduct foreign policy. In an effort to display a tougher line on defense and military spending, the White House did two things. First, they pushed the development and deployment of the MX missile system. Second, they proposed a 3% increase in the military budget over five years. Then, during the hearings on the SALT II treaty in the Foreign Relations Committee, news broke on the Soviet combat troops in Cuba.

In the case of Cuba, the first few articles containing a positive or neutral tone were soon replaced with a plummeting downward trend. Before the news of Cuba broke, public opinion was low. When questioned about the overall job performance of the President, only 33% of the public felt that the President was doing a good job handling the

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<sup>6</sup>"Kissinger Suggests Senate Link Treaty To More Arms Funds," New York Times, 1 August 1979, p. A1.

office of President (see Figure 4). Low public opinion combined with wavering Congressional support of the White House added to the already negative foundation for any foreign policy.

Cuba is unique in this study because, in this case, a foreign policy event occurred and the United States did next to nothing to react. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance stated only that the status quo was unacceptable.<sup>7</sup> To identify the Administration's initial policy was impossible since there was no policy. The best that could be done was to analyze the Administration's public response to the Soviet troops in order to trace the progression of events and mark where changes in the press occurred. A clear policy, which could be coherently discussed by the Carter Administration and reflected in the press, did not emerge until the final stages of front page coverage of events by the press.

From the beginning of the events in Cuba, the Administration was not in control of presenting the situation to the public and the press. The Carter Administration did not go before the American people in a display of leadership and authority in response to the situation and present it in a manner which would perhaps result in a confident media and public rally-round-the-flag

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<sup>7</sup>"Vance Tells Soviet Its Troops In Cuba Could Imperil Ties," p. A1.

response. Instead Senator Frank Church, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, was responsible for breaking the news of the presence of 2,000 to 3,000 combat forces in Cuba to the press.<sup>8</sup>

In the absence of White House reactions and policy, the Times seemed to focus on the vocal members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee who immediately linked the passage of the SALT II treaty to a complete withdrawal of the Soviet troops. The Times writes:

Because many senators were insisting that only outright withdrawal of the brigade would satisfy them, President Carter's freedom of action to seek a milder compromise with Soviet leaders may be seriously restricted.<sup>9</sup>

Even the Secretary of State conceded that as long as the Soviet troops remained in Cuba, the Senate would not approve the treaty.<sup>10</sup>

As is the case with the other events in this study, the Times contrasted this event with the crisis of 1962 between Kennedy and Soviet Prime Minister Nikita S. Khrushchev. The Times reported that with the Kennedy Administration, the

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<sup>8</sup>"Carter Plans Latin Command And Steps Up Watch On Cuba," p. A1.

<sup>9</sup>"Some Liberals Balk at Pact Till Soviet Pulls Out Cuba Unit: Mood Hardens In the Senate--Key Members of Committee Doubt Arms Treaty Will Go to Floor Unless Moscow Yields," New York Times, 7 September 1979, p. A1.

<sup>10</sup>"Vance Tells Soviet Its Troops In Cuba Would Imperil Ties," p. A1.

Soviets were forced to withdraw all medium range missiles and bombers, and now the current Presidency appeared to want to broaden the agreement to include all ground forces with offensive capabilities.<sup>11</sup> As was observed in other events contained in this study, as the initial stages of the event were being reported there was a need to link what was currently happening to what had happened in the past. It was one way in which the media presented the public with a perspective.

This historical linkage to the Cuban missile crisis further fueled the overall negative responses from Congress, the public and the media. It becomes clear that the reaction to the Soviet combat brigade was so severe by the Senate that the President was left with limited options in dealing with the crisis. The President was not free to conduct foreign policy in any way short of achieving troop withdrawal if he wanted to keep even a small chance for the passage of the SALT II treaty alive. It became increasingly evident that the President and the Congress were not united on the appropriate response to events, and that since a one-third minority of senators could defeat the treaty, nothing less than complete withdrawal of the brigade would be

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<sup>11</sup>Ibid.

satisfactory.<sup>12</sup> The Senate Foreign Relations Committee also decided that the SALT II treaty could not be considered by the 15 members until the outcome of the troops controversy was addressed.

The Carter Administration received a tremendous amount of negative press for inactivity. The Senate wanted the White House to act immediately but instead the President did not respond with a policy. The President did not demand total troop withdrawal, as the Senate demanded; instead, negotiations began. Furthermore, the President cautioned that the treaty should be judged on its own merits regardless of the situation in Cuba.<sup>13</sup> When questioned about the issue of a division between the passage of the treaty and the Cuban events in the minds of the public and Congress, Carter replied:

I'm convinced that SALT II ought to be passed on its own merits. I'm convinced that SALT II contributes to the security of our country, and I'm convinced that SALT II enhances the prospect for world peace.<sup>14</sup>

The United States continued to study the role of the

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<sup>12</sup>"Some Liberals Balk at Pact Till Soviet Pulls Out Cuba Unit," p. A1.

<sup>13</sup>"Crisis in Cuba-- Political Issue: Response by President Involves Him Directly," New York Times, 9 September 1979, p. A1.

<sup>14</sup>"President Opposes Tying Cuba Dispute to Arms Pact Vote: Takes Issue With Senators," New York Times, 9 September 1979, p. A1.

Cuban forces. Still there was no clear policy almost two weeks after Church's announcement. The support for the President was a problem not only in the Senate, but also in the State Department. In response to the growing controversy surrounding the event, Carter warned the Soviet Union that if the interests of the United States were not respected, the concerns and sensibilities of Moscow could not be guaranteed with regard to U.S. relations with China.<sup>15</sup>

A tilt towards China had long been advocated by White House aides although it was resisted by the State Department.<sup>16</sup> As the events progressed, there were conflicts between the State Department and the Administration over how to approach the situation. This is apparent in subsequent articles as the Times reported that Brzezinski viewed the incident as a breakdown of U.S.-Soviet relations. The State Department, however, tended to view the actions of the Soviet Union within a broader context, and therefore was more inclined to support a more moderate response in view of the fact that the troops posed no real

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<sup>15</sup>"Soviet Says Troops Are To Advise Cuba: Denies Combat Role," New York Times, 11 September 1979, p. A1.

<sup>16</sup>Ibid.



threat to U.S. security.<sup>17</sup>

The indecisiveness of the Administration opened the door for various policy directives from many sources. A good example of the pressure exerted on the Administration in the policy vacuum is the example of Senator Henry M. Jackson, a leading opponent of the SALT II treaty, who called for a complete withdrawal of the combat brigade in Cuba along with the removal of aircraft and submarines provided to Havana by the Soviets. He warned that if the Soviet Union did not withdraw the troops, the prospects for the SALT II accord would be over.<sup>18</sup>

Even the choice of articles found together on the front page at times conveyed an image of a President weak on foreign policy and military spending while others in government issued demands for action. For example, on the same front page, the Times reported on September 12, 1979 "Jackson Insists Soviets Withdraw Planes in Cuba: Otherwise, He Says, Arms Treaty will be Defeated," as well as the following title: "Carter Rejects Rise of 5% for Military-- Asks Increase of 3%: Inflation Called Big Factor Also, Administration Hopes Figure Will Persuade Opponents to Vote

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<sup>17</sup>"Brzezinski Cautions Soviet on Cuba Unit: He Says Brigade Reflects 'Pattern of Disregard' of U.S. Interests," New York Times, 25 September 1979, p. A1.

<sup>18</sup>"Jackson Insists Soviet Withdraw Planes in Cuba: Otherwise, He Says, Arms Treaty Will Be Defeated," New York Times, 12 September 1979, p. A1.

for the Arms Treaty." As the analysis of this event unfolded in the Times, one could observe that an article could be combined with other articles on the front page to convey a definite, and in this case, negative, overall picture.

A change of semantics became a way for the White House to modify the initial assessment of the Soviet threat in Cuba. In light of Moscow's denial that forces in Cuba were combat in nature, the Administration was reported to be studying and rethinking their prior analysis of the situation.<sup>19</sup>

The press reported that it was possible that Carter would change "combat" to "training" troops since there was growing evidence from the State Department that the primary mission of the Soviet troops was to train Cuban forces for action in Africa. This confusion immediately created a public, as well as a congressional, crisis of opinion over the Administration's inability to conduct foreign policy. The Times concludes that the change in terminology could lead to a problem in the Senate, and that the initial characterization of the Soviet troops as a combat unit, " . . . may have created for itself a semantic as well as a

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<sup>19</sup>"U.S. Weighing View that Soviet Force is Training Cubans: Shift From 'Combat' Theory," New York Times, 13 September 1979, p. A1.

political problem."<sup>20</sup>

Following the discovery that the Administration was rethinking the crisis the subsequent article, appearing on September 14, 1979, raised serious doubts about the Administration's ability to grasp and conduct foreign policy in general.<sup>21</sup> Eventually the question was not whether the mismanagement of the Cuban events would damage the President's image; rather, the question was whether the Administration had the ability to insure that the damage could be contained.<sup>22</sup> After September 14, the Soviet forces in Cuba were referred to as a Soviet brigade instead of a combat unit. The change in semantics drastically altered the U.S. response. Instead of a policy geared towards Soviet combat units in Cuba, the Administration was left to redefine the purpose of the brigade publicly, as well as to craft a foreign policy response.

Through the process of reexamination of the mission of the troops, the Administration created a tremendous amount of confusion in the press. Many senators were calling for immediate withdrawal of Soviet troops and weaponry, while others criticized the President for identifying the forces

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<sup>20</sup>Ibid.

<sup>21</sup>"In a Diplomatic Corner: Handling of Issue of Soviet Force in Cuba Raises Doubt About the Administration's Grip on Policy," New York Times, 14 September 1979, p. A1.

<sup>22</sup>Ibid.

as aggressive and thus creating alarm.<sup>23</sup>

The Administration suffered criticism from many directions. The press was very disapproving and the coverage continued to focus on the lack of solidarity between the Administration and the State Department as well as the divisions which continued to widen between members of the Senate over the President's handling of the issue. In response to the escalating domestic criticism over the mismanaged foreign policy, the President organized a panel of nine to advise the Administration of possible policy options.<sup>24</sup> Furthermore, negotiations for a solution broke down, Cyrus Vance and Andrei Gromyko reached an impasse, and Gromyko returned to the U.S.S.R. Even Castro was given front page space, as he claimed:

What you call a brigade we call a training center. . . . This facility was known and is known to all the different presidents of the United States and was known by the C.I.A.<sup>25</sup>

Through Gromyko, the Soviet Union stated that the troops in Cuba would never be used for combat nor would they have combat capability. On October 1, 1979, the Times reported that Secretary of State Vance was attempting to get

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<sup>23</sup>Ibid.

<sup>24</sup>"Carter Names a Panel On Soviet Cuba Force," New York Times, 27 September 1979, p. A1.

<sup>25</sup>"Castro Assails U.S. Over Troop Furor: Calls Carter Dishonest, Says Unit Has Been in Cuba 17 Years," New York Times, 27 September 1979, p. A1.

assurances that the Russians would comply with the Monroe doctrine. This assurance did little to persuade the Congress as well as the media. Ultimately the U.S. executed policy based on the assumption that the forces in Cuba were for training instead of combat. In doing this the Administration hoped to calm the alarm as well as moderate the demands for strong policy towards Cuba, emanating from members of Congress.<sup>26</sup>

The largest reversal in policy came when Carter decided to leave the status quo in place. The Times responds with the criticism:

Last month the President said the status quo of the Soviet troops in Cuba is unacceptable. In today's speech, and in briefings by officials, it became clear that the troops will remain in Cuba, with Moscow insisting they run a "training center" and nothing more.<sup>27</sup>

The Carter Administration appeared incompetent and scurried to carry out some policy in response to the "threat" which they had concluded was no longer a "threat". In a speech given to the nation, the President proposed steps to be taken against the Soviets, since assurances on the part of the Russians were not adequate to guarantee that troops would not be converted for combat readiness.

The actions of the White House were contradictory and

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<sup>26</sup>"Carter Plans Latin Command and Steps Up Watch on Cuba," p. A1.

<sup>27</sup>Ibid.

muddled. In one instance the Administration conceded the troops were not combat troops and in the next instance, the Administration felt the need to respond to the Soviet presence in retaliation for the potential threat they posed. The Administration appeared powerless when it failed to negotiate a guarantee that the troops would not pose a threat.<sup>28</sup>

Ultimately the White House responded with minor actions in an effort to display some semblance of leadership. Steps taken included:

- 1) A call for an increase in surveillance of Cuba.
- 2) A promise that the United States as well as other nations in the Western Hemisphere would not be threatened.
- 3) The establishment of a new Joint Task Force Headquarters at Key West Florida.
- 4) An increase in maneuvers in the Caribbean and the maintenance of Guantanamo Bay as a U.S. base.
- 5) United States assistance to poor Caribbean countries in an effort to resist possible communist domination and internal social turmoil.
- 6) The President underscored the establishment of a Rapid Deployment Force with the capabilities to send forces into critical areas quickly.
- 7) An increased naval presence in the Indian Ocean, although it was done before the dispute.<sup>29</sup>

The original text of the speech outlining U.S. policy included an accusation that there was substantial evidence to conclude that the unit was a combat unit. According to

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<sup>28</sup>Ibid.

<sup>29</sup>Ibid.

the Times:

. . . the original text read, "We have persuasive evidence that the unit is a combat brigade." But in the actual delivery, Mr. Carter changed "is" to "has been." This seemed to be a gesture to encourage the Russians to change the character of the force.<sup>30</sup>

The effect of the new policy and the actions and rhetoric of the Administration appeared to have had little impact on the damage sustained by the Administration. A strong move emerged in the Senate to call for the President to certify that the troops in Cuba had no combat function and posed no threat to the U.S.<sup>31</sup> Many Democratic Senators were very critical. Senator John Glenn is quoted in the Times: "The status quo just became acceptable and . . . nothing has changed one whit on the island of Cuba."<sup>32</sup> The integrity of the President was questioned in the article when Senator Church was quoted as saying:

I continue to believe that, before the treaty may take effect, the Senate will insist on an affirmation by the president, backed up by our own intelligence, that Soviet combat forces are no longer deployed in Cuba.<sup>33</sup>

The Administration was unable to successfully control

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<sup>30</sup>Ibid.

<sup>31</sup>Ibid.

<sup>32</sup>"Move To Link Pact And Brigade Begins: Arms Treaty Reservation May Deal With The Soviet Unit in Cuba," New York Times, 2 October 1979, p. A1.

<sup>33</sup>Ibid.

the damage resulting from its failure to lead the country in a coherent policy dealing with events in Cuba. However, the immense negativity from the media, Congress, and the public must be put into the broad context with a variety of issues negatively impacting the image of the President. Many of these events were completely out of the control of the White House.



## Analysis

The Carter Administration's management of the situation in Cuba proved to be a media disaster for the Presidency. The progression of policy over time appeared to be greatly impacted, and in some instances managed, by the Congress and especially the Senate instead of the executive. Not only was the event first communicated to the public from outside the White House, but the media portrayed the Administration as lacking a unanimous consensus on a policy response. While some in the Carter Administration believed that the Soviet troops in Cuba colored the entirety of U.S.-Soviet relations, others such as the State Department argued that this event should be considered in isolation and outside of the overall U.S. foreign policy context.

In this event the media tone became very critical much earlier than the study had anticipated. The hypothesis had expected that all events would be covered with at least a neutral if not a positive tone at the outset. Berry's theory asserting that only in the last stages of a policy does the press turn negative was not the case. His theory that "bad news invariably comes from bad policy," did not explain the media's coverage of events in Cuba.<sup>34</sup> Criticism

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<sup>34</sup>Nicholas O. Berry, Foreign Policy and the Press, (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1990), p. 144.

in the press arose well before the Administration had an opportunity to even craft an initial response.

The third article, which displayed the first negative score before the tone of the majority of the articles became negative, dealt with the response of the Senate to the news of the brigade. Even though an official White House position had not yet been articulated, key members of the Senate sharply criticized the Soviet troops and a strong movement demanding nothing short of a total withdrawal of forces began in Congress. The Times writes:

Administration officials have suggested that a satisfactory solution might be a Soviet pledge not to use the combat forces in any role outside Cuba. But it was becoming increasingly evident that a key block in the Senate-- where a treaty can be defeated by a one-third minority-- would be satisfied only by Soviet withdrawal of the brigade from Cuba.<sup>35</sup>

On the basis of careful reading of the Times, the media appeared to be responding negatively to the White House as a result of the growing division between the President and the Congress. Furthermore, by the fourth article which is even more negative in overall tone, the Senate is portrayed as again demanding nothing short of an immediate withdrawal, as the President continues to be criticized by the Times as well as the Senate for being indecisive and not taking any

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<sup>35</sup>"Some Liberals Balk at Pact Till Soviet Pulls Out Cuba Unit: Mood Hardens In the Senate-- Key Members of Committee Doubt Arms Treaty Will Go To Floor Unless Moscow Yields," New York Times, 7 September 1979, p. A1.

action.<sup>36</sup>

Interestingly the same day the Times carried another article on the front page which was significantly less critical. It is a response by the Administration to the Soviet Union. The President does not demand an immediate withdrawal of forces, instead he informs the nation that a diplomatic solution to this crisis will be sought. He called on the nation to react "not only with firmness and strength but also with calm and a sense of proportion."<sup>37</sup>

The following day the President attempted to make a case for the ratification of the SALT II treaty in the Senate, independent of the current events in Cuba. He argued that the treaty should be considered on its merits and not tied to the Soviet troops in Cuba. The response of key senator Bob Dole was that

. . . he would continue his efforts to seek a Senate delay on the consideration of the Strategic Arms Treaty until the Soviet troops had been removed from Cuba or until the Senate had received a written assurance from President Carter that Soviet troops pose no threat to the United States or our allies.<sup>38</sup>

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<sup>36</sup>"Crisis in Cuba: Political Issue Response by President Involves Him Directly," New York Times, 8 September 1979, p. A1.

<sup>37</sup>"Carter Tells Soviet Dispute On Troops May Hurt Relations. He Asks Nation to Stay Calm In a Statement on Brigade in Cuba-- President Says Moscow Must Respect Concern of U.S.," New York Times, 8 September 1979, p. A1.

<sup>38</sup>Ibid.

Interestingly, the negativity in the press was less in this article. It would seem that at least in this case, when the President publicly responded to the situation, the media reacted with a more positive tone. The direct response of the President appeared to be far more persuasive in terms of its positive influence in the media as opposed to the negative demands of a key Senator.

This would lead the researcher to question whether the media responded favorably whenever the President reacted directly to a crisis. Over the course of the event there are five instances reported in the Times when the Administration responded directly. In three of the five cases, the article's overall tone was more positive when compared with the article from the previous day. In one case the tone in the media remained the same and only in one article was there an increased negativity in the tone of the article when the President responded directly. It is important to differentiate between what the Administration says and what the President himself is directly quoted as saying. While the Administration responded in many instances, its effects on the media were far less evident than when the President was directly quoted. The media in most cases reacted to any direct response of the President with increased favorability. The Administration, however, remained an ambiguous bureaucracy which did not have the

same level of effect on the press.

Midway through the articles covering this event, the most negative article occurred. This seemed out of place since it appeared that the the overall trend was for the articles to be increasingly less negative in tone. This article appeared on September 13, 1979. The Times states:

The Carter administration is studying the possibility that the Soviet combat brigade that is reported to be in Cuba may have as its primary mission the training of Cuban forces for action in Africa. State Department officials said today, ". . . If indeed the Soviet force turns out to have had a training mission-- and that is not definite, the officials said-- then the Administration may find itself facing a problem in the Senate." By describing the brigade as a "combat unit," the administration may have created for itself a semantic as well as a political problem.<sup>39</sup>

Even more disastrous than the White House's lack of an initial response and the fact that the flow of information emanated not from the President, but rather from Senator Frank Church, was the news that the Administration had identified the forces as combat in nature when they perhaps were only training forces.

Combat unit conjures up a far different image than does training brigade. The press seemed very critical of this possible alteration in semantics. Interestingly, key Senators did not specifically react to this change, instead

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<sup>39</sup>"In a Diplomatic Corner: Handling of Issue of Soviet Force in Cuba Raises Doubt About the Administration's Grip on Policy," New York Times, 13 September 1979, p. A1.

they proceeded to delay and even end the SALT II treaty debate. The success of the treaty seemed inescapably linked to the mere presence of forces in Cuba regardless of whether they were of a training or combat nature.

Since there were only two articles at the outset of this event which had an overall positive tone and the third being negative, a discussion of what constituted a positive article is very limited. The first two articles are far more descriptive in nature and by the second article a comparison to the historical past was made with the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. Although the media tone for this event was overall very negative, it is possible to look at the data and observe some less negative occurrences.

In two of the other events, there were instances of positive trends developing in the middle of an event. Seldom if ever did an event end with an upward trend in media tone. In other events, the media tone became positive during the latter part of the event, and in this event there is a cluster of four articles with positive overall tone two-thirds of the way through the event. This research found that immediately after the most critical article, the media began to turn less negative. It was anticipated that this upward trend would center around a commonly identifiable theme contained in this cluster of articles. However, this was not the case. The article of September

14, the most negative of the event, deals with doubts about the Administration's ability to handle foreign policy. The subsequent article covers Brzezinski's assertion that the Soviets may be training troops as opposed to combat forces. And the last article is one covering Gromyko's accusation that the White House's anxiety over the event in Cuba is artificial. Also contained in this article is Carter's promise that he would address the nation within the following week in regards to a U.S. response.

There seemed to be no observable trends between policy changes and the media. When the reader observation chart detected a change of policy, the media did not automatically respond positively. The Carter White House did not receive media approval for simply acting, instead the media evaluated each individual act and reacted to fluctuations of policy, in most instances, with a negative interpretation.

The effect of direct responses from the President was a point of interest. The study anticipated that a boost in the media would occur whenever the President personally responded to an event. Unlike the "Administration" or the "White House", issuing a policy or responding with a prepared reaction, it was expected that a direct response from the President would be received favorably in the press. Interestingly, there was no strong evidence to conclude that when the President spoke directly, his approval in the media

increased. In most cases the overall tone in the media seemed to be less negative than the previous day, but still negative.

The Times seems to leave the impression that foreign policy towards Cuba was repeatedly linked to other issues: as the debate over how to deal with the Soviet troops present in Cuba raged, the support for increased military spending expanded. The fate of the SALT II treaty became increasingly questionable and susceptible to the President's response to the crisis in Cuba, as well as growing criticism from the press and Congress. Over the course of events in Cuba, a huge absence of presidential leadership resulted in a policy vacuum which intermittently was filled by the Congress, especially the Senate. This resulted in a myriad of possible policy options and demands emanating from the Congress, as was reported in the Times.

The Administration was not clear initially on what actions it was going to take in response to the presence of the Soviet combat brigade. The first official response identified on the reader observation chart occurred on September 6, 1979. The Administration asserted that the presence of forces was of "serious concern"<sup>40</sup> and could jeopardize overall U.S.-Soviet relations. The Times

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<sup>40</sup>"Vance Tells Soviet Its Troops In Cuba Could Imperil Ties," p. A1.



interpreted the testimony of Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, to imply that the United States would not consider anything short of a total withdrawal from Cuba. However, this was not specifically articulated and seems to have been the opinion of the media. Overall, the media seemed to editorialize far earlier and more frequently in this event.

The Administration modified its stance on September 8, as is identified on the reader observation chart. On that day, the President did not call for an immediate Soviet withdrawal as did the Senate, but instead he announced that the White House would proceed with a diplomatic solution. The Times reports, "Administration officials have suggested that a satisfactory solution might be a Soviet pledge not to use the combat forces in a role outside Cuba." In reaction to the Administration's policy, Congress responded negatively and even liberals began to push for an outright withdrawal.<sup>41</sup>

On September 27, the Carter Administration changed the language from "Combat Forces" to BRIGADE of 2-3000. The President then assembled a panel of advisers to assist in forming policy decisions in response to the Cuban situation. From this point the event is permanently altered through semantics as the White House's description downplays the

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<sup>41</sup>"Crisis In Cuba-- Political Issue," p. A1.

previous linguistic threat conveyed in the use of "combat force" to label the troops. The alteration in semantics established a different set of U.S. options as well as media, public and congressional expectations.

The reader observation table identifies the last significant policy shift at the end of the event, when the Times reported that with Moscow's assurances that the troops represented only a "Training Center", the previously intolerable situation was now tolerable.<sup>42</sup>

In an effort to address the outcry of the Congress as well as the media, the Administration outlined a series of minor retaliatory steps to be taken against the Soviet Union. This resulted in the final policy shift identified on the reader observation chart. This last articulation of the Administration's policy essentially concluded the front page coverage in the Times. After the President announced the steps which would be taken in response to the event the story was relegated to the back pages.

The reader observation chart identifies four instances of official policy responses in the Times. Only in one instance (Sept 6) did the media respond favorably. On the basis of this research it can be concluded that changes in policy or an attempt to alter policy did not illicit a

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<sup>42</sup>"Carte Plans Latin Command And Steps Up Watch On Cuba," p. A1.

positive response in the media. Furthermore, there was no evidence to conclude policy changed just because the media was negative.

The President's approval rating during the Cuban situation experienced an overall gradual decline. Since this event occurred over a short period of only six weeks, there were only two opinion samples concerning the overall job performance of the President. It must also be noted that the second poll occurred almost a month after the crisis. However, it is the assumption of this study that the event was still sufficiently recent to be of influence on the minds of the public.

When questioned specifically in October as to any knowledge of the presence of Soviet troops in Cuba, 87% of the population answered affirmatively. When those who had heard of the event were questioned as to what the U.S. response should be, 24% believed nothing should be done, 7% believed that the U.S. should use diplomatic means, 7% advocated increasing our defense in Cuba, and 7% responded by recommending that U.S. interests be protected. Of those aware of the events in Cuba, 40% approved of Carter's handling of the situation, 44% disapproved.<sup>43</sup>

These statistics are revealing when compared to the

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<sup>43</sup>George H. Gallup, The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion 1979, (Wilmington: Scholarly Research, 1982), pp. 126-128.

overall level of support. The specific approval rating for the President's handling of the Cuban crisis was markedly higher than the President's overall rating by as much as 10 percent. This suggests that the public had an opinion on this foreign policy event. It would also suggest that perhaps the media as opposed to the public were more critical of the Administration. Furthermore, the public did not necessarily mirror the opinions of the press. When the opinion polls are analyzed some important factors such as the high cost of living or inflation come to the forefront of the public's agenda. Although the majority of the American people named inflation as the most pressing problem (57%), only 5% felt international problems were the greatest problem. However, even though international events were not of primary concern it would seem that Americans were concerned enough to not be as critical as the press when evaluating the performance of the President. It is also worth noting that seven months prior to these polls, 18 percent of the population viewed international problems as the number one problem facing the nation as opposed to 5 percent in the September poll. This fluctuation is important to acknowledge because it suggests a level of public interest in the international sphere. It suggests that the priorities of the public do in fact change in

response to current international events.<sup>44</sup>

Almost as fast as the Cuban event emerged, other policies became linked to the crisis. Although this study does not answer the question, it would be worthwhile to evaluate whether this type of linkage occurs more frequently in an environment of overall low public opinion polls. In other words, if a President is high in the polls and the press and the public have confidence in his ability to conduct foreign policy, does a popular President's failing policy become linked to other events? However, if the press, the public and the Congress's overall evaluations of the leadership abilities of the President were low, it would be simple for the press to find a policy, whether domestic or foreign, to link with the predominant failing policy.

Examination of this event strongly leads to the conclusion that foreign policies do not occur in a vacuum, and at times other policies can overlap and impact the policy options of the President as well as color the way the public and the media view an event. In this case the broader framework of overall U.S.-Soviet relations was brought into question and tied by the Congress to the fate of the SALT II treaty. It is suspected, however, that leaders who are perceived to be weak suffer criticism for events and happenings which in actuality may be out of

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
<sup>44</sup>Ibid., p. 6.

presidential control. It may be that the more a leader's popularity decreases, the more the demand for presidential responses to foreign policy events unrealistically increases. As reality falls short of public and media expectations, the result could be an avalanche of criticism which further weakens the standing of the President.

The overall foreign policy of the Carter Administration in response to events in Cuba was not a success in terms of its reception in the media. As the situation evolved the Administration took on the task of damage control. The controversy surrounding the SALT II treaty, along with the debate over the military budget and the Administration's slow response and inadequate policy direction, combined to create a crisis in public, congressional, and media confidence in the Administration's ability to function as a superpower leader.

# Reader Observation Chart

## THE CUBAN BRIGADE




**Figure 3--Reader Observation Chart**

Dates on which the reader observed policy changes:

September 5, 1979	Start of observation period.
September 6, 1979	Troops are called a "serious concern."
September 8, 1979	White House announces it will pursue a diplomatic solution.
September 12, 1979	Soviets state troops are there on a training mission, not as a combat force.
October 3, 1979	President outlines steps to be taken against U.S.S.R.

# Gallup Poll Data

## THE CUBAN BRIGADE



**Figure 8--Gallup Poll Data**

Gallup poll data, based on question: Do you approve or disapprove of the way Carter is handling his job as President?<sup>45</sup>

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<sup>45</sup>George H. Gallup, The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion 1979, (Wilmington: Scholarly Resources, 1982).



**CHAPTER V**  
**THE INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN**

**Introduction**

The invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union produced the sharpest words and actions of the Carter Presidency. The invasion appeared to have been unforeseen by both the Administration and the world community. The press, at the onset, scurried to gather facts and to report the actions of the Administration. Despite a previously low level of public as well as Congressional confidence in the Administration's overall performance, the media along with the public supported the President in his response to the crisis in Afghanistan. A rally-round-the-flag phenomenon seems to have taken over the attitude of the media and the public.

As Carter's bid for reelection got underway in the spring of 1980, he was faced with three major foreign policy problems. The first was the ongoing negative course of the SALT II treaty, stuck in the Foreign Relations Committee. The second problem was the continued failure of negotiations to free the hostages in Iran. Although this does not fall within the realm of U.S.-Soviet relations, it is important

to recognize the impact of this event at the outset of this chapter since so much of Carter's public opinion, media coverage, and world attention was focused on the hostages. It is also significant because the coding process revealed a large number of articles on Afghanistan mentioning the hostages. The third and largest foreign policy problem for the Administration was the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union.

Just prior to the invasion of Afghanistan, U.S.-Soviet relations were being undermined as key members of the U.S. Senate threatened to attach "killer amendments" to destroy the passage of SALT II. Completed in May, the treaty was left hanging in December as lawmakers recessed for Christmas in 1979. Furthermore the recent discovery of a Soviet "combat" brigade in Cuba had damaged the Administration--giving the appearance of poor control over its foreign policy. To toughen its image, the White House accelerated its promotion of the MX missile system. During the debate of the SALT II treaty, the Administration called for a 3% increase in the military budget to appear more hawkish. However, neither the public nor the Congress was swayed by Carter's attempt at toughening the Administration's image. The Administration responded by calling for further military increases amounting to 2% above its previous level to subdue lagging Congressional as well as public opinion.

The U.N. played a much greater role in this event than it had in the other events considered in this research during the Carter Administration. Although this study does not directly sample the impact of the U.N. on public opinion, it was a factor in terms of support for Carter's policy. International leaders, appearing on the front page, conveyed opinions in the press and colored the tone of the articles covering Afghanistan. Again, although this study does not directly take into account the impact of the international community on the media and the public, it does emerge through the coding process to have been an influence upon media's portrayal of events.

Just as the positive tone of various foreign countries' reactions to U.S. policy are recorded in the press, negative reactions are also recorded. During this event, the Times frequently covered the responses of international actors. Negative reactions to U.S. policy in the world community emanated from Pakistan, Argentina, France, and Germany. The impact of international opinion on U.S. foreign policy is difficult to measure. A criticism of U.S. policy, for example, from France or Germany, would obviously carry weight in terms of the impact on U.S. media and public opinion. Conversely, that Cuba and East Germany voted in favor of the Soviet's actions in the U.N. had little if any significance on American public opinion.

Up to the time of the invasion, the Administration had encouraged a climate of detente between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. The Carter Administration pursued a Soviet agenda which included an emphasis on thawing the superpower relations. It is evident from the coding that initially the Carter Presidency was portrayed in the press as working from a position of negotiation rather than strength. Up until this event the Administration's policy of detente had to be accompanied with concessions made to the conservative hawks in Congress. The invasion of Afghanistan, however, fundamentally altered the President's frame of reference as the Times writes:

The Soviet military thrust into Afghanistan had caused him to change his mind fundamentally about the United States' relationship with the Soviet Union. . . . "My opinion of the Russians has changed more drastically in the last week than even the previous two and a half years . . ."<sup>1</sup>

Unfortunately the President did not specifically say how his opinion had been altered or what that meant to the future of U.S. policy towards the Soviet Union. Thus the study must analyze the policy stance taken towards the U.S.S.R. through the media to understand the changed perceptions of the White House. During the crisis, some fundamental changes in U.S.-Soviet policy occurred in the

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<sup>1</sup>"Carter Says Soviet Isn't Telling Facts About Afghan Coup: Cites Threat to Ties, Assails Brezhnev's Answers--Hints at a Stronger Protest by the West," New York Times, 1 January 1980, p. A1.

Carter Presidency. The White House did call for an increase in military spending which exceeded previous requests, a new "Carter Doctrine" justified by the Truman doctrine was crafted, and a new drive towards "Soviet Containment" ensued. Further, the U.S. dependence on Middle East oil and fear of Soviet hegemony in the region resulted in the U.S. taking steps designed to curb Soviet aggression.

**The Carter Administration's Policy in Response to the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan**

To put the event into a proper context, in late December President Hafizullah Amin was assassinated and replaced with a leader, who emerged from hiding in Czechoslovakia, with strong ties to the U.S.S.R..<sup>2</sup> Immediately following the assassination, the Soviets invaded Afghanistan. At first the combat troops numbered 25,000 to 30,000, according to the press; however, within three months the troops numbered 105,000 and thousands of Afghans died.<sup>3</sup>

While the tone of Times articles was generally neutral or positive during its assessment of the White House's response to the invasion, there emerged what would become a continuing trend of linkage to the other foreign policy disasters the Presidency continued to face. As the Times writes:

It was evident in the preoccupation of officials in the State Department and other agencies that the sudden and dramatic developments in Afghanistan had at least momentarily replaced Iran as the most acute issue.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>2</sup>"Carter Calls Soviet Actions a 'Threat': U.S. Aide Flies to Europe to Confer with Allies Over Afghanistan," New York Times, 29 December 1979, p. A1.

<sup>3</sup>"Carter Tells Soviet to Pull Its Troops Out of Afghanistan: He Warns of Consequences," New York Times, 30 December 1979, p. A1.

<sup>4</sup>"Carter Calls Soviet Actions a 'Threat'," p. A1.

The study anticipated that the public would respond negatively to the Administration's handling of events in Afghanistan because of the crisis of confidence which the President's Iran hostage policy had generated. Instead of a blanket negative opinion towards all of Carter's foreign policy, the opinion polls show there was a clear level of public differentiation between events. One negative opinion of the President's handling of a foreign policy event did not color all of the public's perceptions of the President's ability to conduct foreign policy. Existing polls suggested that while the public did not back the President's handling of the crisis in Iran, it was anxious to rally round the flag and support the Administration's policies in response to the invasion of Afghanistan. Polls further suggest that Americans were more concerned about foreign policy issues than domestic issues during the events in Afghanistan.<sup>5</sup> Unlike much of the popular literature which depicts Americans as knowing and caring little for foreign policy issues, some polls suggest that foreign policy, not economic concerns, were upper-most in the minds of Americans.<sup>6</sup>

Although there are instances of clear public distinction among the primary foreign policy events at this

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<sup>5</sup>"Polls Show Carter Gaining Support on Afghan Moves, Slipping on Iran," New York Times, 16 January 1980, p. A1.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid.

time, the media linked Afghanistan to the other events mentioned above. It was very common to observe an article written on the Afghan crisis carrying the latest efforts to free the hostages in the same article. The future of SALT II also appeared as a topic in articles where the main subject was the Afghan crisis.

The initial policy response of the White House took only a few days. The Administration warned that serious consequences to U.S.-Soviet relations would result if the Soviets left their forces in Afghanistan. The President in the same day ordered that Pakistan receive military supplies which had been halted by the Congress a year before. The White House then began to assemble a chorus of heads of state in an effort to bring pressure upon the U.S.S.R. to withdraw. Within twenty-four hours, twenty heads of state had received messages from the Administration.<sup>7</sup>

As part of the Administration's effort to build an international coalition of criticism against the U.S.S.R., as well as to convey to the public and the press the significance of the situation, the President again invoked history. The Times reports:

Mr. Carter regards the Soviet intervention, especially in light of the latest intelligence reports, as politically comparable to the Soviet bloc invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, Soviet

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<sup>7</sup>"Carter Says Soviet Isn't Telling Facts on Afghan Coup," p. A1.



crushing of the uprising in Hungary in 1956 and occupation of Iranian Azerbaijan in the 1940's.<sup>8</sup>

The issue of the hostages as well as the passage of the SALT II treaty is mentioned in front page articles on Afghanistan, even in the initial phase of the Afghan crisis. Furthermore, while the Afghan event unfolded, sharp criticism emanated from key senators regarding the arms pact with the Soviet Union. Media linkage to the hostages and the arms pact continually ran through the articles on Afghanistan. One example of this is found in an early article titled "U.S. weighs request to U.N. to condemn Soviet Afghan move." The article finishes with this reporting of events in Iran:

In Teheran, about 2,000 demonstrators, many of them Afghan students and clerics, converged on the Soviet embassy shouting slogans demanding that the Russians withdraw from Afghanistan. Iranian revolutionary guards fired into the air to disperse the crowd, which was then exhorted to move to the American embassy to denounce "imperialism".<sup>9</sup>

The White House rapidly developed a foreign policy in response to the situation in Afghanistan. By January 5, the main policy response included six initial acts on the part of the U.S., which included:

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<sup>8</sup>"Carter Tells Soviet to Pull Its Troops Out of Afghanistan," p. A1.

<sup>9</sup>"U.S. Weighs Request to U.N. to Condemn Soviet Afghan Move: Support of Allies Reported," New York Times, 2 January 1980, p. A1.

- 1) withholding 17 million tons of grain ordered by the Soviet Union.
- 2) An end to all technological exchanges.
- 3) A halt to all Soviet fishing vessels in U.S. waters, resulting in the loss of 350,000 tons of fish over a year.
- 4) A delay in the opening of new American and Soviet Consulates as well as an embargo on all cultural and economic exchanges.
- 5) A warning that the Summer Olympic games to be held in Moscow would be jeopardized if the Soviets did not withdraw.
- 6) An increase in U.S. food and military assistance to Pakistan to counter the threat it faced from the north.<sup>10</sup>

The following day, the White House threatened to expand the policy taken to include cuts in embassy staffs as well as cuts in bank credits.<sup>11</sup>

The foreign policy of the U.S. towards the Soviet Union carried a negative wave of effects in terms of the domestic realm, specifically the grain embargoes which were implemented by the White House at the expense of midwestern farmers. The effects of the embargo resonated in the commodities markets as well. To calm the effects of the grain embargo on the market, the U.S. suspended grain trading in the futures market. One of the main concerns of the Administration was the impact that these actions would

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<sup>10</sup>"Carter Embargoes Technology For Soviet: Limiting Fishing Privileges and Sale of Grain in Response to 'Aggression' in Afghanistan," New York Times, 5 January 1980, p. A1.

<sup>11</sup>"U.S. Warns of New Responses to Soviet Over Afghanistan As Moscow Defends Its Role," New York Times, 6 January 1980, p. A1.

have on the farmers, since they overwhelmingly voted for Carter previously. There was talk that the Administration would buy surplus grain and begin production of gasohol. The Administration appears foolish when a week later, the Times reports that:

The Carter administration announced last week's curtailment of grain shipments to the Soviet Union without knowing for certain that most of grain was owned by dealers, not farmers. the Administration, therefore, had to shift gears over the weekend, the officials said, and more quickly to protect the grain dealers.<sup>12</sup>

Another facet to the grain embargo and the success of the policy was the need for cooperation from the international community to refuse grain sales to the Soviet Union. Only a month later, the policy was undermined when Argentina quickly replaced the United States as a grain supplier to the U.S.S.R. Since the Argentine government refused to heed the U.S. request to limit grain sales, Argentina's willingness to supply the Soviets with much needed grain undermined a key element of the President's foreign policy leaving a majority of the President's midwestern farming constituency embittered by the White Houses embargo.<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>12</sup>"Grain Prices Fall Maximum Limits as Trading Markets are Reopened: Further Drops Forecast," New York Times, 10 January 1980, p. A1.

<sup>13</sup>"Argentine's Expect Soviets to Buy Grain: Prices Soar as Government Balks at U.S. Request to Limit Sale," New York Times, 1 February, 1980, p. A1.

Another policy objective of the Administration targeted the U.N. To build a base of international condemnation against the U.S.S.R., the U.S. attempted to form a coalition of support for U.S. policy in the United Nations. The Iran hostage crisis intervened, however. In a Times article regarding the United Nations' response to the Afghan crisis, issue linkage occurred.

This was demonstrated in the January 7 article:

In another development there, Secretary General Kurt Waldheim met with President Carter to discuss his mission to Teheran to try to gain the release of American hostages being held in Iran.<sup>14</sup>

Eventually the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was addressed by the U.N. and a Security Council resolution condemning the invasion was vetoed by the Soviet Union and East Germany in a vote of 13 to 2. As a permanent member on the council, the U.S.S.R. was entitled to veto the measure. In this instance the U.N., and later the allies, provided minimal support on behalf of U.S. policy.<sup>15</sup>

One of the most unprecedented findings of this research involved individual public actions which attempted to impact U.S. policy. The first action had the effect of

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<sup>14</sup>"U.S. Says Council Must Condemn Soviet to Protect Smaller Countries," New York Times, 7 January 1980, p. A1.

<sup>15</sup>"Soviet Vetoes a Bid by U.N. to Condemn Its Afghan Actions: But Security Council's Resolution is Backed in 13-2 Vote Led by Third-World Members," New York Times, 8 January 1980, p. A1.

embarrassing the Administration and conveyed the image of an extremely weak Presidency. In response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan the International Longshoremen's Association instructed its members to halt the handling of Soviet vessels and cargoes from ports ranging from Texas to Maine and including Puerto Rico. The action drew a sharp response from the Administration. The Times reports:

A State Department spokesman said that the Carter administration had made it clear that we hope foreign policy decisions will be left to the chief executive and his branch of government and not be made outside of it.<sup>16</sup>

The second event of this kind was the refusal of the baggage carriers union to handle Soviet luggage, causing flights into La Guardia to be diverted.

The Carter Administration next announced plans to prepare a new doctrine aimed at containing Moscow in response to the inflexibility of the Soviet position and the inability of U.S. policy to produce a troop withdrawal. The Carter Administration likened it to the Truman Doctrine of 1947 when President Harry S. Truman responded to the threat of Soviet expansion into Turkey and Greece. The Times reported that

Mr. Carter, seriously disturbed by the long-range implications of the Soviet intervention in a nonaligned nation outside eastern Europe, has sought to convince the Kremlin that he regards

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<sup>16</sup>"Dock Union Bars Soviet Ships," New York Times, 10 January 1980, p. A1.

American interests in the Middle East as so great that he would not hesitate to take any action including military steps to protect them.<sup>17</sup>

At this point the Carter Administration appears to be experiencing an increase of support. The media reflected a lifting of tone as the crisis in public confidence which the President experienced over the summer began to dissipate.

Although the President appeared to be rallying limited domestic support for his foreign policy actions towards the Soviet Union, internationally reactions to the Administration's policies were mixed. Not only did Argentina replace the grain sales which the United States had cancelled, but the Pakistani government also reacted to the offer of 400 million dollars in aid by the United States as inadequate and insulting. President Mohammed Zia ul-Haq publicly dismissed the offer as "peanuts".<sup>18</sup> The Administration was quick to respond in the media that the aid constituted only a portion of the international assistance being offered and that the United States would continue to extend the funds.<sup>19</sup>

While the Carter Presidency was encouraged by the initial support extended on the part of the Germans and the

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<sup>17</sup>"Carter is Preparing a New U.S. Doctrine to Contain Moscow," New York Times, 13 January 1980, p. A1.

<sup>18</sup>"U.S. Offers Pakistan \$400 Million in Aid," New York Times, 22 January 1980, p. A1.

<sup>19</sup>Ibid.

French, eventually the responses and policies of these two countries also undermined the Administration. According to the Times, both Paris and Bonn asked for a Soviet pullout from Afghanistan, and made a joint statement condemning Soviet aggression, calling the invasion a threat to peace.<sup>20</sup> Three days later the Times reported that Elysee Palace was attempting to soften its policy stance. The Times reported that the government of France would pursue policies which did not include a meeting with the allies to discuss the Afghan problem, reasoning that such a meeting would only increase international tension.<sup>21</sup> The United States' foreign policy leadership role was further challenged when a meeting was held between President Valery Giscard d'Estaing and Soviet leader Brezhnev without prior consultation with the allies.<sup>22</sup>

Although this is not an international opinion study, the opinions of the international community appear frequently on the front pages of the Times and therefore the assumption can be made that the attitudes of the public, media, and Administration were impacted. Negative

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<sup>20</sup>"Paris and Bonn Ask for Soviet Pullout From Afghanistan," New York Times, 6 February 1980, p. A1.

<sup>21</sup>"France Wont Join Allied Conference on Afghan Problem," New York Times, 9 February 1980, p. A1.

<sup>22</sup>"Giscard-Brezhnev Meeting Yields Little Progress on Afghan Crisis," New York Times, 20 May 1980, p. A1.

international responses were printed as often as positive responses to U.S. foreign policy. The greatest difficulty in attempting to determine the extent of influence on U.S. opinion from the international community stems from the varying degrees of significance these states hold in the preconceptions of the White House, public, and media.

As a result of the continued Soviet presence in Afghanistan and a lack of response to repeated warnings, the White House finally decided to boycott the Summer Olympics. The Congress supported the President's decision with a House vote of 386 to 12.<sup>23</sup> Although there was support in the House, the officials of the United States Olympic Committee were slow to support the Administration's proposal. The committee went so far as to imply that it would not necessarily comply with the ban. The power of the President was diminished in this situation as panels responded to Carter's proposal by advising the Administration to seek "proper" channels. The President's options appeared limited as the press wrote, "The International Olympic Committee has the sole power to cancel the Olympics as it did during World War II."<sup>24</sup>

Indeed, much of the press concerning the future of the

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<sup>23</sup>"Olympic Ban Backed: House Votes 386 to 12 to Support President," New York Times, 25 January 1980, p. A1.

<sup>24</sup>"President Proposes Deadline of Month for Olympic Move," New York Times, 21 January 1980, p. A1.



summer games was of a relatively critical and negative nature. Headlines reading "Carter, In Plea To Athletes, Is Firm On Olympic Ban," served to undermine the ability of the President to create and execute policy free of obstacles.<sup>25</sup> Not only were the athletes and the U.S. committee, as well as the international committee, slow to abide by U.S. policy, but the debate and the disagreement were rampant throughout the Times.

The Administration finally won backing for its policy from the athletes and the committee. In return, the Administration promised to provide financial assistance on behalf of the Olympic committee. The White House also planned an honorary ceremony for the athletes. The opinions and the actions of the world community, combined with the tepid support from the American athletes, weakened the President's public image. Furthermore, the international community's unwillingness to ban the games threatened the success of the Administration's policy as well as its standing in the polls at home. President Carter personally sent over 100 requests for support to other countries to gain backing for the United States' position. However, the world committee rejected the American panel's request to

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<sup>25</sup>"Carter, In Plea to Athletes, Is Firm on Olympic Ban," New York Times, 22 March 1980, p. A1.

cancel, postpone, or move the games.<sup>26</sup> Just as the grain embargo was foiled by Argentina's willingness to provide grain to the Soviets, the lack of support for the American boycott of the Olympics further diluted the President's foreign policy and undermined his leadership.

On January 25, another change in policy occurred. The United States announced that in response to the Afghanistan crisis, China would be allowed to purchase military equipment for the first time. By cultivating ties with Peking, the Carter Administration was sending a strong warning to the Soviets. Within a week China had joined in the boycott of the Moscow Olympics, increasing the number to eighteen countries supporting the U.S. boycott.<sup>27</sup>

The United States also began supplying arms to Afghan insurgents. While the details of the origin of the arms and the route into the county remained undisclosed, the Times did report that the Afghan insurgents were being armed. The Egyptian Secretary of Defense also announced that military training programs had begun for the training of Afghans opposed to the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. Egypt also announced that insurgents would be sent back from Egypt with weapons.<sup>28</sup>

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<sup>26</sup>"World Committee Reaffirms Moscow as Site of Olympics," New York Times, 13 February, 1980, p. A1.

<sup>27</sup>"China Joins Boycott of Moscow Olympics," New York Times, 2 February 1980, p. A1.

<sup>28</sup>"U.S. Supplying Afghan Insurgents With Arms in a Covert Operation," New York Times, 16 February 1980, p. A1.

Support from the world community became increasingly important and the United States constantly worked to maintain international backing for actions taken towards the Soviet Union. The United Nations provided a forum for the President's foreign policy. However, even though there were votes to condemn the act, it appears that the United Nations resolutions had virtually no power to influence the withdrawal of Soviet forces. While the effects of the resolutions were minimal, they demonstrated international support for the stance taken by the United States. The behavior of the U.N. was significant only in the sense that it served as a validating institution on behalf of the President's policies.

By the beginning of May, the front page coverage of the Afghan crisis in the Times was replaced with news of the lack of foreign policy consensus within the Carter Administration. The White House staff began to suffer from internal foreign policy disagreement which damaged the Administration's image. Carter's leadership was undermined when Cyrus Vance was replaced with Edmund Muskie as Secretary of State. Vance's resignation came as a response to the failed attempt to free the hostages in Iran.<sup>29</sup> In an effort to maintain dialogue between the two superpowers,

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<sup>29</sup>"Muskie Asserts U.S. Must Clarify Status of Soviet Relations," New York Times, 8 May 1980, p. A1.

Muskie met with Foreign minister Andrei Gromyko; however, due to the United State's arming of Afghan insurgents with Pakistani help and the Soviet Union's refusal to withdraw, a meaningful dialogue was impossible.<sup>30</sup>

The Times coverage of the war in Afghanistan declined sharply as presidential elections became closer. The Times continued to follow developments in Afghanistan; however, the crisis in Afghanistan was replaced on the front page with news of the presidential campaign. Carter's policy on Afghanistan remained the same as his bid for reelection became closer and the rapid changes which had typified the early portion of the year slowed dramatically. When the President left the White House, U.S. policy had been unsuccessful in achieving a Russian pullout. The hostages remained in Iran and the SALT II treaty had not been agreed upon by Congress. Eventually the media attention to the crisis in Afghanistan paled in contrast to the major concern the public and the media placed on the hostages in Iran. After a review of public opinion as well as media coverage in the Times, it can be concluded that the Carter Administration most likely would not have lost the election on foreign policy grounds had the major issue been the crisis in Afghanistan. In this event there was a rally-

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<sup>30</sup>"Muskie and Gromyko Confer for 3 Hours: Talk Termed Blunt," New York Times, 17 May 1980, p. A1.

round-the-flag response and there were signs of a general sense of public approval regarding the Administration's handling of the crisis.

## Analysis

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan resulted in a basic change in the Carter Presidency's attitude towards the U.S.S.R. In response to Soviet aggression, the Administration eventually abandoned its goal of fostering detente with the Soviet Union and ultimately pushed for a boycott of the Olympics, increased military spending and removed the SALT II treaty for consideration in the Senate. The policy response in this instance differed greatly from the weaker responses of the White House to other events involving U.S.-Soviet policy. The Administration reacted immediately, and did so firmly and resolutely. This reaction produced public support and a rally-round-the-flag response. Perhaps if the Administration had acted with the same fervor and immediacy in respect to other foreign policy events, such as the Cuban situation, the President could have avoided the crisis in confidence which occurred in his handling of other foreign policies.

The first policy identified in the reader observation chart occurred early in the event. On December 30, 1979, the Carter Administration called for an immediate withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. The White House also expedited the shipment of military supplies to Pakistan. Furthermore, the Administration immediately called on the

international community to openly criticize Soviet behavior. The media responded by crediting the Administration with taking a tough stand against the Soviet Union.<sup>31</sup>

On January 3, articles concerning the SALT II treaty, which had been so much a part of the Carter Administration's Soviet strategy, were replaced with the bigger issue of Afghanistan. The following day the President received support in Congress for ending the prohibition on military and economic assistance to Pakistan.<sup>32</sup> The coding of these articles revealed that the media viewed these actions very favorably.

A further increase in media support as well as new policy was observed on January 4 as the President announced specific policy measures in response to Soviet aggression in Afghanistan. These measures included; grain embargoes, a loss of fishing privileges, a halt to diplomatic exchanges, and a commitment of military as well as humanitarian aid to Pakistan.<sup>33</sup>

Public opinion fluctuated in reaction to the policy initiatives of the White House in response to the Afghan crisis. The first Gallup poll for this event begins on

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<sup>31</sup>"Carter Tells Soviet to Pull Its Troop[s] Out of Afghanistan," p. A1.

<sup>32</sup>"President Obtains Support in Congress on Arming Pakistan," New York Times, 4 January 1980, p. A1.

<sup>33</sup>"Carter Embargoes Technology for Soviet," p. A1.

January 7, 1980. After the dismal approval ratings in the fall of 1979, the dramatic jump in approval supports the rally-round-the-flag theory since it seems to be highly related to events in Afghanistan. According to poll data, it is also important to note that in an unusual twist of priorities, Americans were focused less on domestic issues and more on foreign policy. They wanted an increase in defense spending. Indeed, half of those polled said they wanted the President to take even tougher steps against the Russians.<sup>34</sup>

On January 7, public approval of the Carter Presidency was around 57%. The reader observation chart also noted that another addition to policy occurred in the press on January 7 as the United States called on the United Nations to condemn Soviet aggression.<sup>35</sup> On January 9, the Administration assured American farmers that they would purchase the surplus grain resulting from the grain embargo which the White House placed on the U.S.S.R.<sup>36</sup>

One of the most significant additions to policy, identified by the reader observation chart, was the crafting

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<sup>34</sup>"Polls Show Carter Gaining Support on Afghan Moves, Slipping on Iran," p. A1.

<sup>35</sup>"U.S. Says Council Must Condemn Soviet to Protect Smaller Countries," p.A1.

<sup>36</sup>"U.S. Will Purchase Much of the Grain It Denied Russians," New York Times, 9 January 1980, p. A1.



of the Carter Doctrine. The substance of the doctrine is, in a sense, a reaffirmation of the Truman Doctrine restating containment policy. The President, concerned about Soviet expansion into the Middle East, warned that force would be used if necessary to protect U.S. interests. The tone of the media seemed to support this attitude.

Since the opinions of the Congress, public, and media, had all become highly critical in response to the Carter Administration's weak management of foreign policy the previous year, it seemed that as the White House toughened its stance towards the Soviet Union, a substantial increase of support occurred. According to the findings of a Times poll:

Mr Carter's response to the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan seemed to be helping him in this area; 56 percent of the public approved of his handling of relations with the Kremlin, while in June 1978, only 37 percent approved.<sup>37</sup>

On January 21, the reader observation chart identified a significant policy directive as the Administration stated that unless Soviet troops left Afghanistan, the United States would not participate in the Olympics.<sup>38</sup> This announcement was covered with a positive tone in the Times. Just four days later, in an effort to exert further pressure

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<sup>37</sup>"Polls Show Carter Gaining Support on Afghan Moves, Slipping on Iran," p. A1.

<sup>38</sup>"President Proposes Deadline of Month for Olympics," p. A1.

on the Soviet Union, the reader observation chart records that the United States announced that military equipment would be sold to China.<sup>39</sup> This event also was covered positively in the press.

A cluster of articles mostly negative in overall tone occurred after February 6. Interestingly, the article that day covered France and Germany's response towards the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.<sup>40</sup> While the article suggested that the two countries were about to toughen their stand, the Times reported a few days later that instead both Germany as well as France displayed little support for the U.S.<sup>41</sup> The final policy response according to the reader observation chart was the announcement on February 16 that the U.S. was supplying Afghan insurgents with military equipment as part of a covert operation.<sup>42</sup>

By late summer, the Gallup poll data seemed to indicate a general decline in approval with the Administration experiencing the least support around August 1, 1980. After

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<sup>39</sup>"U.S., in New Rebuff to Soviet, Announces It will Sell China Military Support Equipment," New York Times, 25 January 1980, p. A1.

<sup>40</sup>"Paris and Bonn Ask for Soviet Pillowed From Afghanistan," p. A1.

<sup>41</sup>"France Won't Join Allied Conference on Afghan Problem," p. A1.

<sup>42</sup>"U.S. Supplying Afghan Insurgents With Arms in a Covert Operation," p. A1.

the beginning of August no significant changes in U.S. policy towards the U.S.S.R. occurred. The press tired of the story and a new emphasis was placed on the upcoming election. As the news moved from the White House's Afghan policy, the Carter Presidency was reviewed in an increasingly overall retrospective context in the press and the public.<sup>43</sup> The overall evaluation of the job performance of the Carter Administration in relation to the upcoming election provides a good explanation for the low Gallup poll ratings. If the situation in Afghanistan had worsened and the President had been forced to respond in a dramatic and forceful manner, the approval ratings would have most likely again increased.

Commensurate with the hypothesis, the media remained generally positive during the formation of policy initiatives. In fact, overall the media was positive during the first half of the articles covering the event. Despite the fact that public opinion was sharply critical in response to the Administration's reactions to events in Iran, the public differentiated between foreign policy events and was fairly supportive during the first half of the Afghan event, according to our analysis of the Times. The negativity in the press did not occur until

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<sup>43</sup>Morris P. Fiorina, Retrospective Voting in American National Elections, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981).

approximately halfway through the event when public opinion began to decrease. The overall public opinion curve continued to decline gradually over the period being considered in this study.

Negative articles during the overall positive period in the media did not appear to have a common theme and occurred quite randomly. For example on January 10, 1980, the Times reported that grain prices had fallen to their limit and further drops were predicted. Another very negative article occurred on February 9, 1980. It dealt with the refusal of France to join an allied conference designed to address the Afghan problem.

The most positive articles occurred within the first few months of the event. On January 5, 1980, the day that Carter outlined the embargoes taken towards the Soviet Union in response to what the U.S. termed "aggression in Afghanistan", the media responded favorably.<sup>44</sup> On January 13, 1980, when news of the preparation of a new Carter Doctrine designed to contain Moscow was reported, the press reacted unusually favorably. Another uncommonly favorable point corresponds to a front page report of January 29, 1980 which covers support from 36 Muslim nations as they band together to demand Soviet troop withdrawal. They further

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<sup>44</sup>"Carter Embargoes Technology For Soviet; Limits Fishing Privileges And Sale Of Grain In Response To 'Aggression' In Afghanistan," p. A1.

support the steps taken by the U.S. to boycott the Olympics when they encourage the Islamic world to also abstain from the Moscow games.<sup>45</sup>

By far the most positive article occurred slightly over midway in the event. This article dealt with Germany and France's call for an immediate pullout of Soviet forces from Afghanistan. According to the Times, this was the toughest stance taken by these countries. One observation which can be made as a result of noting the abnormally high points on the graph is the impact that foreign states have on the opinions of the media. In the four unusually positive points in this study, two of the articles deal with responses from the international community.<sup>46</sup> In cases when the international community responded favorably towards U.S. policy, the impact on the opinions of the media was

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<sup>45</sup>"36 Countries Support A Resolution Demanding A Troop Withdrawal," January 29, 1980, p. A1.

<sup>46</sup> In comparison to his predecessors, Reagan was far more inclined to take into account his international as well as domestic audience in terms of opinion and the selling of his foreign policy. In an interview with David Gergen John Maltese quotes Gergen "Reagan's was the first presidency I had been aware of-or at least in which I had worked-in which it was obvious that a president had to communicate to more than a domestic audience," Gergen said. "We never did that during Ford. In fact, under no other administration that I'm aware of. Carter had a film early on when he was president-a speech to an international audience that was distributed through USIA. But public diplomacy became a very important part of communications in the Reagan presidency. It had not been theretofore." See John Anthony Maltese, Spin Control, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1988), p. 178.

noticeable. A possibility for future study would be to measure the effect that the international community has on domestic media opinion.

As the hypothesis anticipated, even though the President was suffering in the polls when this event occurred, there was an overall sustained positive tone in the press at the onset of this crisis. The President's response to the invasion came very early in this event. Carter's public reactions to the crisis occurred mostly in the first half of the articles with the exception being in the fiftieth article, where he reaffirms the position of the U.S. to boycott the Olympics. The President was quoted directly in the Times on seven occasions during this event. In all but one instance when he responded personally to the crisis the overall tone of the articles was positive. Only once when he responded did the score have an overall negative value, which was very slight.

In four of the seven articles where the President is directly responding, the tone was more positive than in the prior article. In one instance the tone remained the same. Twice the article was more negative than the previous day. This trend would support theories asserting the President can achieve an advantage in the press by personally commenting on a particular event. In this case the President did not attempt to change policy nor did he

increase his presence in the media as the overall trend became increasingly negative. If the President had been attempting to change the biases in the press, an increase in presidential statements in response to increasing negativity would have been observed. Instead the President's attention was turned to other issues.

Towards the end of this event, it is Secretary of State Edmund Muskie who handles talks with the U.S.S.R. He also assumes the task of continuously reaffirming the earlier stance taken by the President.

Issue linkage was a significant trend throughout this event. Even at the outset of the event the Times writes on January 2, 1980:

President Carter has two difficult decisions to make fairly soon officials said. The first is what the Administration should do about the pending nuclear arms treaty. The Senate is to take up the treaty upon return from recess January 22. As of yesterday, the Administration was saying that it still supported the accord on the grounds that it served United States National Interests. There is also a question on grain sales. Because of deficiency in its harvest last fall, the Soviet Union is expected to buy about 34 million metric tones of grain in the 1979-80 year, the bulk of it from the United States.<sup>47</sup>

The application of Berry's four stages is impossible based on the manner by which the crisis unfolds. In this

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<sup>47</sup>"U.S. Weighs Request To U.N. To Condemn Soviet Afghan Move: Support of Allies Reported Action in Assembly Is Suggested to Avoid Possibility of a Veto in the Security Council," New York Times, 2 January, 1980, p. A1.

event the Administration moved so rapidly in terms of policy, that the distinction between the initial information stage and the policy implementation state was totally blurred. It seemed that almost as fast as the media was becoming aware of the event, the Administration was reacting with a policy response. By December 30, The Times had reported that Carter had told the Soviets to pull out of Afghanistan, and by January 4, the White House announced that military aid to Pakistan would be forthcoming.

A similar trend which emerged in the analysis of all events was the continual referral by both the Carter and Reagan Presidencies to the historical past. At the beginning of an event, as the press gathered facts and as a policy response was initially crafted, the President, along with the media compared present events to the past foreign policy experiences of the United States. Although this study does not include this analysis, it would be interesting to observe whether the historical parallels used by the President and the media are good predictors for the way the U.S. will respond to a current foreign policy challenge.

This use of the historical past also prepared the public by establishing a tone for the degree of "importance" which the issue should take in the foreign policy arena. If Americans are told that an invasion into Afghanistan is like the experience of Czechoslovakia or Hungary, Americans



perceive the danger to be serious, making them perhaps more likely to support the policy of the President. The problem which arises, however, is that if a President tries to dramatize an event by linking it to the past, the possibility of the past providing policy expectations on the part of the public could potentially impact the current policy options available to the President. For example, if the public believes that the Soviet Union is violating the Truman doctrine by not remaining in their outlined "sphere of influence" and, if as in this case, the President believes it necessary to respond with yet another doctrine of containment, the President incurs a set of preexisting beliefs and attitudes linking the past to his policies of the future.

By characterizing a situation as a "Soviet Threat", it would seem that a President is condemning himself to pursue an aggressive, and hawkish, foreign policy agenda. While a situation may require a tough foreign policy stance, by creating public alarm and fostering a sense of an urgent need for containment, the Administration commits itself to act quickly and with strength towards the aggressor. This may not be in the overall best interest of the country. Further, if the State Department, as in this case, refuses to consider all U.S. policy towards the U.S.S.R. in an overall context, and if it argues that each foreign policy

event should be treated as a single event without linking each situation to the whole, than a case could be made against using the historical experiences of the past in an effort to define the magnitude of a current event. Linking the past with the present has the potential for producing inferior policy.

The timing of White House policy response is highly unusual and seems to have signaled the Administrations's level of concern. It is also important to note that the White House stood firm behind its initial policy reactions towards the crisis in Afghanistan. Even though the White House chose to respond to continued Soviet aggression with some domestically unpopular actions including the grain embargo and the cancellation of the Olympics, the Administration carried out the policies outlined from the very start of this crisis. Because the level of changing information regarding the invasion dropped, and also due to the fall elections, front page news of events in Afghanistan were soon relegated further into the body of the newspaper.

The crisis in Afghanistan produced the harshest tone and toughest stance in terms of Soviet policy since the start of the Carter Administration. Initially it was expected that since the media continually brought up the SALT II treaty and the events in Iran in the articles on Afghanistan, the media and the public would perceive the

Administration's policy response negatively. This was not the case. The press and the public did differentiate.

Furthermore, analysis of the events in Afghanistan lead this author to conclude that foreign policies requiring international cooperation are at best risky for a weak President. The absence of international support for the grain embargo as well as the global boycott of the summer Olympic Games in Moscow all impacted the domestic opinions of the media and the public.

## Reader Observation Chart

### THE INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN





Figure 5--Reader Observation Chart

Dates on which the reader observed policy changes:

December 29, 1979	Start of observation period.
December 30, 1979	Carter tells Soviets to pull out.
January 4, 1980	Military aid to Pakistan announced.
January 7, 1980	U.S. calls to condemn Soviet aggression.
January 13, 1980	Carter Doctrine announced.
January 21, 1980	No Olympic participation unless troops withdrawn.
January 25, 1980	Military support to China announced.
February 16, 1980	Support for Afghan insurgents announced.
October 17, 1980	End of Observation period.

## Gallup Poll Data

### THE INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN



**Figure 6--Gallup Poll Data**

Gallup poll data, based on question: Do you approve or disapprove of the way Carter is handling his job as President?<sup>48</sup>

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<sup>48</sup>George H. Gallup, The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion 1979, and The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion 1980, (Wilmington: Scholarly Resources, 1982).

**CHAPTER VI**  
**THE POLISH CRISIS**  
**AND THE CHILL IN SUPERPOWER RELATIONS**

**Introduction**

At the outset, the Reagan Presidency's handling of U.S.-Soviet relations differed dramatically, in tone and rhetoric, from that of the previous Administration. The attitude of the Reagan White House was markedly less conciliatory and much more confrontational than the Carter Administration's. If nothing else, the election of Ronald Reagan represented the embodiment of a clear mandate for change by the voters. The vote for Ronald Reagan, in terms of foreign policy, was in large part a vote against the previous four years.<sup>1</sup>

One of the first foreign policy challenges which the Reagan Administration faced was the threat which the Soviet Union posed to Poland. As winter approached at the beginning of 1981, Poland found its border threatened by hundreds of thousands of approaching Soviet troops. Internally, the Polish government was experiencing many trade union demands for better working conditions. Strikes

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<sup>1</sup>Morris P. Fiorina, Retrospective Voting in American National Elections, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981), p. 6.

plagued mines and shipyards. The Polish government headed by General Wojciech Jaruzelski showed signs of difficulty maintaining control. Added to the internal unrest was the country's financial crisis. International debts along with a failing economy further weakened the government. The Polish government's failure to distribute adequate food to the population resulted in requests for international assistance. Outside aid became essential in order to sustain the population's basic needs and maintain the stability of the government.

While Jaruzelski continued in power, his position remained precarious. According to some news accounts in Pravda, the ideological commitment of the Polish government was in question.<sup>2</sup> The Soviets massed on the borders and the psychological warfare became much like the Tito-Stalin dispute of 1948, as the Polish population fell victim to the war of rhetoric and posturing among the Soviet Union, Poland, and the United States.<sup>3</sup>

The White House became increasingly vocal in the media as the danger of a Soviet invasion into Poland loomed. During this event, the Administration monitored, evaluated,

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<sup>2</sup>"U.S. To Aid Poland With Surplus Food Worth \$70 Million," New York Times, 3 April 1981, p. A1.

<sup>3</sup>Vladimir Dedijer, The Battle Stalin Lost: Memoirs of Yugoslavia 1948-1953, (New York: Viking Press), 1970, pp. 33-35.

and responded to Soviet involvement in Polish affairs. A continual public commentary was run by the Administration and carried by the press as events unfolded. One of the greatest defining features of this event, in contrast to those studied during the Carter Administration, is the White House's willingness to speculate and project potential policy reactions beforehand in an effort to deter possible "worst case scenarios" from becoming foreign policy realities.



### Policy Response

The Reagan Administration began an effort to make certain that Poland avoid bloodshed if at all possible. The White House strongly encouraged negotiating efforts between the Polish government and labor. Along with western allies, the United States hoped that the country would be able to settle its domestic differences on its own without any outside interference from the Soviet Union. In February of 1981, the United States' official assessment of the Polish situation concluded that "The Poles are perfectly capable of handling their internal affairs without outside interference."<sup>4</sup> A few days later, The United States and West Germany attempted to further dissuade the Soviet Union from intervening in Poland. The Soviet Union had expressed interest in a summit meeting and it was one issue that the U.S. and Germany attempted to use as leverage in an effort to discourage the Soviet Union from interceding.

Although the Russians continued to pose an increasing military threat to Poland as large scale maneuvers ensued along the borders, the United States opted not to directly confront the Soviets with a specific set of retaliatory policies. Instead, the United States continued to publicly

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<sup>4</sup>"U.S. Doubts Moscow Will Invade Poland," New York Times, 11 February 1981, p. A1.

utilize the media to wage its own response to Soviet activity. New intelligence information continually released in the press provided a daily backdrop for either an increased or decreased sense of U.S. anxiety over the potential threat of a Soviet invasion of Poland.

Frequent evaluations of the "current threat" as opposed to the "previous threat" became commonplace rhetoric in the language of the Administration. Secretary of State Alexander Haig was given a considerable amount of press coverage. Haig offered an example of a typical White House response to Polish events when he stated "I think in light of recent events that the situation is somewhat more tense than it was three weeks ago."<sup>5</sup>

This continual public comment from the White House was of such magnitude and frequency that it can itself be considered a major policy response of the Administration. The frequent speculation as to the level of danger Soviet troops posed to Poland was designed to restrain the Russians from military intervention. As the Times writes:

Officials from both the Carter and Reagan administrations insist that the public discussion has had a deterrent effect, but they acknowledge that this cannot be proven.<sup>6</sup>

As the events continued unhampered by Western actions

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<sup>5</sup>"U.S. Now Voices Reduced Concern That Russians May Invade Poland," New York Times, 18 March, p. A1.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid.

aimed at both stopping the Soviet Union from intervening, as well as Polish government officials from cracking down on the general populace, East Germany and other Warsaw pact nations continued to heighten preparations along the Polish borders. The Soviets excused the troops as being a part of military maneuvers, although this was in direct violation of the Helsinki Accord (1975) requirements of prior notification, since there were over 25,000 troops involved. Furthermore, while the maneuvers were to last three weeks, the Soviet government extended the operation indefinitely.<sup>7</sup>

When the promise of economic aid did not produce a defusing of events, the United States shifted its course and embarked upon other types of policy. In response, Western nations banded together and threatened a virtual discontinuation of East-West relations if the Soviets invaded Poland.<sup>8</sup> Defense Secretary Casper Weinberger reiterated that a crackdown in Poland would have "grave consequences" for any effective kind of disarmament or arms limitation talks.<sup>9</sup> When the situation appeared to remain unaltered a few days later, Administration officials outlined three developments which were of particular

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<sup>7</sup>"Haig Is Troubled By Troops Moves On Polish Border," New York Times, 30 March 1981, p. A1.

<sup>8</sup>Ibid.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid.

concern:

- (1) The Polish government's plan to put down a general strike in abeyance.
- (2) An attack on the Polish communist party by Pravda accusing them of weakness.
- (3) The uncovering of intelligence information indicating that the Russians were prepared to move into Poland in the event they deemed it necessary.<sup>10</sup>

In an effort to keep Soviet activities public, the State department revealed that the Russians were ready to move into Poland. They further asserted that a Soviet communications system had been installed that would bypass Polish military command, thereby allowing the Soviets to stay in touch with Russian troops in Poland, secure from Polish interception. There were also indications that airborne units in the western part of the U.S.S.R. had been placed on high alert. Lastly, the Soviets were also reported to be stockpiling equipment and fuel along likely routes into Poland.<sup>11</sup>

When the carrot of U.S. aid to Poland and the threat of a cancellation of arms limitations talks with the Soviet Union were having no apparent impact on the course of events in Poland, the United States began to establish and implement harsher policies. The Administration reportedly

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<sup>10</sup>"U.S. To Aid Poland With Surplus Food Worth \$70 Million," New York Times, 3 April 1981, p. A1.

<sup>11</sup>"U.S. Asserts Soviet Steps Up Readiness To Move On Poland," New York Times, 4 April 1981, p. A1.

began to look to Peking as a potential recipient for U.S. aid in the form of military technology. Two months later it was announced that an agreement had been reached which would result in the selling of arms to China.<sup>12</sup>

Amid this public discussion of Soviet actions toward Poland, the policy of media openness turned against the Administration.<sup>13</sup> Interestingly the initial backlash originated from reports out of Poland. These negative opinions would soon be reflected in the attitudes of the international press as well as by the biases in the Times as the following illustrations will demonstrate. The Times reported that, like many of his countrymen, a Polish writer was constantly tuned to the BBC for the latest U.S. assessment of the events in Poland. The Times writes:

. . . statements by United States officials yesterday that an invasion no longer necessarily appeared imminent caused relief but also no small amount of anger. . . . a man-in-the-street theory is taking hold that Washington has become an unwitting dupe of Moscow in the war of nerves against Poland. <sup>14</sup>

Internationally the European allies began to believe

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<sup>12</sup>"Deepening U.S.-Soviet Chill: Decision to Sell China Arms May Have Reduced Prospects to Deter Moves by Kremlin on Poland," New York Times, 18 June 1981, p. A1.

<sup>13</sup>"Haig Cautioned By Allies About Warnings On Poland," New York Times, 12 April 1981, p. A1.

<sup>14</sup>"Amid Lure Of A Spring Sun, Poles Mutter Of U.S. 'Game'," New York Times, 6 April 1981, p. A1.

that the repetitiveness of the Administration's warnings and public statements would incite the Soviets towards intervention in Poland.<sup>15</sup> The Times became critical of the Administration's frequent comments, and in subsequent articles the paper refers to Weinberger's statements as his continued "running commentary on Moscow's threat to Poland."<sup>16</sup>

By the middle of April, it was clear that what had once appeared to be a relatively solid coalition of support by the allies favoring the U.S. response to the Polish crisis had weakened. The Times reports that the allies were increasingly uncomfortable about Haig's continual public discussion on the issue. The Times writes:

The thrust of the allies' view, as explained to reporters, was that by constantly drawing attention to the Soviet threat, the Reagan administration ran the risk of inciting the Russians to intervene.<sup>17</sup>

Not only did the allies disagree with the continuous public discussion of events by the Administration, but a more basic criticism of the overall handling of U.S.-Soviet relations was also beginning to emerge. The Times writes that the

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<sup>15</sup>"Haig Cautioned By Allies About Warnings On Poland," p. A1.

<sup>16</sup>"Weinberger Sees Poles Threatened With Soviet Invasion 'By Osmosis'," New York Times, 7 April 1981, p. A1.

<sup>17</sup>"Haig Cautioned By Allies About Warnings On Poland," p. A1.

allies were having difficulty adapting to the newly elected Administration's overall confrontational tone towards the Soviet Union.<sup>18</sup>

Not only was public and media opinion a challenge for the new Administration, internal disagreement among cabinet members became a problem for the Reagan Administration. In each event surveyed, there has been evidence of dissent within the Administration. The Reagan Administration appears to have experienced some difficulty with the opinions expressed by Secretary of State Alexander Haig. The Carter Presidency weathered a similar experience with Cyrus Vance. Instances in which an Administration is forced to take exception with the articulated policy of one of its cabinet members is a potential public relations disaster which tends to be perpetuated by the press. Once differences between the President's foreign policy and a cabinet member's opinions appear in the media, the potential for damaging public opinion becomes significant.

In respect to events in Poland, Haig seemed to be portrayed in the press as always having an opinion, and expressing it publicly. On many occasions, Haig would be in the forefront with a lengthy statement, while the rest of the Administration remained very quiet. The media coverage of Haig was very heavy and with analysis of the Secretary's

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<sup>18</sup>Ibid.

statements in the press, it at times appeared that he was conducting his own foreign policy. There is very little hesitation or filter in the Secretary's style. A good illustration of Haig's tendency to overly assert himself comes on April 28, 1981, in an article titled "White House Takes Exception to View of Haig on Poland." In this instance, the Secretary offered the option of imposing a trade ban on Moscow in the event the Russians moved into Poland. In response to Haig's warning towards the Soviets, the President refused to validate the threats by neither acknowledging nor denying the policy as an option which the Administration was considering. Later in the day a White House aide was quoted in the Times saying:

Mr. Haig's remarks put the Secretary "somewhat" out front of Mr. Reagan on the issue, but he said there was no real disagreement between the President and the Secretary.<sup>19</sup>

While events remained tense, there were few if any changes in the U.S. stance towards the Poles and the Russians and U.S. media interest and coverage of the Polish crisis fell off sharply. The domestic unrest continued in Poland as the Polish government began to perceive the growing activities of the free trade union movement as an intolerable threat to the government's control. In response to the growing labor unrest in Poland, the Polish government

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<sup>19</sup>"White House Takes Exception To View of Haig On Poland," New York Times, 28 April 1981, p. A1.



issued directives for the implementation of a military crackdown on the population. Martial law was imposed and civil as well as union rights were restricted. In response, Solidarity activists retaliated by calling for a general strike.<sup>20</sup>

Immediately, the United States issued a policy which halted economic aid to Poland. Grain and feed sales, which amounted to one hundred million dollars, were suspended. The Reagan Administration as well as Congress were low-key in their response although the Times reported both branches to be surprised and appalled at the Polish government's crackdown.<sup>21</sup> The United States responded with warnings against further oppression. White House deputy press secretary Larry Speaks stated:

The United States on Monday suspended economic aid to Poland, including \$100 million in credits for feed and food grains, in reaction to Warsaw's military crackdown on the free trade union movement. Poland, under severe economic strains, had requested \$740 million in food aid for the next fiscal year.<sup>22</sup>

The policy of the Administration became more ambiguous

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<sup>20</sup>"Poland Restricts Civil And Union Rights: Solidarity Activists Urge General Strike," New York Times, 14 December 1981, p. A1.

<sup>21</sup>"Further U.S. Help is in Abeyance Until Polish Situation is Clarified," New York Times, 15 December 1981, p. A1.

<sup>22</sup>"Washington Says Risk Is 'Grave': Protests Over Police at Its Embassy," New York Times, 16 December 1981, p. A1.

and the rhetoric was markedly less inflammatory. The strategy of the President appears to have been one of staying out of the press as much as possible, and allowing other parties in the Administration to react to the situation in a majority of instances. By so doing, it could be speculated that any negative press or attacks on the President's ability to lead in foreign policy matters were avoided. Blame instead could be directed to the Secretary of State, as was the case in the instance of the press's handling of Haig taking the "lead" and falling out of sync with the Administration. This approach not only insulated the President to some degree from media and public attack, but it also limited his exposure. When he did issue a statement he presented the policy itself. Trial approaches or hypothetical avenues which might have been pursued were continuously tested in the media by members of the Administration, never by the President. This gave Reagan a more authoritative stature and in instances when he went public, the press knew that he was not just considering a "possible" foreign policy response.

When the President finally commented on the events in Poland the press wrote:

The President thus appeared to go further than anyone in his Administration in assigning blame to the Soviet Union for the recent actions by the Polish government. He also seemed to go further in suggesting that the United States was ready to try to influence events by offering possible

future aid. At this time, Mr. Reagan said, it would be "impossible for us to continue trying to help Poland solve its economic problems while martial law is imposed on the people of Poland."<sup>23</sup>

By carefully calculating official comment on the event, the President was able to appear to be acting as opposed to reacting to changes in Poland. By offering brief concise comments the Administration seemed in control of policy as well as being informed on the issue.

The repression in Poland set off a series of defections from high ranking Polish diplomats, the first being Poland's ambassador to Washington. Ambassador Remeled Spasowski along with his wife publicly denounced the harsh treatment of the Polish people and lent their support for labor leader Lech Walesa when they requested, and were granted, political asylum in the United States. The articles covering the U.S. response portrayed Reagan as a "sympathetic father". The Times reported that the meeting with the President was very emotional for everyone. White House spokesman Larry Speaks reported that during the conference in the oval office, the ambassador and his wife wept and "Mr. Reagan's eyes brimmed with tears."<sup>24</sup> A picture on the front page of the Times

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<sup>23</sup>"President Says Moscow Supports Crackdown by Warsaw On Union," New York Times, 1 December 1981, p. A1.

<sup>24</sup>"Reagan Sees Pole Who has Defected," New York Times, 23 December 1981, p. A1.

accompanied this article with the President standing in the rain holding an umbrella for the ambassador and his wife while they embrace. The image of the President as a kind fatherly figure was epitomized in this photograph. The picture symbolized the broader overall positive tone in the press at this point. It is inconceivable that such a photograph would have been placed on the front page in the absence of a national rally-round-the flag climate in the media.

In response to continued tensions in Poland, the White House next curbed commerce and credit to Poland and further extended a warning to the Soviet Union if military rule was not ended immediately. As the Times writes:

In his sharpest condemnation of the events in Poland since the imposition of Martial law Dec. 13, Mr. Reagan said in a televised address from the White House, "I want emphatically to state tonight that, if the outrages in Poland do not cease, we cannot and will not conduct 'business as usual' with the perpetrators and those who aid and abet them."<sup>25</sup>

Although there was sharp condemnation towards the Soviet Union, the President took action only towards the Polish government. Sanctions were taken which included:

(1) a suspension of dairy and agricultural products from the U.S. government until the Polish government could absolutely guarantee that these products could be distributed to the

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<sup>25</sup>"Reagan Tells Polish Regime Its 'Crime Will Cost Dearly': Curbs Credit and Commerce," New York Times, 24 December 1981, p. A1.

population.

(2) A refusal to renew Poland export credit insurance through the Export Import Bank backed by the American government.

(3) A suspension of aviation privileges into the United States.

(4) A suspension of agreement to allow the operation of Poland's fishing fleet in American waters.

The President blamed the Soviet Union for the crisis and sent a letter to Brezhnev calling for a restoration of human rights which was provided for in the Helsinki Final Act.<sup>26</sup> The Soviets were additionally threatened with future economic and political measures.

When the Soviet Union responded to Reagan's letter, it caused a stir in the press which brought to the surface the overall strained relations between the U.S. and Soviet Union. Almost as revealing as the "evil empire" rhetoric, which would be uttered later by the President, was Reagan's response to Brezhnev in the press. While the contents of the letter were not publicly divulged, the President did reveal the tone of the letter and the Administration's overall relationship to the U.S.S.R. when the press questioned the President about whether the letter was positive or negative and he replied, "With them, it's always negative."<sup>27</sup>

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<sup>26</sup>Ibid.

<sup>27</sup>"Brezhnev Response to Reagan's Letter is Called Negative," New York Times, 28 December 1981, p. A1.

Over the weekend, following the Brezhnev letter, the United States decided to take action towards the Soviet Union. The President took steps to punish the Soviet Union for not respecting the "clear desire" on the part of the Polish population "for a process of national reconciliation, renewal and reform."<sup>28</sup> In retaliation, the Reagan Administration took the following steps against the U.S.S.R:

- (1) A suspension of high tech, computer, electronic and other technological items.
- (2) A postponement of long-term negotiations for grain, although the current pact allowing the Soviet Union to purchase 25 tons in 1981 remained in place.
- (3) Talks on a new maritime accord were postponed and Soviet ships were denied access to American ports.
- (4) New licenses for gas and oil equipment were barred, which included the equipment needed to complete the pipeline from Siberia to Western Europe; however, existing licenses continued to be valid.
- (5) Aeroflot's American landing rights were revoked.
- (6) The President closed the Soviet Purchasing Commission which was responsible for a third of all Soviet non-farm orders.
- (7) No renewals for exchange agreements in science, technology or energy were to be made.<sup>29</sup>

The United States immediately looked to the Western allies for support. Bonn disagreed by stating that sanctions were not the answer. This response typified the

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<sup>28</sup>"Reagan Curtails Soviet Trade and Halts Technology Sales," New York Times, 30 December 1981, p. A1.

<sup>29</sup>Ibid.

attitude of many of the allies, as the Administration was confronted with the fact that implementing U.S. policy did not elicit support from the international community in the instance of Poland.

The year concludes with the Soviets continuing to pose a threat to Poland, and the United States scurrying to find western support for its policy. Despite the wavering international support, the new Administration was definitely very distinct from the Carter Presidency. The exchanges and tone of U.S.-Soviet rhetoric and the emerging response of the media, allies, and the public all contribute, to some degree, to the conclusion that, as Tass asserts, there had been a return to the Cold War.<sup>30</sup>

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<sup>30</sup>"Tass Assails Reagan's Sanctions as a Return to the Cold War Era," New York Times, 31 December 1981, p. A1.

## Analysis

When examining the Polish case, the invasion of Afghanistan, beginning in 1979, serves as a significant backdrop for this event in terms of pre-existing superpower tensions. Although it is not easy to quantify, it must be assumed that this factor shaped the response of the Reagan Administration as the Soviets massed on the Polish border. Furthermore, in an effort to understand and assess this incident, it must be recognized that many variables such as the economy, unemployment, and other international events all impact public opinion, and to a varying extent biases in the media.<sup>31</sup>

The press became the Administration's foreign policy tool as the White House embarked upon a running commentary covering the developments in and along the Polish border. Through a continuous flow of public remarks issued by the Administration, the U.S. hoped that the Soviets would be

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<sup>31</sup>Charles W. Ostrom and Dennis M. Simon, "Promise and Performance: A Dynamic Model of Presidential Popularity," American Political Science Review, Vol. 79, 1985, March-June, p. 354.

See also Miroslav Nincic, "The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Politics of Opposites," World Politics, Vol. XL, No. 4, July 1988, p. 452. Nincic states:

It is apparent, however, that the policies of the super powers toward each other are shaped by the interplay of domestic and international circumstances, and that the former are probably no less important than the latter.



dissuaded from intervening in Poland's internal affairs. Statements made by Administration officials such as Haig warned

. . . that along with these troubling developments there were also some "good signs" that suggested that an invasion might not occur.<sup>32</sup>

This tactic eventually found disfavor with the allies, and the Times seemed to mirror the criticism of the Administration's use of media overload as a tool for discouraging the Soviet Union's intervention in Poland. This event contrasts sharply with the discovery of the Soviet brigade in Cuba under the Carter Administration. While the policy pursued by the Carter Administration was to say nothing, the Reagan Administration's policy was to conduct a continuous commentary on the situation.

Over time, as superpower relations plummeted, the media as well as public support for the Administration's policy became questionable. When the reader observation chart, as well as media coverage, are analyzed two significant events must also be kept in mind.<sup>33</sup> The first was the assassination attempt on the President by John Hinckley Jr.

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<sup>32</sup>"Haig is Troubled by Troop Moves on Polish Border." New York Times, 30 March 1981, p. A1.

<sup>33</sup>Charles W. Ostrom and Dennis Simon, "The Man In The Teflon Suit!" Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 53, 1989, p. 166. See their approval-enhancing and approval-diminishing list of events.

This occurred at the end of March. Prior to the assassination attempt, Reagan's job performance rating was significantly lower when compared to other post-war Presidents two months into their Presidencies, including the Carter Administration.<sup>34</sup> The assassination attempt temporarily reversed the rapid increase in public disapproval. As the Gallup Polls indicate, however, the popularity increase was moderate as well as temporary. The increase in levels of support declined as would be expected. The other factor which impacted the public opinion polls was the economy.<sup>35</sup> By the middle of 1981, the economy was weakening. This could explain why the Gallup Polls dropped sharply by June 4, 1981. And in fact those such as Mueller, Ostrom and Simon note that the dominant economic problem had been inflation the ten years preceding the election of Reagan. After the election, unemployment became the economic factor which most heavily impacted the overall opinion of the public.<sup>36</sup>

In reaction to declining popularity and pressures resulting from a slumping economy, the White House attempted

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<sup>34</sup>George A. Gallop, The Gallop Poll: Public Opinion 1981, (Wilmington: Scholarly Resources, Inc.), 1981, p. 70.

<sup>35</sup>Ostrom and Simon, "The Man in the Teflon Suit!" p. 358.

<sup>36</sup>John E. Mueller, "Presidential Popularity from Truman to Johnson," The American Political Science Review, Vol. 64, p. 22.

to bridge the foreign and domestic policy gap by addressing the plight of American farmers who suffered economic losses as a result of grain embargoes. In May, President Reagan lifted the grain embargo which had been implemented during the Carter Administration. The Reagan White House reasoned that it was unfair for American farmers to bear the sole economic burden of sanctions implemented against the U.S.S.R. in response to the invasion of Afghanistan. The lifting of the embargo, at a time when the threat of Soviet invasion into Poland continued to escalate, displayed to the public that the Reagan Administration was concerned about the domestic welfare of the country as well as international events.<sup>37</sup>

Overall the media's tone was generally positive in the ten articles which spanned the first two months of the event. The initial articles focused primarily on informing the public of the situation just as the central hypothesis had anticipated. The press was mostly positive in tone until the beginning of April. Up to this point the U.S. had been engaged in the ongoing dialogue and public evaluation of Soviet actions.<sup>38</sup> The subsequent article, which is significant for its overall negative tone, outlined the

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<sup>37</sup>"Haig Says U.S. Will Cut All Trade With Soviet if It Moves Into Poland," New York Times, 26 April 1981, p. A1.

<sup>38</sup>"Haig is Troubled by Troop Moves on Polish Border." p. A1.

major concerns which the United States had over the developments in Poland. Labor unrest and the pressures of the Solidarity movement seemed to be leading towards the Russian as well as the Polish government's justification for Soviet intervention.<sup>39</sup>

On April 4, 1981, the Times reported that according to the State Department,

Soviet forces were at a higher level of readiness for a possible intervention than they were last December, when the Carter administration feared that a Soviet move might be imminent.<sup>40</sup>

Considered as a whole, these articles conveyed a seriousness as well as a certain amount of information which led to an overall sense of immediacy in the media.

According to the reader observation chart, the Administration's initial policy response to the Polish crisis occurred on March 11, 1981. The Soviet interest in a superpower summit meeting was used as leverage by the United States as well as Germany in an effort to keep the Soviet Union out of Polish affairs. The tone of the story immediately following the summit threat was much more negative. The article reported that the United States had reduced its concern over the possibility of the Russians

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<sup>39</sup>"U.S. To Aid Poland With Surplus Food Worth \$70 Million: New Concern About Troops," New York Times, 3 April 1981, p. A1.

<sup>40</sup>"U.S. Asserts Soviet Steps Up Readiness to Move on Poland: Copters are Shifted," p. A1.

invading Poland.<sup>41</sup> On the basis of this change in the tone of the two articles, it would seem that the media was uncomfortable with substantial alterations in the Administration's assessment of the possibility of Soviet intervention. A state department spokesman is quoted as saying, "I'd say there is less concern right now about the possibility of outside intervention than there was a couple of weeks ago or in December." However the Times prints in the same article:

Only last Friday, Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig, in meeting with reporters, talked of "huge" maneuvers and said: "I think in light of recent events that the situation is somewhat more tense than it was three weeks ago."<sup>42</sup>

The second policy response occurred on March 27, 1981 when the White House issued a warning directed towards the Soviet Union as well as the Polish government urging a settlement of differences. This article received an overall positive coding and was much more positive than the preceding day. In fact when the results of the coding process are analyzed, eight of the ten articles in the first three months have a neutral to positive tone. At this point, the first Gallup Poll data is available. It was taken on March 17. The poll depicted an increasingly

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<sup>41</sup>"U.S. Now Voices Reduced Concern That Russians May Invade Poland," New York Times, 18 March 1981, p. A1.

<sup>42</sup>Ibid.

positive trend in approval ratings at around 60%.

On March 27, the reader observation chart identified the third policy change. The United States along with NATO threatened, or implemented a "threat policy", stating that in the event bloodshed occurred, future economic and financial aid from the west would be thwarted and trade would stop. The overall tone of the media remained positive.

On March 30, the running commentary commenced with Alexander Haig beginning the public evaluation of events. Although this was an ongoing process, the reader observation chart identifies this point on the table as the beginning of this policy process. This is the point in the analysis of the media that it became obvious that the White House was embarking upon a very open dialogue in reaction to Soviet activity and initiatives taken by the Polish government against the people. The press responded with continued positive coverage.

An event occurring at the end of March must be noted in order to put into the proper context any changes in the overall tone of the media as well as public opinion. This is the point at which the assassination attempt occurred. In light of this incident, the study anticipated a significant increase in respect to a positive bias in the press. Also, an increase in public approval was expected.

Interestingly there seemed to be little effect of the assassination on the media's coverage of Polish events. In respect to an increased positivity in the media towards Reagan's handling of this foreign policy event, there was none. In fact the opposite occurred and the coding process actually observed an increased number of negative articles soon after the assault on the President's life. Perhaps issues such as problems with the economy were reported on more favorably or even abandoned in the wake of the assassination attempt. As expected, the Gallup Polls display an increased level of overall support for the Administration following the attack. However, the poll immediately following does not occur until one month after. The increase in approval is very slight. To argue that the assassination attempt had created a substantial rally-round-the-flag response, both the public as well as the media would have been expected to react with obviously sharp increases of support for the United States' foreign policy.

Shortly after this, the United States began to consider aid to China. The reader observation chart notes this introduction of policy on April 5, 1981. This is a classic example of threat policy, as the United States warned that in the event the Soviet Union interceded in Poland, the U.S. would respond by selling arms to Peking.

On June 18, 1981, the United States announced that a

decision had been made to sell arms to China. The news of this action was reported with an overall neutral tone in the press. Some parts of the article were quite negative, however. In fact the Times openly responds in a very critical and biased way when it reports:

Reagan's decision to supply arms to China and his comments on the situation in Eastern Europe have deepened the chill in Soviet-American relations and may have reduced the Administration's prospects for deterring Soviet military intervention in Poland.<sup>43</sup>

It is interesting to note that while the Gallup Polls had been rising since the middle of March and leveled off at around 67%, the day after the above article appeared in the press a huge drop in public opinion occurred, bringing the President's approval rating down by ten percentage points. Part of the reason could be that although Americans wanted a President who would conduct a tougher, more coherent foreign policy than the previous Administration's, they also wanted an easing of superpower tensions. The drop would also demonstrate that Americans do care about foreign policy issues.

This action is interesting since it exceeded the prior threat, which warned of arms sales to China if the Soviet Union invaded Poland. In the absence of this invasion

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<sup>43</sup>"Deepening U.S.-Soviet Chill: Decision to Sell China Arms May Have Reduced Prospects to Deter Moves by Kremlin on Poland," New York Times, 18 June 1981, p. A1.



scenario, the United States decided, for whatever reasons, that a firm reaction was needed and the sale of arms to China was arranged. This action is unique in that it overstepped the previously outlined threat response of the Administration. It is unclear what signal was sent to the Soviet Union, since it seemed that they were being punished for an action which did not occur. This response limited the policy options available to the Administration since this action was no longer available in the event the Soviets invaded Poland, and policy options were thus narrowed.

From June to December 24, the overall coverage of the Polish events were reported positively in the press. During this time ten articles occurred. None were negative in tone. Once again, however, the coverage was clustered in the month of December. All but two of the articles occurred in December. The articles in this period (which will be discussed more fully below) dealt with suspension of U.S. aid to Poland in reaction to the military crackdown of its trade union movement.<sup>44</sup> There was a strong White House response to the crackdown on the labor union movement in Poland as the Times reported:

. . . [this was a] strong warning to Poland today against further acts of repression. The use of

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<sup>44</sup>"Widespread Strikes Reported in Defiance of Polish Regime; U.S. Postpones All Pending Aid: Further U.S. Help is in Abeyance Until Polish Situation is Clarified," New York Times, 15 December 1981, p. A1.

violence against the Polish people by the Government would have extremely grave consequences.<sup>45</sup>

Further, the Administration also reacted with alarm to curbs on U.S. diplomats in Poland.<sup>46</sup>

Very little happened in terms of new policy until December 15, 1981, when the Administration suspended economic aid to Poland in response to the military crackdown on the trade union movement. This included \$100 million worth of food grains and feed. In sharp contrast to the previous actions of the Administration, the President as well as Congressional leaders became very quiet in reaction to the crackdown. The following day the policy of the White House took on a much less structured approach to dealing with the crisis. The Administration retreated from its use of constant comment in the media and White House deputy press secretary Larry Speakes stated, "Our actions will be decided as developments warrant."<sup>47</sup>

Beginning in the fall, the Gallup Polls displayed a downward trend. The last poll available occurred at the

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<sup>45</sup>"Washington Says Risk is 'Grave'; Protests Over Police at Its Embassy," New York Times, 16 December 1981, p. A1.

<sup>46</sup>"Polish Diplomats Being Restricted By U.S. in a Retaliatory Measure," New York Times, 17 December 1981, p. A1.

<sup>47</sup>"Washington Says Risk Is 'Grave': Protests Over Police at Its Embassy," New York Times, 16 December 1981, p.A1.

beginning of December. Approval was at approximately 52% and the overall trend had been one of gradual yet steady decline since September. Since there was no front page coverage of the Polish crisis from mid September to the middle of December, it is impossible to tie public opinion to the events in Poland. The last poll corresponding to this study occurred on December 3, 1981 which is well before the events in Poland escalate to the point of a strong presidential response. Overall it is safe to argue that the economy was the predominant issue in terms of public opinion. The effects of a weak economy, not international relations, continued to influence and significantly impact the public's opinion of presidential performance.

After December 24, 1981, the reader observation chart shows a change in the overall tone from positive to negative. The articles beginning with December 24 demonstrated a very sharp response from the President as he stated:

I want emphatically to state tonight that if the outrages in Poland do not cease, we cannot and will not conduct "business as usual" with the perpetrators and those who aid and abet them.<sup>48</sup>

The President then continues with sanctions against the government of Poland.

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<sup>48</sup>"Haig Wants Allies to Act on Poland: Cites Need for Joint Pressure for End to the Crackdown," New York Times, 25 December 1981.

The reader observation chart records a policy change at the end of December. By the end of December the United States chose to enact sanctions against the Soviet Union in response to the crackdown in Poland. The media was souring and public opinion was at a low of 50%. The most negative article occurred on December 31, 1981 as the Times seems to mirror Tass' opinion that Reagan's sanctions towards the Soviet Union have returned the world to the cold war.<sup>49</sup>

During this event the bulk of policy changes occur when the overall reporting in the press is positive. Seven of the eight policy changes occurred in a positive media environment. The three most positive articles occurred in the first eight weeks and the last two weeks of the coverage of this event. The three most negative articles also appeared quite randomly throughout the event.

The President spoke very little in the initial stages of this event. This was an unexpected finding since so much came out of the White House initially. It was not until the end of April that the President was directly quoted from a briefing as considering all of the United State's options in dealing with the Polish crisis.<sup>50</sup> It seemed that the

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<sup>49</sup>"U.S. Makes Decision to Punish Russians on Role in Poland," New York Times, 29 December 1981.

<sup>50</sup>"White House Takes Exception To View of Haig on Poland: Punishing Soviet is Disputed," New York Times, 28 April 1981, p. A1.

President's style was to allow cabinet members to issue statements on behalf of the White House. This tactic perhaps served to distance the President from the fluctuations and changes of opinion in the public as well as the press directly. The other instances of Reagan speaking out directly did not occur until the end of December when the United States implemented sanctions towards both Poland and the Soviet Union. Of the four instances in which the President responded directly, three occurred when the overall tone in the press was negative. Further, two of the instances in which the President responded were the most negative articles contained in this event. On the basis of this research, it could be concluded that the President was better off in terms of media treatment when he allowed others in the Administration to present policy. This is a finding which the study did not anticipate.

As the flow of information began to slow, the Times engaged in analyzing the policy itself along with its potential implications. While this study does not answer the question, further study could be conducted to examine the possibility of any correlation between the flow of information and the amount of negative press a policy receives. Based on this research the assumption would be that once the flow of information begins to dwindle, the papers begin to "editorialize" more frequently. This could

also be, as Berry suggests, the outcome and evaluation phase. This is a time when reporters' biases begin to culminate in a process of critical analysis in the press.<sup>51</sup> In this case, the Times became critical of some of the Administration's policy even in the titles of the front page articles.<sup>52</sup>

When the reader observation chart is analyzed it seems that policy changes occurred mostly in the first two months and the last month. However, policies varied in significance. The most drastic initiatives were taken in the month of December. There does not appear to have been a noticeable increase or a decrease in policy initiatives correlating to changes in the Gallup Polls.<sup>53</sup>

Increased negativity in the press or low public opinion ratings did not necessarily precipitate an increase in policy initiatives. In fact as was noted earlier, the President's response as well as exposure on this topic was very limited. The most significant policy occurred at the

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<sup>51</sup>Berry, 1990, p. 142.

<sup>52</sup>For example the Times title "Deepening U.S. Soviet Chill: Decision to Sell Arms to China May Have Reduced Prospects to Deter Moves by Kremlin on Poland," New York Times, 18 June 1981, p. A1.

<sup>53</sup>No specific public opinion data were available in the Gallop index. Events in Poland were not viewed as being of critical importance. Reagan's popularity would most likely have been enhanced and prolonged if the economy had been stronger. Perhaps this would have led to a greater focus on foreign affairs.

end of December as the President was faced with the tough task of responding to Soviet-backed actions taken against the Polish labor movement and the imposition of martial law, circumstances which the White House had attempted to halt since the term began.<sup>54</sup>

The greatest difference between this event and the events taking place during the Carter Administration was the President's extensive use of his cabinet and aides to respond with broad overall White House rhetoric. When substantial policy decisions such as sanctions or harsh presidential responses were in order, the President responded. However, by providing a continuous "White House" reaction to the events in Poland, the President created the impression in the media that the Administration was leading the country by responding to emerging developments surrounding the situation.

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<sup>54</sup>Paul Brace and Barbara Hinckley, "Presidential Activities from Truman through Reagan: Timing and Impact," Journal of Politics, Vol. 55, 1993, p. 388.


Brace and Hinckley state:

The more dramatic evidence points to the reactivity of these addresses. They are much more likely to occur when approval is falling and following hard choices that the presidents have made, choices expected to lower their approval.

However this must be kept in mind with the rest of their findings, in that same article, asserting that when the economy is bad, presidents hide.

## Reader Observation Chart

### THE POLISH CRISIS



**Figure 7--Reader Observation Chart**

Dates on which the reader observed policy changes:


February 2, 1981	Start of observation period.
March 11, 1981	Soviet interest in summit meeting used as leverage by U.S. and Germany
March 27, 1981	Western nations warn that Polish crackdown would lead to loss of aid and trade sanctions (threat policy).
April 5, 1981	U.S. weighs aid to China if Russians act against Poland.
April 26, 1981	Reagan lifts grain embargo, stating farmers were bearing the burden.
June 18, 1981	Decision to sell arms to China.
December 15, 1981	Suspension of economic aid to Poland



December 24, 1981 Measures taken against the Polish  
Government.  
December 30, 1981 Steps taken against U.S.S.R.  
December 31, 1981 End of observation period.

# Gallup Poll Data

## THE POLISH CRISIS



**Figure 8--Gallup Poll Data**

Gallup poll data, based on question: Do you approve or disapprove of the way Reagan is handling his job as President?<sup>55</sup>

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<sup>55</sup>George H. Gallup, The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion 1981, (Wilmington: Scholarly Resources, 1982).

## CHAPTER VII

### THE MX DEBATE

#### Introduction

The Reagan Administration's battle for the MX missile system took place in a political climate of widespread attack and controversy. Sharp disagreements were present within the U.S., as well as NATO, concerning the overall tone and tough stance of the United States' Soviet policy. In an effort to achieve support for his foreign policy, the President made an attempt to accommodate Congress, the public, and NATO. With these groups in mind, the Administration's policy towards the Soviet Union underwent a metamorphosis which resulted in a more conciliatory style.

In 1983, relations between the United States and the Soviet Union started as poor at the beginning of the year, improved by the summer, and then plummeted again by fall.<sup>1</sup> One of the major obstacles to successful arms negotiations with the Soviets was the Reagan Administration's emphasis and drive toward increased military strength. The White House's continual reference to the larger numbers of Soviet land-based missiles came to be known as the United States'

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<sup>1</sup>Strobe Talbott, The Russians and Reagan, (New York: Vintage Books, 1984), p. 3.

"window of vulnerability". The Reagan Administration believed that before arms reductions could occur, the United States had to go to the bargaining table from a position of strength.<sup>2</sup> The perception that the Russians were to be feared and that effective bargaining required an arms build-up was an essential part of the initial Reagan rhetoric. However, as opposition to the White House's hard line increased by the third year of his Presidency, the Administration's stance had to be altered in an attempt to avoid an overall break-down in East-West relations.<sup>3</sup>

The Administration suffered a severe set-back by the Democratic gains in the House in the 1982 November elections. The President's programs were falling under wide attack, and he was reported to have told his aids that he felt no one was making his case.<sup>4</sup> As a result, the President began a campaign to win over support for his foreign policy. He utilized the bully pulpit accompanying the office and began to dominate the political arena on such issues as arms control and military spending which had come under fire. It was a deliberate attempt by the White House

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<sup>2</sup>Ronald Reagan, An American Life, (New York: Pocket Books, 1990), p. 194.

<sup>3</sup>Talbott, p. 4.

<sup>4</sup>"The President Out Front: Reagan, Taking the Offensive, Orchestrates Intensive Effort to Win Support for Policies," New York Times, 3 April 1983, p. A1.

to barrage the media before Congress recessed for Easter vacation. The Administration hoped that the direct appeal would influence the voters at home.<sup>5</sup>

After maintaining a low profile during the period of budget formulation in December and January, the Administration emerged to fight tough battles in Congress over the nuclear freeze, the MX missile, and the military budget. The Administration utilized the airwaves to promote its version of a futuristic missile defense system. Although this chapter focuses on the battle for MX funding, it must be taken together with the other issues such as the nuclear freeze and the military budget, which both impacted the future of the U.S. defense system. The MX is worth consideration in this study since the system provided the catalyst for changes in U.S.-Soviet relations during the year. The foundation of U.S.-Soviet negotiations, as well as public opinion and Congressional spending, was heavily influenced by the Administration's missile defense system.

By 1983, the concept of the missile defense system dated back ten years. The promotion of MX had been used as a tool to compensate for what the United States, under the Carter Administration, had proposed to give up in the SALT II agreement. By the time Reagan came to office, the MX became referred to as the "peacekeeping weapon". The

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<sup>5</sup>Ibid.

widespread controversy surrounding the issue demonstrates that not all of the public or the Congress perceived the weapons system as the ultimate, or even a desirable, Soviet deterrent.<sup>6</sup>

The MX was used as a response to a massive buildup in Soviet intercontinental missiles. By the third year of the first Reagan term, sufficient opposition to White House policies forced the Administration to re-evaluate the direction of its strategy toward the Soviets. Substantial factions began to form in the public, as well as the Congress, in opposition to the overall tone and the contentious nature of U.S.-Soviet relations at this time.<sup>7</sup> The inflexibility of the Reagan Administration was becoming a liability rather than an asset. While the public feared the Soviets, there is evidence that opinion was turning towards the option of an easing of relations and a climate of negotiation as opposed to the chilled superpower tensions.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>6</sup>"Officials Say MX Study May Lead to a New Arms-Control Strategy: Stress on Warhead Limits," New York Times, 10 April 1983, p. A1.

<sup>7</sup>Talbott, p. 19.

<sup>8</sup>"The public's approach to preventing nuclear war and reducing nuclear arms-- by a margin of 64% to 25%, according to the poll-- was to seek a mutual freeze on nuclear weapons with the Soviet Union rather than a military buildup by the United States." ("Poll Finds Doubt Over Responses to Soviet Threat," New York Times, 15 April 1983, p. A1).

The Reagan Administration attempted to use the MX as leverage in negotiations with the Soviet Union. Thus the MX became a way for the White House to pressure the Soviets towards arms talks which would result in an image change for the Administration and in a bargain for a reduction in arms. The MX would bolster the land-based nuclear system of the U.S., the Administration reasoned, and a position of strength would result with respect to arms negotiations. In terms of an effective White House strategy, it was necessary that Congress support the MX. The weapons system was so central to the Administration's policy that without the support from Congress for the MX system, negotiations between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. would have most likely remained at an impasse.<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>9</sup>"Officials Say MX Study May Lead to a New Arms-Control Strategy" p. A1.

## MX Policy

The Reagan Administration perceived a need to assemble a bipartisan commission in an effort to ultimately achieve congressional and public approval for the Administration's arms control policy. A deadlock had ensued over the method best suited for reducing the vulnerability of American land-based ICBM's. The commission's suggestions were first adopted by the Administration after the commission called for a shift in emphasis away from limiting the number of missile launchers to restricting the number of warheads permitted on each missile and allowing more missiles as long as they contained only one warhead.<sup>10</sup>

The MX gave rise to basic changes in policy as the Times writes:

A presidential commission today recommended basing 100 MX missiles in existing Minuteman silos and proposed "new directions" for strategic forces and arms control through development of a new single-warhead missile for the 1990's. . . . commission members who insisted that their recommendations constituted an "inseparable" package, made clear that they regard the potential shift on arms control as a major selling point to persuade a skeptical Congress to vote for funds for deployment of the MX missile.<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>10</sup>Ibid.

<sup>11</sup>"MX Panel Proposes Basing 100 Missiles in Minuteman Silos: Urges New Limits on Arms," New York Times, 12 April 1983, p. A1.



The suggested shift in policy provided a new direction which limited warheads, making the land-based missile less of a threat by decreasing its destructive capabilities.

The commission further recommended a change in the Reagan Administration's policy, suggesting the consideration of the submarine forces and American bombers, in addition to the deterrent force missiles, as vital components of the strategic security system of the United States. It was in the context of a total assessment of the nuclear defense capabilities of the United States that the MX system was promoted.

U.S. strategic doctrine in the nuclear age is based on a land-sea-air "triad" of nuclear options. The triad gives the United States the ability to strike the Soviet mainland with land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and nuclear bombs carried by aircraft. But the bomber fleet was aging in 1981, and SLBMs are less accurate than ICBMs. If the U.S. land-based missiles became sitting ducks that could easily be destroyed in their underground silos, a "Window of Vulnerability" would exist until the United States could develop a new land-based missile that would be protected either by its mobility or by some form of hardened shield.<sup>12</sup>

The MX system provided a way to " . . . remove the Soviet advantage in ICBM capability."<sup>13</sup> This change in direction, it was argued by the commission, would also provide an

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<sup>12</sup>Lou Cannon, President Reagan: The Role of a Lifetime, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991), p. 164.

<sup>13</sup>"MX Panel Proposes Basing 100 Missiles in Minuteman Silos" p. A1.

incentive for the Soviets to negotiate for a reduction in strategic forces.<sup>14</sup>

Support for the President's new policy of reduction began to gain momentum in the House. On April 14, the House defeated an amendment by a vote of 229 to 190 which would have called on the President to begin dismantling nuclear warheads before new ones could be deployed. It would appear that the President was beginning to benefit from an aggressive public relations campaign which altered the Reagan image to appeal to a broader base with its increasingly moderate tone.

Only a week later, the news of the Soviet violation of the terms of the SALT II, along with four other treaties agreed upon in the 1970's, broke. Although the SALT II treaty was never approved, both countries had been abiding by the terms of the treaty. Many conservatives in Congress along with the Administration utilized these findings to further the case for the MX missile and to spur public support for an increase in the overall defense budget. These findings were viewed as a way to put the Soviets on the defensive.<sup>15</sup>

As was the case with the Afghanistan invasion and the

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<sup>14</sup>Ibid.

<sup>15</sup>"Panel Tells Reagan the Russians Seem to Have Broken Arms Pact," New York Times, 21 April 1983, p. A1.

Polish crisis, certain considerations impacted the policy of the United States. Although it is impossible to quantify the impact of the opinion of the western allies, it is assumed that these opinions affected the parameters and options available to the President. While the Administration could potentially make public the information on Soviet arms violations and achieve the support necessary to silence a great deal of the opposition posed by the freeze movement, it will be argued that the response was tempered by two factors, the first being the sentiments of the western allies. The anti-freeze movement in Europe was of far greater magnitude than that in the United States. Europeans were increasingly becoming uncomfortable by the superpower arms escalation.<sup>16</sup> A second factor was the possible disintegration of arms talks as well as a killing of the MX system in any form. This study assumes that these factors were, in part, responsible for moderating the response that impacted the possible policy options of the Administration, although it is difficult to know to what extent.

By May, the Administration was moving towards a policy that was seen as a concerted effort to placate Congressional opponents of the MX. The new shift in policy was an attempt to illustrate to Congress that the Administration had

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<sup>16</sup>Talbott, p. 125.

changed its policy in a serious effort to reduce arms. While media coverage of proponents of nuclear freeze in Congress seemed to decrease, doubts about the commitment of the Administration to arms reduction emerged as the principal obstacle for the funding of the MX system.<sup>17</sup>

The policy shift was substantial since the strategy of the United States as articulated by the Times was fundamentally altered. Arms control talks had previously focused on the number of launchers each side was allowed. This led to the creation of missiles with the capability to deliver multiple warheads. By limiting the number of missiles, the war planners could achieve an advantage over the enemy by packing each missile with many warheads. Large missiles are dangerous since they provide the means for an attacker to theoretically wipe out the enemy's arsenals by firing only a few missiles. This also carries the temptation of a first strike, since damage to a multiple warhead system, as opposed to a single warhead system, is far more dramatic.<sup>18</sup>

In an effort to resolve the danger posed by multiple warheads, the special committee strongly urged the Reagan Administration to alter its policy stance as well as its

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<sup>17</sup>"U.S. Said to Move Toward New Plan on Strategic Arms: Stress on Limiting Warheads, Not Launchers, Thought to Form Core of Proposal," New York Times, 11 May 1983, p. A1.

<sup>18</sup>Ibid.

overall objectives. By addressing potential dangers through a shift in arms control policy, the Times writes in a front page article that:

If each weapon has only one warhead, an attacker can knock out a rival's arsenal only on a one-for-one basis, and thus can gain no advantage by moving first.<sup>19</sup>

By shifting policy, the President had an opportunity to appear to be taking steps to alleviate the threat of nuclear war while, at the same time, building support for the MX missile system.

Reagan's change in policy, along with his personal appeal to Congress, began to take effect. On May 11, the President was able to gain the approval of the Defense Subcommittee of the Appropriations Committee in a vote of 9 to 3 in favor of providing \$560 million, which had been frozen the previous year for testing of the MX. A personal letter from Reagan to committee members was reported to have mentioned that the Administration was "conducting a review" with the goal of crafting "new negotiating proposals".<sup>20</sup>

The following day the Times reported that another obstacle had been overcome in the House by the Administration as the Senate appropriations Committee voted

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<sup>19</sup>Ibid.

<sup>20</sup>"President Pledges to Shift Approach on Arms Control: Gains Victory on Missile; House Panel Backs MX Funds After Nine Congressmen Get Reagan Letter on Vow," New York Times, 12 May 1983, p. A1.

an additional \$65 million for flight testing.<sup>21</sup> Again, this success is credited to the personal letters from the President to a group of influential Senators. Reagan's personal appeals and lobbying efforts to lawmakers were sufficient (in the opinion of House Speaker Tip O'Neil) to have salvaged the missile from certain defeat.<sup>22</sup>

Reagan continued with an effective campaign to demonstrate his sincere commitment to the promotion of arms reductions. The House approved the Administration's plan by 239 to 186 on May 24, 1983, to base 100 MX missiles in existing shelters in Wyoming.<sup>23</sup> This vote was important since it reversed the decision made the year before to block the deployment of this weapon, which had the capability of carrying ten densely packed warheads with great accuracy. The President successfully convinced legislators that the weapon was critical to the future of arms reductions. However, the battle for the appropriation of \$4.8 billion dollars for the procurement of the weapon still remained.<sup>24</sup>

On May 26, 1983 the Senate gave final approval for the

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<sup>21</sup>"MX Plan Clears Another Hurdle By a 17-11 Vote: Reagan's Letter is Seen as Swaying Senators," New York Times, 13 May 1983, p. A1.

<sup>22</sup>Ibid.

<sup>23</sup>"President's Plan for Basing of MX Approved in House: Key Victory for Reagan," New York Times, 25 May 1983, p. A1.

<sup>24</sup>Ibid.

basing of 100 MX missiles and the release of \$625 million for the weapons development.<sup>25</sup> The Times explains the victory:

Today's decision also appeared to end a 10 year search for a home for the weapon, the largest designed by the United States. The critical factor in this changed attitude was a report by a Presidential commission last month that packaged the MX plan with two other proposals. One was that the Administration would also develop a smaller and more mobile missile for deployment in the 1990's; the other was that Mr. Reagan would be more flexible in arms control talks with the Soviet Union.<sup>26</sup>

The Defense Department, along with the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, favored the conclusions of the bipartisan commission on Strategic Forces for a change in the Administration's direction in arms negotiations. All three groups agreed that the most threatening weapons in the U.S. and Soviet arsenals were the multi-warhead missiles. The recommendation was made to eliminate limitations imposed on both sides for the development and deployment of single warhead missiles.<sup>27</sup> This is an instance in which an alternative policy was recommended publicly to the President before it was endorsed. The Administration did back the

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<sup>25</sup>"Senate, By 59 To 39, Votes \$625 Million for Testing of MX," New York Times, 26 May 1983, p. A1.

<sup>26</sup>Ibid.

<sup>27</sup>"U.S. Plans to Shift Arms Bid to Soviet in Geneva Parley: Agencies Split on Detail," New York Times, 8 June 1983, p. A1.

recommendation of the commission which resulted in a change in negotiating emphasis from deep cuts in the number of missiles to one of control of the number of warheads.<sup>28</sup> The hope of the commission was that negotiations would move to the deployment of less dangerous single-warhead missiles which would be accomplished by increasing the overall missile ceiling.

As the second week in June began, arms talks with the U.S.S.R. threatened to remain deadlocked, and the President altered his policy by stressing flexibility as he eased his previous stand on missile limits. However, the President, mirroring the concerns of the commission and the Security Council, remained firm on the Administration's goal of reducing warheads held by each side to 5,000 but softened on the exact number of land and sea based missiles.<sup>29</sup> It was at this point that the tone of the President became demonstrably different. With reference to the talks in Geneva, the President stated that "a new feeling of partnership" in NATO as well as a "new spirit of bipartisanship" in both Houses was emerging as a result of the change in the policy of the Administration.<sup>30</sup>

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<sup>28</sup>Ibid.

<sup>29</sup>"Reagan, Stressing Flexibility, Eases Arms Talks Stand," New York Times, 9 June 1983, p. A1.

<sup>30</sup>Ibid.



According to the Times, by the third week of June the Administration was threatening to " . . . deploy 100 MX missiles unless the Soviet Union agrees to give up most of its 818."<sup>31</sup> The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, headed by Kenneth Adelman, communicated to the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Charles H. Percy,

. . . that the MX was a response to a massive buildup in Soviet intercontinental missiles. In an authorized statement, he said the Administration would go forward with MX "unless the Soviets are prepared to reverse this buildup and forgo their heavy and medium ICBM's."<sup>32</sup>

This came about in the midst of the first successful flight test the preceding week.

As arms negotiations began to stall, Adelman publicly offered to abandon the MX missile if the Soviet Union would give up the bulk of its medium and heavy land-based weapons. The American demands were unrealistic since relinquishing the medium- and long-range missiles would encompass the bulk of the Soviet Union's nuclear arsenal.<sup>33</sup> At a hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, four former directors of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency stated

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<sup>31</sup>"U.S. Presses Soviet for Big Reduction In Its ICBM Force: Proposal is Linked to MX But Senior Administration Aide and Key Senators Say the Plan is Not Realistic," New York Times, 22 June 1983, p. A1.

<sup>32</sup>Ibid.

<sup>33</sup>"Four Predecessors Assail Adelman on Missile Idea: Say ICBM Stand Could Hurt Talks in Geneva," New York Times, 23 June 1983, p. A1.

that the position articulated by Adelman would hurt the United States' negotiating position.<sup>34</sup>

Mr. Adelman's statement became an embarrassment to the White House. This was a case in which the Administration suffered the consequences of internal disagreement. Secretary of State George Shultz quickly responded in an effort to downplay Mr. Adelman's threats. A letter was sent to the Foreign Relations Committee which was then made public. Mr. Shultz, as well as other officials, responded to the Foreign Relations Committee chairman Senator Charles H. Percy by writing that Adelman

. . . did not reflect the United States' negotiating position, which they described as flexible. At the same time, Mr. Shultz said no significant progress had been made with Moscow on a variety of issues even though the United States was seeking to negotiate.<sup>35</sup>

While internal disagreement was at times identifiable in both the Reagan and Carter Administrations, the manner in which the particular President responded determined the damage caused by public displays of conflict. When compared to internal disagreements occurring within the Carter Administration, the Reagan Presidency appeared more adept at containing damage by shifting the attention of the press to other aspects of this event. The White House quickly

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<sup>34</sup>Ibid.

<sup>35</sup>Ibid.

responded to the statements of Adelman by distancing "official" position from that of Adelman and claiming to pursue negotiations from a position of flexibility.<sup>36</sup>

The major test for funds for the MX missile system occurred in the latter part of July. The Congress was now asked to appropriate \$4.65 billion for the missile itself, which was reportedly in trouble as Representatives continued to waver. The Administration began an intense lobbying program to secure the House vote. Brent Scowcroft, who had headed the President's bipartisan commission on the MX, cautioned Congress in a letter. He warned that rejection of the missile would "fracture the bipartisan consensus" which had emerged in Congress on decisions involving strategic issues. He further cautioned that a failure to support the funding would undermine the progress made in arms reduction talks in Geneva.<sup>37</sup> The request to spend \$4.65 billion on the missile was followed with the reiteration of the promise by the Reagan Administration which included a commitment to negotiate an arms control agreement with the Soviet Union in return for Congressional funding for the MX system.

On July 20, the Reagan Administration won the critical victory necessary to insure the deployment of the MX missile

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<sup>36</sup>Ibid.

<sup>37</sup>"Reagan Mounts New Phone Drive to Gain MX Funds in the House," New York Times, 20 July 1983, p. A1.

system. The House voted to release \$2.6 billion for the upcoming fiscal year to produce the first 27 weapons which were scheduled for deployment in 1986. While the MX continued to face other battles, this victory was significant since the vote virtually guaranteed that the system would be authorized and that money would be available to fund the project later in the year.

## Analysis

The passage of the MX missile system was central to the overall direction of the Reagan Administration's foreign policy towards the Soviets. With analysis of this event it is evident that the White House was forced to make some concessions and compromises in order to successfully achieve funding for the system. The President's policy and tone altered as domestic forces called for change. Pressure on the Reagan Administration for overall moderation in defense policy became so great that the Congress began to consider measures such as arms freeze legislation. It is safe to venture that in the absence of a more conciliatory stance from the White House, Congress would not have appropriated the money necessary for the mobile missile system, and without the system the Administration would not have adopted a concerted effort towards serious negotiations for arms reduction.

The Administration's original public stance was simple: to negotiate from a position of strength.<sup>38</sup> The Reagan Administration came to office believing that the United States' defense system had been weakened by a lack of adequate defense spending, causing the U.S. to lag twenty

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<sup>38</sup>Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy, Simon and Schuster New York

years behind the U.S.S.R. In his memoirs Reagan writes:

In spite of a stagnating Soviet economy, Soviet leaders invest twelve to fourteen percent of their country's gross national product in military spending-- two to three times the level we invest. I might add that the defense share of our United States federal budget has gone way down . . . in 1962, when John Kennedy was President, forty-six percent, almost half, of the federal budget went to our national defense. In recent years, about one quarter of our budget has gone to defense, while the share for social programs has nearly doubled.

The combination of the Soviets spending more and the United States spending proportionately less changed the military balance and weakened our deterrent. Today, in virtually every measure of military power, the Soviet Union enjoys a decided advantage.<sup>39</sup>

The Administration believed that only through parity with the Soviet Union would it be able to negotiate.<sup>40</sup> Upon close examination of the Times articles, it is clear that a central theme is repeated, as the Administration continually advocates increased defense spending in pursuit of a rapid military build up.

The MX debate was first reported in the press with a positive to neutral tone, although this only lasted for the first week of the event. From April 10, 1983 onward the overall tone of the media was overwhelmingly negative, with only four of the last twenty-seven articles displaying

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<sup>39</sup>Ronald Reagan, An American Life, (New York: Pocket Books, 1990) p. 561.

<sup>40</sup>Cannon, pp. 162-163.

positive tone.

The most negative press came from April 10, 1983 to May 5, 1983. On May 10, the Times reported that

A new approach to arms control is rumored to be contained in a "report, from the bipartisan Commission on Strategic Forces, which could move the arms control strategy from efforts to limit the numbers of missile launchers toward emphasizing limits on warheads and allowing more missiles if they have only one warhead each."<sup>41</sup>

During this period the media sank to its lowest level of support. It was at this time that the reader observation chart recorded growing opposition to the President's plan in the Senate as well as the public. Public opinion differed greatly with the President's emphasis on an increased arms build-up. According to a Times survey, 64% believed that the best deterrent to nuclear war was not an arms build up, but rather a mutual freeze.<sup>42</sup> In response to growing opposition to the Administration's plan, the President attempted to win over the media and public with the "window of vulnerability" rhetoric in an effort to gain support for the MX system.

From May 5, 1983 to July 21, 1983 the tone of media remained negative, but the bias scores appear quite a bit

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<sup>41</sup>"Officials Say MX Study May Lead to a New Arms-Control Strategy: Bishops Cite Differences," New York Times, 10 April 1983, p. A1.

<sup>42</sup>"A Big Victory for Reagan: President Hails 57-to-42 Vote as a 'Positive Step' Toward Consensus on Cutback," New York Times, 15 April 1983, p. A1.

less negative than they had previously. During this period, a new plan for strategic arms was announced and the Administration continued to portray the MX missile system as the essential component in the Reagan arms policy. The Administration altered its hardened stance, however, on June 9, 1983 when an announcement was made. An easing in tone and a stress on flexibility was adopted by the Administration. The Times writes:

Administration officials said that beyond easing the proposed limit on deployed long range missiles, the President's modified proposal was notable mainly for a change in tone and promise of flexibility, a word he used repeatedly in his statement. And with reference to the talks, he also said there was "a new feeling of partnership" in the Atlantic alliance as well as a "new spirit of bipartisanship" in Congress.<sup>43</sup>

This softening of overall policy towards the Russians generated an increase of approval in the polls. On July 24, 1983, just over two weeks after changing the tough policy stance towards the U.S.S.R., the Gallup poll approval rating increased approximately four to five percentage points to 47%. This was the highest level of approval found during the event.

Approval ratings and media tone did not appear to run in the same direction. In the initial period, overall

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<sup>43</sup>"Moscow Says Shift in U.S. Arms Stand is No Basic Change: Commentary by Tass Asserts Reagan Still Seeks an Edge in Strategic Weapons," New York Times, 10 June 1983, p. A1.



approval remained at around 42%. However as the tone in the media turned increasingly negative in the middle part of the event, public opinion displayed an opposite trend by climbing slightly in a positive direction. Toward the end of the event, public opinion fluctuated by approximately 5% between 42% and 47%.

The findings of this event support the hypothesis in terms of the initial response in the media to the President's policy. During the first week the overall tone of the media was neutral to positive. Of the five articles, three were neutral, one was positive, and one negative. After April 10 through May 5 eleven articles occurred, and of these only one was positive. This unique article covered the public's opinion on the correct U.S. response to the Soviet Threat. Although the article reported disagreement with the President over an increased arms build-up, far more of the article dealt with the public's acceptance of the the idea that a Soviet threat did exist.<sup>44</sup>

According to the reader observation chart there were no policies or policy changes observed in the initial reporting of the event. This finding is in keeping with the expectations of the central hypothesis. Although the "window of vulnerability" rhetoric was abandoned and the MX

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<sup>44</sup>"A Big Victory for Reagan: President Hails 57-to-42 Vote as a 'Positive Step' Toward Consensus on Cutback," p. A1.

plan was unveiled and heavily pushed by the Administration, it does not appear that negative reporting in this period led to an increase in policy responses from the Reagan White House.

Three of the five policy responses occurred during the period from May to July. Initially, this is a segment in time in which some very harsh policy is attempted by the Reagan Administration towards the Soviet Union. During this period the Administration is attempting to convince the press as well as the public that the missile system is the essential element in American arms policy. Shortly after this campaign, the Administration moderates its overall stance towards the Russians, in what appears to be a response to a decline in the polls as well as a negative response by the media. Furthermore, this last period reveals a mildly erratic variation in the polls. They varied from a low of 40% to a high of 47% never following an overall trend. This may also have been somewhat of a reaction to the alteration in the tone and overall policy stance of the Administration towards the Soviet Union.

Based on the results of the coding process, it would be impossible to conclude that clear evidence supported the notion that an increased negative tone in the press led to more frequent attempts to respond by the White House. It was not the case. It may be safe however to suggest that in

late May when the Administration attempted to link the missile system to the overall success of all of arms policy, the backlash in the media as well as the public opinion polls precipitated change. It was only two weeks later when the Administration's stance had noticeably softened.

The President spoke directly only three times during this event. He began the event by announcing it personally. This article's tone was the most positive of all of the articles. The next time he spoke the overall tone in the media was negative. In fact the tone of the article preceeding it was very positive. This article covered Reagan's victory as the Senate confirmed Kenneth L. Adelman as the director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Even though the content of this article seemed to be outwardly positive, there was a tremendous amount of coverage devoted to opposition. The last time the President spoke directly, the media tone was positive. This article dealt with Reagan stressing flexibility in an attempt to reduce the tension surrounding arms talks.<sup>45</sup> This article was more positive than the one previously. It does not appear that the President was attempting to use the media by frequent public speaking. On the contrary, the personal appeals and comments of the President were very sparse and

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<sup>45</sup>"Moscow Says Shift in U.S. Arms Stand is No Basic Change: Commentary by Tass Asserts Reagan Still Seeks an Edge in Strategic Weapons," p. A1.

he stayed out of the media directly. This pattern was also noticed in his handling of events in Poland.

At times throughout this event, the President clearly had a tremendous amount of opposition to the MX system in Congress, the public and NATO allies. Reagan writes:

Meanwhile, in Congress, Tip O'Neill said he had taken on the moral commitment to block further development of the MX missile, and this, I knew, wouldn't make it any easier for me to convince the Soviets that we were a united country committed to a policy of peace through strength.

Once again, a committee of 535 was trying to set foreign policy. At the same time, opposition to our new strategic policy toward the Russians continued from small but well-organized and well-publicized antinuclear groups in Europe, and some European leaders, feeling the heat, began expressing doubts about NATO's 1979 decision to deploy the new weapons.

What would I think, I asked myself, if I were a Soviet leader and saw this kind of factiousness among the leaders of the United States and the Western alliance? I'd try to exploit it, which is what they did. Seeing the split on our side, the Soviets intensified their propaganda offensive, trying to achieve political and military goals through a public relations campaign that blamed us for the impasse and claimed we were leading the world to the brink of nuclear war-- when they had been the party who'd walked away at Geneva.<sup>46</sup>

Interestingly, the question as to the effect of the press, Congress, and public opinion on Soviet leadership was seldom asked or given any thought to in terms of the press. Ultimately the openness in the United States, and NATO, was

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<sup>46</sup>Reagan, 1990, p. 602.

not sufficient to to stop the authorization of funds for the MX.


The battle for the MX missile system occurred in the midst of great controversy in respect to the Reagan Administration. Through bargaining, compromise and an appeal to the public, the President was able to achieve appropriations for a system which was questionable at the outset. The Administration's focus on the missile's approval in the Congress ignored some of the very legitimate and basic issues raised in reference to the advisability of the system itself. Some argue that it was never a good idea, but one that the President latched onto and refused to change regardless of the system's overall pitfalls. In fact, Reagan's arms control chief Kenneth Adelman later reflected that it was "the worst of all possible solutions."<sup>47</sup>

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<sup>47</sup>Ibid., p. 169.

# Reader Observation Chart

## THE MX DEBATE




**Figure 9--Reader Observation Chart**

Dates on which the reader observed policy changes:

April 3, 1983	Start of observation period.
April 12, 1983	Congress suggests shift in arms strategy.
April 12, 1983	End of "window of vulnerability" rhetoric.
May 11, 1983	New plan on strategic arms announced.
May 25, 1983	Missile portrayed as the essential element in arms policy.
June 9, 1983	Change in arms talks easing tone and stressing flexibility.
July 21, 1983	End of observation period.

# Gallup Poll Data

## THE MX DEBATE



**Figure 10--Gallup Poll Data**

Gallup poll data, based on question: Do you approve or disapprove of the way Reagan is handling his job as President?<sup>48</sup>

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<sup>48</sup>George H. Gallup, The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion 1983, (Wilmington: Scholarly Resources, 1984).

## **CHAPTER VIII**

### **CONCLUSION**

The analysis of presidential leadership is an extremely complex endeavor. Perhaps one of the most frustrating obstacles is the fact that so many variables continuously work together to impact the final foreign policy result. Factors such as the economy and widely held media and public perceptions of the international sphere as a whole all effect the policy process. Furthermore, there is reason to believe that some leaders are just "luckier" when compared to others in terms of the international issues they are forced to deal with during a given presidential term.

Questions such as what constitutes good leadership are difficult to answer when no two foreign policy crises are alike. Also the changing role of the press and the public make the study of the Presidency difficult. The political culture of the American society has been indelibly shaped by the Vietnam War as well as the cold war and its eventual demise. Had this study sampled the foreign policy process of the U.S. during the McCarthy era at the height of the cold war, the results would have been much different. There would have been far more cohesion, media and public support



for the President, and a definite bi-partisan consensus.<sup>1</sup>

While individual participation in political causes has increased, voter turnout remains at a low. Single issue voting, along with a huge increase in voters who perceive themselves as independents, has mushroomed. The power of the party has plummeted and Presidents must put together coalitions of groups and patch together a platform which appeals to a multiplicity of interests in order to get elected.<sup>2</sup> This trend has given rise to a public with a very short attention span, vulnerable to the sensationalized television images of the media. However, in events with an absence of competing Congressional elite arguments questioning a President's foreign policy, the public as well as journalists are limited to "official" information and in these cases a President has a much greater control of media and subsequent public information.<sup>3</sup> Overall, however, the cynicism in the public and the media, should lead observers to question whether there is truly such a thing as a strong leader. Will we ever return to a Presidency able to wield the foreign policy power of the Administrations prior to Vietnam? Probably not.

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<sup>1</sup>Jerel A. Rosati, The Politics of United States Foreign Policy, (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1993). p. 554.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 559.

<sup>3</sup>John Mueller, War, Presidents and Public Opinion, (New York: Wiley, 1973).

Both the Carter and Reagan Administrations did lead in the initial stage of foreign policy. However, over the duration of an event, the media, as well as public opinion, became, in many instances, less supportive. When the Carter and the Reagan Administrations were compared in terms of public approval at the outset of the events, the overall average of approval for the Carter Administration was 43% and the Reagan Administration's overall average was 52%. Interestingly, there were 790 network news stories during the first 100 days of the Reagan Presidency, as compared to 906 for the same period of the Carter Administration.<sup>4</sup> In the cases of Cuba, Afghanistan and SALT II, all occurring under Carter, opinion polls conducted at the beginning of the events registered a decrease in overall public approval ratings from previous levels. Cuba began at 34%, Afghanistan 57%, and Salt II 38% and then a decline followed. In the case of the Reagan Administration, public opinion began at 43% for the MX debate, and held relatively steady. Only in the instance of Poland was there a sharp increase in the overall level of support for the President.

Furthermore, when levels of support are compared in terms of the significance of an event, the study reveals that if Afghanistan and Poland are compared, the public

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<sup>4</sup>John Anthony Maltese, Spin Control, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1994), p. 217.

approval rating is very similar. It could be hypothesized that these events elicited a rally-round-the-flag response from the public because of their seriousness and the fact that they were both illustrated in the press as instances of Russian aggression and the further spread of Soviet domination. On the basis of this research it would seem that international events which are of substantial magnitude occurring acutely with little or no warning, positively impact the overall evaluation of a President's performance rating even if only for a short time.

To lump all of foreign policy together oversimplifies the intricate process. Foreign policy does not fall within a single category. There are policies involving treaties, war, international development, and foreign assistance to name a few.<sup>5</sup> Varying types of foreign policy must also be evaluated in terms of information flow. According to Lance Bennett, information and public opinion is determined in large part by the flow of information. When a climate of open information flow exists, competing Congressional elite ideas challenge the dominant policy of the President. When this occurs, the opinions of the public are less stable and

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<sup>5</sup>Barbara Hinckley, Less Than Meets the Eye, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), p. 6.

there is far more information for journalists to report.<sup>6</sup>

The level of media saturation also varies the course of foreign policies. In a climate of open information flow, the media is more likely to saturate the airwaves and newspapers, which also serves to provide more information to the public.<sup>7</sup> In a closed system, there is one dominant policy and the access to information is controlled by the Administration. According to Bennett this was the case in the Gulf War. A policy was decided upon and through the skillful manipulation of the public as well as the press, elite debate was very limited as the Congress debated the committing of forces for only a short time.<sup>8</sup>

In the cases of Cuba, SALT II, and the MX system, it would appear that there was far more Congressional or elite opposition. The Times was filled with criticism of the Administrations' policies. In the instances of SALT II and the MX debate, these were national defense issues which had been on preceding presidential agendas. This begin the case, there was a tremendous amount of time which opposing forces had for framing an argument against the policies of

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<sup>6</sup>W. Lance Bennett, Taken By Storm, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), p. 33.

<sup>7</sup>R.A. Brody, and C.R. Shapiro, "A Reconsideration of the Rally Phenomenon in Public Opinion," in Political Behavior Annual, ed. Samuel Long, Vol. 2 (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989).

<sup>8</sup>Bennett, Taken By Storm, p. 37.

the Presidents.

The Polish crisis, as well as the invasion of Afghanistan, seemed less hampered by criticism from Congressional elites, when compared to Cuba, the MX, and SALT II. On this basis, a differentiation of the policies in this study can be made. However, in terms of levels of saturation, the policies chosen were covered at least twenty times on the front page of the Times, even though the distribution of that coverage varied over time.

Barbara Hinckley, in her book Less Than Meets The Eye, would most likely differ, to a point, since she argues that foreign policy conflict between the President and Congress is an illusion. Hinckley states:

Indeed, the notion that there is a struggle for influence between the two elected branches is itself the most effective illusion, hiding how small the agenda actually is.<sup>9</sup>

Even if Congressional and presidential debate is an illusion, its varying levels in response to a particular foreign policy exert corresponding effects on the availability of information to journalists. Thus in a climate in which Congressional and presidential debate rages, the effects on the media and subsequent public opinion are far more dramatic, even if the debate itself is an illusion. The presence of elite criticism affects the

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<sup>9</sup>Hinckley, Less Than Meets the Eye, p. 174.

information flow which may translate into media saturation as well as changes in public opinion.

This being the case, and recognizing that each foreign policy is unique, and that making a comparison is at best difficult, there are some important elements of the study which seek to account for the uniqueness of each of these five events. First, all policy considered covered U.S.-Soviet relations during the Carter and first term of the Reagan Administration cold war. By choosing Soviet policy, the study anticipated that if Americans had an opinion on foreign policy issues, policies dealing with the Soviet Union would be most likely to generate opinions as well as a relatively high level of media saturation.

By selecting Soviet policy, the study also anticipated that a historical context was present in the public's mind. Information covering U.S.-Soviet relations was frequent enough that new policies could be given some sort of context as well as a comparative level of importance in the broader historical progression of superpower relations.

Unlike Berry who selected one event from five different Administrations, occurring in different regions of the globe, this study attempted to consider the major superpower tensions which occurred over two Administrations. The study did not preselect policies which were "successful", as did Berry, but rather all events which appeared twenty or more

times on the front page were included.

In all five of the events, the coding identified a positive initial response in the press. The positive coverage in the instance of Cuba however, was very short. A possible explanation for the uniqueness of the Cuban event could be simply that it was not the White House which informed the press about the story. Instead it was Senator Frank Church of Idaho who decided to go public with the information of the presence of Soviet combat troops in Cuba. The author of this study argues that the negativity in the media was more a response to the Administration's seeming lack of control of the situation in terms of the dissemination of information, rather than any substantive policy stance taken by the Administration.

If the reader observation charts are analyzed, there is an indication that each case does initially begin with a positive or neutral response in the press even though this phenomenon may be short-lived. The ramifications of this finding would lead to the conclusion, in support of the hypothesis, that regardless of who is filling the office of the White House, a President has a tremendous amount of power in the initial stage of the foreign policy making process.<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>10</sup>Charles W. Ostrom, Jr. and Brian L. Job, "The President and the Political Use of Force," American Political Science Review, 80:541.

Our experience as a country changed in the aftermath of Vietnam and Watergate. Media and public respect for the office of the President has been replaced by questions challenging presidential power and executive decision-making. In numerous instances, disastrous foreign policies of the past impact the media and public's assessment of new presidential responses to emerging international challenges of the present. To borrow from a very Marxian concept, its as if society knows nothing about the present without putting it into the context of the historical past.

It was originally hypothesized in this study that both the Carter and Reagan Presidencies made policy in a relatively unhampered, or even favorable environment in the early stages of an event. The original hypothesis can be supported on a limited basis. In all fairness, it must be recognized that many times the initial neutral or positive media responses were rapidly replaced with an increasingly negative tone in the press. It must be noted that much of policy occurred significantly later than the first front page stories of an event. Berry assumes that all policy occurs in the early stages of an event, and that the media supports the policy at the outset of a crisis. He misses completely the fact that this early stage is not the only time when the White House is likely to respond with a



policy.<sup>11</sup> There is a time lapse between an event and an official response. On the basis of this research, there was mixed evidence to support Berry's theory.

Overlapping of the policy process was the norm in these events. Furthermore, it is absolutely infeasible to fully support Berry's notion that in the initial stages the media supports the Administrations's policy. This research indicates that policy is often not clearly defined in the initial stage of an event. In fact many times the most significant policy responses occurred at the conclusion of an event. What can more logically be assumed is the idea that the media accept and support the Administrations's initial description and assessment of an event. This is also a time when Congressional or elite opposition has not yet peaked.

It is the opinion of this author that foreign policy is dominated by the President in the initial phases of a new policy by virtue of the fact that the flow of information to the press is very likely to fall under the control of the White House at the outset of a foreign policy crisis. It is the dissemination of information and the manner by which it is presented to the Congress, the media, and subsequently the public which impacts public and media expectations as well as determines the time frame for executive response.

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<sup>11</sup>Berry, p. 141.

If news of an event is "officially" reported to the media and its significance is minimized, the pressure for immediate action is much less, as opposed to a situation in which the White House alarms the press with inflammatory language of an impending crisis.

The manner in which a foreign policy event is revealed to the press, and subsequently the public, should perhaps be interpreted as a policy reaction in and of itself. It certainly sets the tone as well as expectations for a future response by establishing a level of importance on the "public" presidential agenda. Furthermore, the time frame in which an event is becoming known to the media and the public is extremely brief. What follows, in most instances before official policy reactions, is the media's continuation of information gathering which may overstep the "official" assessment of an event. It is this space in time between the revelation of a crisis and a presidential foreign policy response to an event which creates a vacuum for the media to fill. However, this vacuum was not filled negatively by the press at the outset of an event except for the instance of Cuba.

It is also important to recognize the impact of other international events. A good example is the response of the Reagan Administration to the Polish crisis which came in the wake of the invasion of Afghanistan. One could also

consider the effects of the hostage crisis in Iran and the events in Afghanistan during the Carter Administration. It was observed that frequently a media story would include other foreign policy events within the confines of the front page of the Times. This colored the media's portrayal of an event as well as serving as a broad evaluation of the general state of foreign affairs.

The author concludes from this research that foreign policy is an ongoing process. It is impossible to define a clear-cut time when policy is formulated and when a policy is uniformly introduced to the public. There were threats, trial balloons, and instances of no official response whatsoever occurring in the events analyzed. Also, policy was found to be multifaceted. For example, in the case of Afghanistan, a new Carter doctrine emerged, sanctions were implemented and the Olympics were boycotted. This occurred over time. When a policy is implemented and produces little or no effect, other policies emerge. In both Administrations a pattern of a mild response in the form of rhetoric or a threat seemed to typify the first initial reaction. Flexibility seemed to be desirable to both Administrations which explains why the policy process occurred incrementally. In fact it would be irrational for a leader to implement all policy options in the early phase of an event, as Berry suggested.

The use of "threat policy" appeared to have carried some definite drawbacks. In some events a threat would be made in an effort to deter unwanted behavior on the part of the Soviet Union. This carried potential hazards for the President. First it established a set of future expectations by the press if the threats needed to be implemented in the form of policy. Second it limited the President's future actions. What may seem a logical response in the present may not be plausible at a later time. Third the articulation of a potential threat carried with it the possibility that the press and the public would respond negatively and support for a presidential action would be undermined before a policy was even implemented. This was a recurring problem which the Carter as well as the Reagan Administrations faced in their dealings with the Soviet Union.

Democracy and open press along with public opinion polls had the capability of relegating foreign policy responses by the United States to a compromised status when compared to the Soviet totalitarian model of leadership and decision making. The effects of public opinion polls as well as negativity in the media thwarted and in some instances overturned the foreign policy of a particular Administration over time. The other problem with policy and the President's ability to act came whenever the

international community was involved. Interestingly it was not until the Reagan Administration came to power that real concern about foreign opinion occurred.<sup>12</sup> In the instances of the MX debate, the invasion of Afghanistan and the events in Poland, part of the policy of the Administrations hinged on support from the international community. In each instance the President was undermined not only by the American press or public opinion, but rather the international community and in some instances western allies. Coalition building in the international realm proved to be a very risky policy option and in most instances was detrimental to the leadership of an Administration.

The use of the historical past is also a practice which may limit the President. In each event, there was some comparison to a similar event which had occurred in the past. In the case of Poland it was the invasions of Hungary and Czechoslovakia. In the case of Cuba it was compared to the Bay of Pigs. In the case of Afghanistan it was also compared to Soviet aggression into Eastern Europe. In the cases of Salt II and MX, they were linked to previous treaties and past treaty violations. By constantly comparing an event to events in the past, expectations on the part of the media and the public arise. Although many

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<sup>12</sup>Maltese, 1994, p. 195.

Americans could not identify Poland on a map, they could identify with the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia and Soviet aggression into other East European states as being negative.

The impact of international factors seems to be an area which has suffered academic neglect and could benefit from further study. As the United States becomes more globally interdependent, various media may have some anticipated effects on the foreign policy arena. It may be that the United States will ultimately join a "populist democracy" in which the complexity of international discourse will make the international public next to unmanageable.<sup>13</sup> The role of various other media other than the Times will need to be analyzed as new information sources such as cable and computers emerge and dominate the flow of information. In the event more global conflicts are mediated by the U.N. the role of the President and the Congress will have to be reexamined. in setting the media's agenda.

The events do support the original hypothesis. In the initial phases of a foreign policy, a President is able to exercise power relatively freely. Ultimately it must be remembered that the public cares far less about foreign

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<sup>13</sup>D. Webster, "New Communications Technology and the International Political Process," in The Media and Foreign Policy, ed. S. Serfaty, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991).

policy when compared to domestic issues. Furthermore, only a very few foreign policy events will end up on the President's or the Congress' agenda. Therefore, while the executive branch continues to make the bulk of foreign policy decisions, the President, Congress, media and the public are privy to only a minute amount of foreign policy information.<sup>14</sup>

It would seem that part of good leadership is made up of identifying a problem and outlining a response. Even if policy responses changed, the media and the public seemed more comfortable knowing the direction the Administration was taking. It is useful to keep in mind that many times the public as well as the media do not follow the President, instead they join a leader in the pursuit of a goal.<sup>15</sup> The ability to define U.S. interests and policy objectives, appeared to be a very essential component to presidential leadership. While the media does allow the President a somewhat free hand in the initial phase of a foreign policy event, unless a goal can be articulated with an accompanying set of policies, the press and the public have no direction to follow and no policy by which to rally.

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<sup>14</sup>Hinckley, Less Than Meets the Eye, pp. 184-185.

<sup>15</sup>Wills, p. 70.

**APPENDIX A**  
**ARTICLE CODING**

**How I Coded:**

Below is a sample of one of the front page stories from the New York Times, dated September 13, 1979. Bernard Gwertzman reports in this article the possibility that the Soviet forces in Cuba may be training forces. Gwertzman constructs a story focusing on the possibility that the Administration has incorrectly identified the role of the combat brigade in Cuba. He explores the possible negative effects this will have on the Administration as he writes of the semantic problem this mix-up has created. This overall negative article was made up of seventeen paragraphs, coded as having 12 neutral and 5 negative paragraphs.

This story is a good representation of both the task as well as the challenges of conducting content analysis. For example I coded a paragraph reporting the possibility that the Soviet brigade may be serving its major function as that of training Cuban forces for the ongoing war in Africa with a score of -1 (negative) . Some would have perhaps coded it as 0 (neutral) when answering the question of measurement "how does this paragraph reflect on the president's policy, support and overall ability to lead?" However, it is the



assumption of the researcher that most individuals would read the paragraph, ask the question and conclude that this information made the President appear unable to capably lead since it makes the Administration look like they are unsure of the Soviet intentions especially when they had previously reported them as being combat in nature.

Another paragraph which received a 0 (neutral score) reported, in the same article, that no disagreement existed within the State Department over the types of weapons which the Soviet forces had. This is a good example of the typical and by far most prevalent paragraph which reports merely fact. It was anticipated that the vast majority of the paragraphs would be neutral and this was most certainly proven by the coding process.

An example of a very positive paragraph could be illustrated with an example in the instance of Afghanistan occurring on January 27, 1979. One paragraph reported that:

The executive board of the United States Olympic Committee voted unanimously tonight to ask the International Olympic Committee to postpone, cancel or transfer the Moscow Games.

This paragraph received a +1 (positive) rating since it seemed to be a strong indication of support for the President. When the question was applied to this paragraph, "How does this paragraph reflect on the president's policy, support and overall ability to lead?" the coder reasoned that the President was definitely receiving support for his

policy.

The reliability of the coding is strengthened in several different ways; first, the study codes all of the articles. Berry selected from the New York Times index, which created a bias from the start. By considering all articles for the year, the number of samples increases dramatically from the approach used by Berry, and the bias in selection is circumvented. Second, the article was coded, and then several months later, the article was recorded. The results were very close. Third, by simplifying the scale to a three-point measure, the coding process itself seemed to be simplified in such a way that the coder did not bias the results as was the case with a five-point scale. It was found that a far greater amount of deliberation went into a five-point scale, which created a greater potential for bias.

**Example of a Negative Article:**

This is the entire text of the article, with each paragraph's score in parentheses.

**"U.S. Weighing View That Soviet Force Is Training Cubans",**

The Carter Administration is studying the possibility that the Soviet combat brigade that is reported to be in Cuba may have as its primary mission the training of Cuban forces for action in Africa, State Department officials said today. (-1)

Even though the possibility of the training function is only one of several theories being discussed, the fact that it is under consideration suggests a possible modification in the Administration's previous insistence that the force of 2,000 to 3,000 soldiers is strictly a combat unit. (-1)

Intelligence officials said the United States learned from the monitoring of Soviet radio communications a year ago that a combat force designated as a "Brigade" was in Cuba, but did not pursue the matter. The officials said indications of the presence of a brigade were first received in 1975 and 1976 and had been ignored in higher echelons of the Government. (-1)

Since Pravda, the authoritative Soviet Communist Party daily, was so categorical in asserting yesterday that Soviet military personnel were in Cuba solely for training purposes, the Administration has undertaken to see whether this can be reconciled with the evidence, officials said. There are arguments for and against the training theory, one official said. Part of the problem may be to define what a combat unit is. (0)

With negotiations continuing today between Security of State Cyrus R. Vance and Ambassador Anatoly F. Dobrynin of the Soviet Union over the status of the brigade in Cuba, the Administration was focusing increasingly on the mission of the Soviet forces. (0)

State Department officials said there was no disagreement within the Administration that the Soviet force consists of two rifle battalions, one rocket artillery battalion, and one tank battalion. (0)

Some military experts, the officials said, have raised the possibility that the force for some years has been a combat brigade with a training mission. The mission would be to teach Cubans how to maneuver in unit strength. The officials said the 40,000 Cuban troops deployed in Africa, mostly in Angola and Ethiopia, were organized in similar units. (0)

If indeed the Soviet force turns out to have had a training mission-and that is not definite, the officials said-then the Administration may find itself facing a problem in the Senate. By describing the brigade as a "combat unit," the Administration may have created for itself a semantic as well as a political problem. (-1)

The description of the brigade as a combat unit springs from its command organization. The unit has not only battalions of a combat type but also a command headquarters of a kind that would normally be used to direct a brigade in combat. The question is whether a unit organized as a brigade could not also be used as a military training group. (0)

Having emphasized the combat nature of the brigade, the Administration would now face a problem in persuading the Senate that the unit has a training role. Senator Frank Church, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, for instance, has said that unless the combat brigade is removed, the strategic arms treaty will not be approved by the Senate. (-1)

State Department officials said speculation about the mission, aside from a possible training function, included the following: a symbol of Soviet support while Cuban troops are in Africa; as a "trip-wire" to insure Soviet support for Cuba in case of an invasion; and protection of Soviet communications. (0)

Mr. Vance met with Mr. Dobrynin for two hours over lunch at the State Department of continue their discussions, begun Monday. During the day Mr. Vance went twice to Capitol Hill, to brief Representative Clement J. Zablocki, chairmen of the foreign Affairs Committee, in the morning, and Senator John C. Stennis, chairman of the Armed Services Committee, in the afternoon. (0)

Although the presence of the brigade has become a political issue threatening approval of the strategic arms accord, President Carter today again urged approval of the pact. Speaking to 125 religious leaders at a White House

breakfast, he said rejection in the Senate could mean the end of a common Soviet-American effort "to find a way towards reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons from the face of the earth." (0)

The Administration has carefully avoided stating what it wants the Soviet Union to do about the Brigade in Cuba. And, except for yesterday's Pravda editorial, the Soviet Union has been generally restrained publicly on the issue. (0)

Officials said that when the matter was first raised Aug. 29 with Vladilen M. Vasev, the second ranking diplomat in the Soviet Embassy, by David D. Newsom, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, the Russian asked about the legal basis for the complaint. (0)

Mr. Vasev said, according to officials, that the Soviet Union had lived up to prior understandings not to deploy offensive forces in Cuba and that the military personnel in Cuba were not a violation. Mr. Newsom agreed that they were not a violation and countered that the United States was concerned about foreign troops in the Hemisphere. (0)

When Mr. Vasev returned to the State Department a week later, he said that Soviet troops posed no threat and had every right to be in Cuba. Mr. Vance then decided to await Mr. Dobrynin's return before continuing the discussion because it was felt that Mr. Dobrynin, who has been ambassador here for more than 17 years, would understand the political situation and be sensitive to the American concern. (0)

## APPENDIX B

### New York Times Articles Pertaining to Chapter III, The Failure of the SALT II Treaty

#### Article #1            June 15, 1979

"President Lands in Vienna to Meet With Brezhnev and Sign Arms Pact: Carter Holds 'No Illusions'."

Paragraphs: 21    Neutral: 16    Positive: 4    Negative: 1

First formal meeting between the two leaders since 1974. This mostly deals with the itinerary between the two leaders.

#### Article #2            June 15, 1979

"President Lands in Vienna to Meet With Brezhnev and Sign Arms Pact: Moscow Is Warily Optimistic."

Paragraphs: 27    Neutral: 25    Positive: 0    Negative: 2

Background information and history mostly. Also talks on the possibility of Congressional opposition. Russians accuse Carter of the development the deployment of the MX as a concession to the hawks in return for the SALT II treaty.

"The treaty took six years to negotiate, partly because the Carter Administration tried to change tactics when it took office in 1977 and to negotiate lower ceilings on the number of long-range missiles and bombers. For three years, the fact that it was not completed prevented a summit meeting."

"Mr. Brezhnev is expected to press at the meeting for a lifting of the ban Congress imposed in 1974 on most favored-nation tariff terms and Export-Import Bank credits for trade with the Soviet Union."

#### Article #3            June 17, 1979

"Brezhnev and Carter Begin Vienna Parley in Friendly Discord."

Paragraphs: 39    Neutral: 34    Positive: 4    Negative: 1

More reference given to the Congress as Brezhnev states: "A careful attitude should be displayed toward what has been achieved with such great effort."

"There had been none of the sharp talk and rancor that characterized the Soviet-American summit conference in Vienna in 1961 when John F. Kennedy met with Nikita S. Khrushchev."

**Article #4                      June 17, 1979**

"Brezhnev Letter on Soviet Bomber Is Said to Lack Desired Assurances."

Paragraphs: 24      Neutral: 12      Positive: 6      Negative: 6

Reports negative response due to the Soviet bomber capable of striking the U.S. with refueling.

There is NATO criticism of the Backfire Bomber. "For more than six years, the Backfire has been an obstacle to conclusion of the treaty. Some American military officers contend that, with refueling, it can strike targets in the United States and should therefore be counted 'among the long range strategic weapons limited by the treaty.'"

**Article #5                      June 19, 1979**

"President, Warning of Arms Race, Sets Theme for Debate on the Pact."

Paragraphs: 32      Neutral: 20      Positive: 3      Negative: 9

Policy articulated in Carter's speech before the House. "A major theme of the speech was the dual nature of American policy-- to seek arms control accords and to maintain a strong defense, so strong, he said, that no potential adversary could be tempted to attack us."

"The treaty reduces the danger of nuclear war, he said, by placing equal limits on each side's nuclear arsenal; it makes future competition 'safer and more predictable,' it slows and 'even reverses the momentum of the Soviet arms buildup' and it allows the United States to concentrate on building up conventional and allied forces. The treaty enhances our ability to monitor Soviet actions, Mr. Carter continued, and it leads directly to the next step in controlling nuclear weapons."

Likens appearance on Capitol Hill to that of President

Richard M. Nixon on June 1, 1972, when he spoke to a joint session less than a half-hour after returning from a four-nation journey that included his first meeting with Mr. Brezhnev.

"During his meeting in Moscow, Mr Nixon signed the first strategic arms limitation agreement, consisting of a treaty putting a ceiling of 200 on the number of antiballistic missiles permitted each side, and an interim accord putting a curb on land-based and submarine-launched offensive missiles. The Senate voted 88 to 2 on September 14, 1972, to approve that treaty. The treaty that Mr. Carter and Mr. Brezhnev signed this morning in Vienna in a sense continues the process that was begun in 1972. The leading critic in the Congress in 1972 is the same Senator who is likely to play a major role in opposing the new treaty, Henry M. Jackson, Democrat of Washington."

**Article #6                      June 19, 1979**

"Leaders Make Signing of Treaty A Warm and Poignant Closing."

Paragraphs: 15      Neutral: 11      Positive: 4      Negative: 0

Treaty signed by the two leaders. This represents six years of negotiations in the 70 page document. By painting Brezhnev in a negative light, Carter and the United States are perceived to be the leaders.

**Article #7                      June 19, 1979**

"U.S and Soviets Sign Strategic Arms Treaty; Carter Urges Congress To Support Accord: Ceremony In Vienna-- Brezhnev Hails Agreement Sought Since 1972-- 2 Leaders Embrace."

Paragraphs: 29      Neutral: 22      Positive: 4      Negative: 3

"The treaty signed today runs until the end of 1985. It embodies the concept of parity, limiting both sides within six months to 2,400 and later to 2,250 bombers and missile launchers, and takes a step toward restraining arms modernization by limiting each side to one new missile."

"One major change negotiated here was a more explicit acknowledgement from Mr. Brezhnev that the Soviet Union would not step up the present production rate of 30 a year of its Tu-22M bomber, known in the West by the military code-name of Backfire."



First Soviet-American summit meeting since late 1974.  
"In a joint communique, President Carter won Mr. Brezhnev's public assurance that the Soviet Union, like the United States, was 'not striving and will not strive for military superiority'-- a statement that could help win votes in the battle for Senate approval of the treaty."

"The signing ceremony involved four sets of documents: a 22-page treaty that runs until the end of 1985; a two-page protocol that prohibits testing and deployment of mobile missiles and cruise missiles before 1982; 43 pages of agreed statements and common understandings that interpret the treaty; and a three-page joint statement of principles guiding the next round of arms negotiations."

". . . the Soviet Union gave the total number of its long-range missile launchers and bombers as 2,504, meaning that it will have to destroy 254 by Jan. 1, 1981, to comply with the new maximum of 2,250, while the United States gave its force as 2,283 missiles and bombers, and must destroy 33 mothballed B-52 bombers to comply with treaty terms."

"The treaty itself provides several subordinate limits within the overall ceiling of 2,250, including the following:

- A combined total of 1,320 launchers for ballistic missiles with multiple warheads and heavy bombers equipped with cruise missiles or ballistic missiles.
- No more than 1,200 launchers for ballistic missiles.
- No more than 820 land-based launchers for ballistic missiles with multiple warheads; the Soviet Union has a separate limit of 306 on the number of launchers for its heavy SS-18 missiles."

It was also an agreement to improve US-Soviet relations. The text endorsed the following points:

- Impetus to other arms control measures, but it offered no evidence of progress on a comprehensive nuclear test ban, a prohibition on anti-satellite weapons or on conventional force reductions in Europe.
- Efforts to spread detente to all areas of the globe.
- More regular summit meetings, with no specific schedule.

**Article #8                      June 20, 1979**

**"Joint Chiefs Said to Assure Carter of Support for Treaty With Soviet."**

**Paragraphs: 24      Neutral: 12      Positive: 6      Negative: 6**

"The approval of the Joint Chiefs has the potential to undermine Senate votes against the Treaty. It is only with the Carter Administration's push to develop and deploy the MX, that many believe, the support is there."

**Article #9                    June 26, 1979**

"Gromyko Warns U.S. Any Changes Doom Nuclear Arms Pact: Hails Carter-Brezhnev Talk."

Paragraphs: 18    Neutral: 17    Positive: 1    Negative: 0

SALT limits each side's strategic nuclear bombers and missiles. The article basically gives the Soviet perspective as articulated by Gromyko.

**Article #10                  July 9, 1979**

"Hearings on Arms Treaty Opening As Chances for Reservations Grow."

Paragraphs: 14    Neutral: 13    Positive: 0    Negative: 1

Senator Byrd suggests that the "Senate write into its ratification resolution President Brezhnev's written assurance to President Carter that production of the TU-22 or Backfire would not be increased and that the U.S.S.R. did not intend to give the aircraft intercontinental capability."

**Article #11                  July 10, 1979**

"Vance and Brown Defend Arms Pact At Senate Hearing."

Paragraphs: 28    Neutral: 15    Positive: 7    Negative: 6

**Article #12                  July 12, 1979**

"Joint Chiefs Support Arms Treaty But Urge Higher Nuclear Spending."

Joint Chiefs call for increased military spending. There is a connection to the Treaty's ratification and increased spending. While they claim to not link the two, they are being linked and the policy is in a sense beginning to change as a result.

Senate debates. Must remember that "one part of the defense system, is being debated. It is not the entire defense system."

**Article #13            July 18, 1979**

**"Some Senators Say an Arms Pact Loophole Aids the Soviets."**

**Paragraphs: 14    Neutral: 3    Positive: 2    Negative: 9**

Soviets could deploy 5 intercontinental missile systems it has had under development. "While the treaty would not allow the new systems to differ significantly in weight and size from existing missiles, the aides said, the new generation of missiles could still be more accurate and reliable and would be easier to maintain."

**Article #14            July 27, 1979**

**"Haig Urges Delay on Arms Treaty In Senate Till 'Flaws' Are Resolved."**

**Paragraphs: 17    Neutral: 9    Positive: 1    Negative: 7**

Haig, who is the recently retired Allied Supreme Commander in Europe, calls for delay on the treaty until the flaws are worked out and the Senate can assess President Carter's future military spending programs. This is a clear case in which ratification of the treaty is directly linked to military spending. It appears the President is having to make domestic concessions in order to pass his foreign policy. His foreign policy is becoming quickly linked to domestic policy.

**Article #15            July 31, 1979**

**"Vance Tells Senate 3% Arms-Funds Rise Remains 'Essential'."**

**Paragraphs: 17    Neutral: 10    Positive: 1    Negative: 6**

New policy of the Carter Administration. "In what appeared to be an effort to insure more support for the strategic arms treaty, Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance said today that it was 'essential' to uphold a commitment to the atlantic alliance to increase military spending by 3 percent annually."

"The Executive branch had heard a warning given last week by Senator Nunn that he would vote against the treaty unless there was a significant spending increase."

**Article #16            August 1, 1979**

**"Kissinger Suggests Senate Link Treaty To More Arms Funds."**

Paragraphs: 32    Neutral: 23    Positive: 2    Negative: 7

"Senators should approve the Treaty with the U.S.S.R. only if Carter makes a binding and urgent commitment to increase military spending." Kissinger suggests that "the President be required to submit an augmented military budget before a vote on the treaty."

**Article #17            August 5, 1979**

"3 Senators Demand Pledge From Carter on Arms-Fund Rise: Nunn, Jackson and Tower Call Pact Flawed Without Such Vow--Kissinger Repeats Stand."

Paragraphs: 19    Neutral: 9    Positive: 4    Negative: 6

"Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, meanwhile, firmly reiterated an earlier statement that he, too, favored delaying action on the treaty until a new military program had been placed before Congress and that he would recommend rejection of the treaty if this and other conditions were not met by Mr. Carter."

"Mr Kissinger and Senator Sam Nunn, Democrat of Georgia, made clear that those actions were being taken to dispel interpretations by some politicians, officials and journalists that they had earlier intended to express support for the arms treaty."

**Article #18            August 10, 1979**

"President Weighing Five-Year Increase in Military Outlays: Orders A Review of Budget."

Paragraphs: 13    Neutral: 10    Positive: 0    Negative: 3

Clearly the Senate is beginning to lead the President. If one asks how this effects the President, his policy, perception and ability to lead, it becomes obvious that the President is no longer in control of policy and that concession in other areas or linkage is occurring. Incredibly, the military is already deciding and fighting amongst themselves as to where the money will be spent.

**Article #19            August 29, 1979**

Carter Is Reported Likely to Seek Supplemental Funds for Military."

Paragraphs: 14    Neutral: 11    Positive: 1    Negative: 2

The MX, its development, and deployment are increasingly becoming a topic of discussion linked to the treaty.

"Officials said that if Mr. Carter decided to stick by a real increase of 3 percent in military spending, the Administration would probably have to request as much as 4 billion in additional funds."

**Article #20            September 6, 1979**

**"Vance Tells Soviet Its Troops In Cuba Could Imperil Ties: Threat To Arms Pact-- Church Sees No Likelihood of Its Passage if Force Remains on Island.**

Paragraphs: 11    Neutral: 7    Positive: 0    Negative: 4

U.S. warns that Soviet Troops in Cuba will hamper the treaty making process. There are those who even argue that because of inadequate defense funds, we are not able to detect Russian action.

"The adequacy of American intelligence concerning Cuba was questioned today by Senator Howard Baker the minority leader, after testimony of the subject by Mr. Vance. He said the United States was paying the price of 'reduced surveillance' and trimming back of the CIA by the Carter administration."

**Article #21            September 9, 1979**

**"President Chooses Mobile Missile Plan To Elude Soviet Attack: 200 MX's Would Be Put In Western U.S."**

Paragraphs: 23    Neutral: 16    Positive: 4    Negative: 3

"The 95 ton, 10-warhead MX, the biggest the United States has ever produced, would be 'the last missile system of enormous destructive power that we will ever have to build.'"

"The deployment plan announced today, Mr. Carter said, not only enables the Soviet Union to verify how many missiles the United States has but also assures the American people that the nation has the capability of dissuading the Soviet Union from attacking it."

"Under the somewhat complex system announced today by Mr. Carter, 200 MX mobile missiles, each carrying 10 nuclear warheads, would be deployed on circular roadways similar to race tracks. Each such site would be equipped with 23

concrete shelters; each missile would be moved on mammoth transporter vehicles weighing about 335 tons. These would be covered by shields that would prevent Soviet photography satellites from determining whether the vehicle was loaded with missiles."

"Mr. Carter said that his decision was a result of the increased vulnerability of the nation's fixed, land-based Minutemen III intercontinental ballistic missiles. He compared his decision to the establishment of the Strategic Air Command under President Truman and the subsequent decision by President Kennedy to create the silo-based Minuteman missile system."

**Article #22            September 13, 1979**

"Moscow Leadership Said To Expect No Changes That Would Kill Pact."

Paragraphs: 20    Neutral: 15    Positive: 0            Negative: 5

**Article #23            September 19, 1979**

"Senate Approves Military Budget Larger Than Carter Had Wanted."

Paragraphs: 13    Neutral: 9            Positive: 0            Negative: 4

The increase is 5% or \$40 billion over the next three years. "Although Mr. Carter argued against so large an increase for the second and third years, the vote could enhance the prospects for passage of the proposed treaty with the Soviet Union to limit strategic arms. Pro-military senators, led by Senator Sam Nunn, Democrat of Georgia have said that higher military spending was essential if they were to support the treaty. In essence the debate became a competition between two perceived threats to national security-the military threat of the Soviet Union versus the economic threat of increasing inflation and declining confidence in the dollar."

"The central argument advanced by proponents of higher military spending was simple: The United States is rapidly falling behind the Soviet Union."

**Article #24            October 10, 1979**

"Senate Deeply Split On Carter's Speech."

Paragraphs: 17    Neutral: 6            Positive: 2            Negative: 9

Carter's handling of the events in Cuba leave Senators unable to decide what to do about SALT II. Here it is important to note that the foreign policies are being linked together.

**Article #25            October 5, 1979**

**Panel in Senate Said to Question Verifying of Pact."**

Paragraphs: 18    Neutral: 12    Positive: 1    Negative: 5

"Senate sources said 'it draws no firm conclusion that the new strategic arms treaty can be adequately verified.' . . . Robert C. Byrd of West Virginia, warned today that he would not bring the pact up for a vote until the Carter Administration had given the Senate a preview of its future military spending plans."

**Article #26            October 6, 1979**

**"Senate Panel Reports Nuclear Treaty Helps In Monitoring of Arms."**

Paragraphs: 19    Neutral: 12    Positive: 3    Negative: 4

"'In a few material respects, the SALT II treaty will not be verifiable with a high degree of confidence for several years.' But he added that, because rejection of the treaty would eliminate the prohibitions on concealment and deception, the report concluded the United States would be worse off without SALT II than with it."

**Article #27            October 7, 1979**

**"President and Pontiff Issue a Plea at White House for World Peace: After Meeting Privately With Carter, John Paul Calls For Arms Limitations-- Big Mass on Mall Today."**

Paragraphs: 9    Neutral: 6    Positive: 3    Negative: 0

"After meeting privately with the President, the Pope issued a strong call for arms limitation. He did not cite the pending strategic arms limitation treaty, but his statement was immediately measured as a possible lift for the treaty's chances of approval by the Senate."

**Article #28            October 11, 1979**

**"Senator Byrd Now Expects to Start Arms Treaty Debate About November 1."**

Paragraphs: 15    Neutral: 11    Positive: 0    Negative: 4

"The Senate majority leader said today that he hoped to be ready to begin debate on the strategic arms limitation treaty with the Soviet Union by about November 1, and the Carter Administration promised to give Congress an outline of future military spending plans before the Senate votes on the pact."

**Article #29            October 24, 1979**

"Senate Panel, By 8-7, Defeats Amendment Periling Arms Pact: Close Vote Worries Backers."

Paragraphs: 15    Neutral: 12    Positive: 0    Negative: 3

"The Senate Foreign Relations Committee narrowly defeated today a so-called killer amendment to the strategic arms limitation treaty that would have asserted a legal right by the United States to match the Soviet deployment of heavy missiles."

**Article #30            November 10, 1979**

"Senate Committee Supports Arms Pact By A Vote Of 9 To 6: Margin Disappoints Aide to Carter and Raises Fresh Doubts on Passage by Full Chamber."

Paragraphs: 16    Neutral: 7    Positive: 2    Negative: 7

"The Senate Foreign Relations Committee voted 9 to 6 today to send the strategic arms treaty with the Soviet Union to the full Senate with the recommendation that it consent to ratification."

"The vote seemed to indicate that the final outcome of what has been described as one of the most important Senate debates of the century remained in doubt."

**Article #31            November 20, 1979**

"Senate Panel Issues Arms Pact Report, Urging Its Approval: 9-Member Majority Asks Adequate Budget Rise-- 4 Republicans Formulate Minority View."

Paragraphs: 14    Neutral: 10    Positive: 1    Negative: 3

"The committee made clear that an increase in military spending was critical in order to keep parity with the Russians. They called for as much spending as necessary in



order to keep up with the Russians. A minority report was filed by the four republican members of the committee. It argued that the treaty was 'detrimental to the security of the United States' and recommended that it should not receive the Senate's consent."

**Article #32            November 29, 1979**

**"Carter Accepting Substantial Rise In Arms Budget"**

Paragraphs: 16    Neutral: 12    Positive: 0    Negative: 4

"The Carter Administration, under the prodding of Senator Sam Nunn, Democrat of Georgia, and former Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger, has agreed to a substantial increase in its budget request for military spending over the next five years, Government officials said today. The officials said that, in a determined effort to gain Senate approval for the treaty with the Soviet Union on limiting strategic arms, senior Administration aides had engaged in private negotiations with Senator Nunn and Mr. Kissinger on military spending plans."

**Article #33            December 13, 1979**

**"President Calls for 4.5% Increase in Military Budgets for Five Years."**

Paragraphs: 21    Neutral: 20    Positive: 0    Negative: 1

The President now links his increase in defense spending to the situation in Iran. Officials "said that while the President's speech would have been made with or without Iran, they conceded that the hostage situation in Tehran had strongly influenced public and Congressional opinion. Recent events in Iran have been a vivid reminder of the need for a strong and united America-- A nation which is supported by its allies and which need not bluff or posture in the quiet exercise of its strength."

"President Carter, apparently in an effort to build broader Senate support for the treaty to limit strategic arms, today proposed a five-year increase in the military budget of 4.5 percent a year."

**Article #34            December 14, 1979**

**"Proposed Rises in Military Budget Appear to Aid Drive for Arms Pact."**

Paragraphs: 22    Neutral: 15    Positive: 3    Negative: 4

"President Carter's proposal to increase the military budget appeared today to have improved the prospects of Senate approval of the treaty limiting strategic arms."

**Article #35            December 17, 1979**

"19 Senators Ask Carter for Delay On Arms Treaty: Letter Said to Recommend Bolstering of U.S. Forces."

Paragraphs: 12    Neutral: 8    Positive: 0    Negative: 4

"Nineteen Senators have sent a letter to President Carter asking him to consider delaying vote on the nuclear arms treaty with the Soviet Union until after next year's Presidential election. "According to the aides, the Senators told Mr. Carter that failure by the Senate early next year to approve the treaty would constitute a blow to American foreign policy unsettling relations with Western allies and raising questions about Washington's capacity for leadership. At the same time, however, the Senators are said to have voiced strong concern about various provisions of the treaty and what they saw as an erosion of American military strength."

## APPENDIX C

### New York Times Articles Pertaining to Chapter IV, The Cuban Brigade

#### Article #1                      September 5, 1979

"Church Delays Arms Pact Hearings to Study Soviet Troop Use in Cuba."

Paragraphs: 15      Neutral: 6      Positive: 8      Negative: 1

"Senator Frank Church, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, announced today that hearings on the nuclear arms treaty would be postponed so his committee could 'deal immediately' with reports of Soviet combat forces in Cuba." "What possible justification is there for Soviet combat troops?" Mr. Church asked rhetorically in his statement.

#### Article # 2                      September 6, 1979

"Vance Tells Soviet Its troops in Cuba Could Imperil Ties: Threat To Arms Pact."

Paragraphs: 32      Neutral: 11      Positive: 12      Negative: 9

Vance testifies before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The Times reports that anything short of a troop withdrawal would jeopardize the successful ratification of the SALT II treaty, which was at the same time being considered by the committee. Church states "I'd be less than candid to say there was not a very real possibility that the two could be connected depending on what happens."

The article also integrates history as it recalls Kennedy's showdown with Khrushchev and Kennedy's demand on the Russians to withdraw their bombers and medium-range missiles. Again in 1970 President Nixon complained about indications that a base was being constructed at Cienfuegos to service Russian nuclear submarines. The Russians agreed that the understanding of 1962 included sea-based systems in Cuba. The Carter Administration now appears to be broadening the understanding of 1962 to include ground forces with an offensive purpose.

#### Article #3                      September 7, 1979

**"Some Liberals Balk at Pact Till Soviet Pulls Out Cuba Unit: Mood Hardens In the Senate-- Key Members of Committee Doubt Arms Treaty Will Go To Floor Unless Moscow Yields."**

Paragraphs: 26 Neutral: 10 Positive: 13 Negative: 13

This is interesting because what the President thinks should be done about the event and what Congress thinks should be done, are totally different. "Administration officials have suggested tat a satisfactory solution might be a Soviet pledge not to use the combat forces in any role outside Cuba. But it was becoming increasingly evident that a key block in the Senate--where a treaty can be defeated by a one-third minority-- would be satisfied only by Soviet withdrawal of the brigade from Cuba. . . Some of the more influential members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee said it was unlikely that the committee would sent the treaty reached with the Soviet Union in June to the floor unless the Soviet brigade was removed from Cuba or transformed into a non-combat status. . . . many Senators were insisting that only outright withdrawal of the brigade would satisfy them. President Carter's freedom of action to seek a milder compromise with the Soviet leaders may be seriously restricted. . . leaders of the foreign relations committee said privately that it would be folly to permit the 15 committee members to begin considering the treaty, and amendments, reservations and understandings until the outcome of the troop controversy was more clear. . . The reason for this assessment, one Senator suggested, is that unless the President has resolved the problem, senators may be tempted to begin writing their own solutions into the treaty."

**Article #4                      September 8, 1979**

**"Crisis in Cuba: Political Issue Response by President Involves Him Directly."**

Paragraphs: 19 Neutral: 7 Positive: 1 Negative: 11

"Although some senators have described the situation in terms of the October 1962 Cuban missile crisis, it is not so much a national security problem of the Carter Administration as it is a domestic political one for a President who is seeking re-election next year and who is trying to gain Senate approval for a new treaty wit Moscow to limit nuclear arms. . . . Clearly there are tremendous political problems for the Administration. Instead of Vance putting others at ease, the Senate wants something done immediately. Carter is being criticized for not acting,

being indecisive . . . What makes the 1962 comparison appealing to many is that the choice was so simple: The Soviet forces had to be withdrawn or else. But Mr. Carter, who has accepted the advice of Mr. Vance and avoided exaggeration in foreign policy, evading the creation of crisis where national security was not endangered, has chosen to act cautiously if ambiguously. He has not said what the United States wants the Soviet Union to do about the combat brigade and he has not issued any ultimatums. . . Beyond the questions of the Soviet brigade and the fate of the Strategic Arms Treaty lie the public's perception of Mr. Carter's qualities under pressure."

**Article #5                    September 8, 1979**

"Carter Tells Soviet Dispute On Troops May Hurt Relations. He Asks Nation to Stay Calm In a Statement on Brigade in Cuba-- President Says Moscow Must Respect Concern of U.S."

Paragraphs: 31    Neutral: 9    Positive: 8    Negative: 14

The President does not demand withdrawal of the troops, but instead says the Administration will pursue a diplomatic solution to the problem. "The President called on the nation to react 'not only with firmness and strength but also with calm and a sense of proportion. . . Bob Dole announced that "he would continue his efforts to seek a Senate delay of consideration of the strategic arms treaty until the Soviet troops had been removed from Cuba or until the Senate had received a written assurance from President Carter that Soviet troops pose no threat to the United States or our allies."

**Article #6                    September 9, 1979**

"President Opposes Tying Cuba Dispute To Arms Pact Vote. Takes Issue With Senators: Carter, Warning Against Linkage, Wants Treaty With Soviet To Be Judged 'On Its Merits'."

Paragraphs: 28    Neutral: 13    Positive: 8    Negative: 7

Carter wants the SALT II treaty to be judged on its own merits and not linked to the events in Cuba. Carter states "I'm convinced that SALT II ought to be passed on its own merits. I'm convinced that SALT II contributes the security of our country and I'm convinced the SALT II enhances the prospect for world peace.

**Article #7                    September 10, 1979**

**"Church Says Soviet Tests U.S. Resolve On Troops In Cuba."**

Paragraphs: 25    Neutral: 17    Positive: 2    Negative: 6

Church again links the successful passage of SALT II to the complete withdrawal of Soviet troops in Cuba.

**Article #8                    September 11, 1979**

**"Soviet Says Troops are to Advise Cuba: Denies Combat Role--  
- U.S. is Studying Overall Buildup of Cuban Forces."**

Paragraphs: 14    Neutral: 9    Positive: 0    Negative: 5

There still is not a clear policy towards Cuba. This article is asserting that there has been an increased military buildup in Cuba courtesy of the Soviet Union. However, the only response printed in the article follows. "President Carter's statement on Friday that, if the Soviet Union ignored American interests in Cuba, it could not expect the United States to respect Moscow's own 'sensibilities and concerns'." The officials said the remark was meant to warn Moscow that its support for Cuba could lead to growing cooperation with China. Although some White House aides are known to support a tilt toward Peking to underline the United States' displeasure for Soviet support of Cuba, this proposal is resisted in the State Department.

**Article #9                    September 11, 1979**

**"Soviet Says Troops are to Advise Cuba: Denies Combat Role--  
Envoy Meets Vance."**

Paragraphs: 25    Neutral: 17    Positive: 5    Negative: 3

Background on the Soviet envoy. Vance asks for patience and the ability to precede with caution.

**Article #10                  September 12, 1979**

**"Jackson Insists Soviet Withdraw Planes in Cuba: Otherwise,  
He Says, Arms Treaty Will Be Defeated."**

Paragraphs: 25    Neutral: 9    Positive: 4    Negative: 12

This is another example of a Senator making foreign policy-- or trying to. Senator Henry M. Jackson, a leading critic of the SALT II states "the accord would go 'down the tubes' unless the Soviet Union withdrew not only its combat brigade

from Cuba but also the planes it had supplied Havana and unless it agreed to provide no more submarines. He is outlining what policy should be in very specific terms while the Administration says nothing.

A related article (un-coded), titled, "Carter Rejects Rise of 5% for Military: Asks Increase of 3%," appears the same day. Linkage is shown in a sub-title, "Also, Administration Hopes Figure Will Persuade Opponents to Vote for the Arms Treaty." This article was not coded because it does not discuss the treaty or the Cuban brigade directly.

**Article #11                    September 13, 1979**

"U.S. Weighing View That Soviet Force is Training Cubans."

Paragraphs: 17    Neutral: 11    Positive: 1    Negative: 5

"The Carter Administration is studying the possibility that the Soviet combat brigade that is reported to be in Cuba may have as its primary mission the training of Cuban forces for action in Africa, State Department officials said today."

Even though the possibility of the training function is only one of several theories being discussed, the fact that it is under consideration suggests a possible modification in the Administration's previous insistence that the forces of 2,000 to 3,000 soldiers is strictly a combat unit.

"If indeed the Soviet force turns out to have had a training mission-- and that is not definite, the officials said-- then the Administration may find itself facing a problem in the Senate. By describing the brigade as a 'combat unit,' the Administration may have created for itself a semantic as well as a political problem."

Carter urges approval of the treaty and says it should not be linked to Cuba. "The Administration has carefully avoided stating what it wants the Soviet Union to do about the brigade in Cuba. And, except for yesterday's Pravda editorial, the Soviet Union has been generally restrained publicly on the issue."

**Article #12                    September 14, 1979**

"In a Diplomatic Corner: Handling of Issue of Soviet Force in Cuba Raises Doubt About the Administration's Grip on Policy."

Paragraphs: 14    Neutral: 1    Positive: 0    Negative: 13

"The Carter Administration, in the opinion of informed officials, may have painted itself into a diplomatic corner in the way it disclosed the existence of a Soviet brigade in Cuba and then insisted that it had a combat role. Eventually, with some cooperation by Moscow, there may be a face saving solution, but for the moment, at least, the impression is building in the Government that the Administration has made negotiations on the question of the brigade more difficult, jeopardized the strategic arms treaty, and raised new questions about its ability to deal with the Soviet Union and its critics in Congress at the same time."

"Unlike the situation in the celebrated missile crisis 17 years ago, it is questionable whether the tempest over the Soviet troops can be resolved in a way that both satisfies critics of the Administration and enhances Mr. Carter's credibility. In the view of many officials close to the problem, the Administration's major task is less in finding a way to win a foreign policy victory for the President than in insuring that a defeat is a limited one."

**Article #13            September 23, 1979**

"Brezezinski Cautions Soviet on Cuba Unit: He Says Brigade Reflects 'Pattern of Disregard' of U.S. Interests."

Paragraphs: 20    Neutral: 8    Positive: 7    Negative: 5  
Brezezinski is now saying that these may have been training troops, however, they are there for combat. There is speculation as to what the Administration will do and the article mentions that even western allies want Carter to do something. The official position seems to be, as Carter said, "the issue was of great concern to us" and that "the status quo was not acceptable," If the effort to achieve a diplomatic solution was unsuccessful, "then I would have to take appropriate action," he said, but he declined to be more specific. The article also says that the security adviser Brezezinski tends to view the incident as a breakdown of U.S.-Soviet relations. While the state department wasn't only to look at it in the context of the event without an overall view, thus calling for a more guarded reaction since taken out of the broad picture, a more moderate response is more appropriate.

**Article #12            September 26, 1979**

"Gromyko, at U.N., Calls Concern Over Soviet Unit in Cuba Artificial."



Paragraphs: 15    Neutral: 11    Positive: 3    Negative: 1

Gromyko calls the U.S. response to Cuba artificial and states that the U.S.S.R. will make no concession to the U.S. even to save the SALT II agreement.

"Tonight, speaking at Queens College, President Carter promised that he would report to the nation 'probably within the next week,' on the results of his negotiations with the Soviet Union on the troop issue, and what actions the United States would take if it is not satisfied by the Soviet response."

**Article #15            September 27, 1979**

"Carter Names a Panel on Soviet Cuba Force."

Paragraphs: 12    Neutral: 8    Positive: 3    Negative: 1

The language is different. Now it is a BRIGADE of 2-3000. Carter also sets up a panel of 9 advisers to help with the decisions. Meanwhile Vance and Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko negotiate in New York, centering on solutions short of the brigade's withdrawal.

**Article #16            September 28, 1979**

"Vance and Gromyko End Talk on Troops; Impasse is Indicated: U.S. Security Council Meets."

Paragraphs: 22    Neutral: 15    Positive: 4    Negative: 3

Now it is only a "brigade." Talks break down and more members are added to the President's "panel."

**Article #17            September 29, 1979**

"Carter Will Speak Monday on Dispute Over Soviet Troops: Vance Reports on Meetings-- Gromyko Said to Have Stood Firm on Denial That Force in Cuba Has a Combat Capability.

Paragraphs: 30    Neutral: 20    Positive: 0    Negative: 10

Even the state department criticizes the Administration for the handling of the intelligence of the Cuban troops. There is an impasse between the United States and the U.S.S.R., and the Soviets refuse to admit that the Soviet soldiers are there for anything but training of the Cubans.

**Article #18            October 1, 1979**

"Vance Said to Seek a Pledge on Troops From Soviet Envoy: Carter's Speech Due Tonight-- Secretary, Meeting With Dobrynin, Reported to Ask Clarification of Gromyko's Position."

Paragraphs: 18    Neutral: 14    Positive: 2    Negative: 2

Vance tries to get assurances that the "Soviet military personnel would never be given a combat role. . . . Mr. Vance, it was understood, wanted to obtain confirmation of Mr. Gromyko's position from Mr. Dobrynin and get from him as precisely as possible the Soviet pledge not to give the troops a combat capability."

**Article #19            October 2, 1979**

"Carter Plans Latin Command and Steps Up Watch on Cuba: Opposes 'Return to Cold War'."

Paragraphs: 37    Neutral: 20    Positive: 7    Negative: 10

First a series of measured military and political steps are taken. Then, in a complete reversal, the Times writes, "Last month the President said the status quo of the Soviet troops in Cuba 'is unacceptable. In today's speech, and in briefings by officials, it became clear that the troops will remain in Cuba, with Moscow insisting they run a 'training center' and nothing more."

Carter says that as a result of the meetings between Vance and Gromyko along with messages between himself and Brezhnev, "the Russians gave 'significant' assurances that the troops would not assume a combat function and would never be a threat to the United States or any other nation."

Carter felt the assurances were too vague so the following steps were to be taken against the Russians:

- 1) The surveillance of Cuba by planes, satellites and electronic listening equipment will be increased.
- 2) The Soviet troops in Cuba will not be allowed to threaten the security of the United States or any other nation in the Western Hemisphere.
- 3) A new permanent military headquarters to be called Caribbean Joint Task Force Headquarters, will be established at Key West, Florida.
- 4) Military maneuvers in the Caribbean will be expanded and the U.S. will keep its forces at Guantanamo Bay.

5) Economic assistance will be granted to poor nations in the Caribbean to allow them to resist social turmoil and possible Communist domination.

6) The establishment of a previously planned Rapid Deployment Force, designed to send troops and equipment quickly into critical areas, was underscored by the President as a show of determination.

7) The American naval presence in the Indian Ocean has been increased. This was done before the Cuban dispute.

8) Capabilities for monitoring Soviet and Cuban activity will be improved and steps will be taken to prevent leaks.

**Article #20                    October 2, 1979**

**"Move to Link Pact and Brigade Begins: Arms Treaty Reservation May Deal With the Soviet Unit in Cuba."**

Paragraphs: 20    Neutral: 2    Positive: 4    Negative: 14

"A strong move to adopt a reservation stating the 'strategic arms treaty cannot come into legal force until the President has certified that the Soviet troops in Cuba have no combat function or represent no threat to the United States' appears likely in the Senate following President Carter's speech."

"Senator John Glenn, Democrat of Ohio, and Senator Richard B. Stone, Democrat of Florida, both members of the committee considering the treaty, were not enthusiastic about the President's assurances and arguments. . . . Senator Glenn said that 'The status quo just became acceptable' and that 'nothing has changed one whit on the island of Cuba'."

Even the President is being questioned. "Senator Church said that 'I continue to believe that, before the treaty may take effect, the Senate will insist on an affirmation by the President, backed up by our own intelligence, that Soviet combat forces are no longer deployed in Cuba'."

**Article #21                    October 3, 1979**

**"Senate Deeply Split on Carter's Speech: But He Feels Stand on Soviet Unit Breaks Logjam on Arms Pact."**

Paragraphs: 17    Neutral: 8    Positive: 1    Negative: 8

There is deep opposition towards the treaty. Only the

liberals are not linking Cuba and the treaty. There is deep division inside the democratic party. Many argue that until there are written assurances on the part of the Administration, no ratification can take place

"Senator Baker said at a news conference that, despite the Soviet assurances described by President Carter, the reported brigade was not in Cuba on a training mission and had 'never engaged in training.' They are calling the Carter Administration a liar."

## APPENDIX D

### New York Times Articles Pertaining to Chapter V, The Invasion of Afghanistan

#### Article #1                      December 29, 1979

"Carter Calls Soviet Actions A 'Threat': U.S. Aide Flies to Europe to Confer With Allies Over Afghanistan."

Paragraphs: 18      Neutral: 13      Positive: 5      Negative: 0

"Noting previous Soviet military actions to preserve Moscow's interests in Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968, Mr. Carter said that 'this is the third occasion since World War II that the Soviet Union has moved militarily to assert control over one of its neighbors.'"

"He said it was the first such move 'into a Moslem country' since the Russians had held the northern part of Iran during the war and were slow in removing their forces."

"NATO agrees that the 6,000 combat troops, along with the death of President Hafizullah Amin and his replacement with a President with 'close ties to Moscow' is a grave threat to peace."

"It was evident in the preoccupation of officials in the State Department and other agencies that the sudden and dramatic developments in Afghanistan had at least momentarily replaced Iran as the most acute issue."

The article is then editorializing in the last paragraph. "Among the options open to the United States is a major propaganda campaign to inform Soviet moslems of the actions against the Afghan tribesmen who are in rebellion at what they perceive to be the anti-Islamic tendencies of the Afghan government since the coup in April 1978 that brought Noor Mohammad Taraki to power."

#### Article #2                      December 30, 1979

"Carter Tells Soviet to Pull Its Troops Out of Afghanistan: He Warns Of Consequences-- President Sends Note to Brezhnev on Hot Line and Gets Reply."

Paragraphs: 25    Neutral: 14    Positive: 9    Negative: 2

"In the toughest diplomatic exchange of his Presidency, the President has warned the Soviet Union in a special message to withdraw its forces from Afghanistan or face 'serious consequences' in its relations with the United States."

"In his message, Mr. Carter reportedly warned Mr. Brezhnev that the Soviet actions, 'if not corrected, could have very serious consequences to United States-Soviet relations.' The message specifically called for a troop withdrawal."

"President Carter has been in telephone contact with President Mohammed Zia Ul-Haq of Pakistan about the Afghanistan crisis and he ordered that deliveries of military supplies be resumed to Pakistan and expedited."

"The President wants to build a chorus of international criticism against the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. To that end, he has sent messages to more than 20 heads of state in the last 24 hours."

"Troops totals are roughly 25,000 to 30,000. 'Mr. Carter regards the Soviet intervention, especially in light of the latest intelligence reports, as politically comparable to the Soviet bloc invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, Soviet crushing of the uprising in Hungary in 1956 and occupation of Iranian Azerbaijan in the 1940's by making these comparisons publicly, as he did yesterday in his statement at the White House, he hopes to persuade the world community that it is in every nation's interest to criticize Moscow. The President believes that as such criticism mounts, the Soviet leaders will rapidly come to the conclusion that their move has been costly in terms of relations with the United States and the world."

"In regard to the hostages, the President was in touch repeatedly today with Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance, who was negotiating with members of the United Nations Security Council in New York about the next move in the crisis."

"In regard to Iran, 'He is aware that the American public's impatience with the crisis is rising, but regards that impatience as mirroring his own.' The President feels he had no choice but to withdraw from a scheduled January 7 debate in Iowa with Senator Edward M. Kennedy and Governor Edmund G. Brown, in view of the international tensions. He says the world is in a period of unusually rapid change, almost unprecedented in peacetime, and that it would be a mistake for him to be away from the White House and unable

to respond as quickly as possible. . . . He seems to feel that if the situation in Afghanistan calms down and the prospects for release of the hostages improve brief campaign forays would be possible."

**Article #3                    January, 1, 1980**

"Carter Says Soviet Isn't Telling Facts About Afghan Coup Cites Threat To Ties: Assails Brezhnev's Answer- Hints at a Stronger Protest by the West."

Paragraphs: 32    Neutral: 25    Positive: 4    Negative: 3

Again it is written that the President is using the strongest words of his presidency. " . . . the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan would severely and adversely affect the relationship now and in the future between ourselves and the Soviet Union."

Note the linkage present in the article. "In Washington, a number of Senators said President Carter risked defeat in the presidential election if he insisted on bringing up the nuclear arms pact with the Soviet Union for approval in the Senate early in the year.

This paragraph gives a very important change in the Administration's overall view of the Soviets. "Mr. Carter, speaking in an interview with ABC-TV, said the Soviet military thrust into Afghanistan had caused him to change his mind fundamentally about the United States' relationship with the Soviet Union." Mr. Carter goes on to state, "My opinion of the Russians has changed more drastically in the last week than even the previous two and a half years. . . . This is a circumstance that I think is now causing even former close friends and allies to re-examine their opinion of what the Soviets have in mind. I think it is imperative that within the next few days leaders make it clear to the Soviets that they cannot take such actions as to violate world peace without severe political consequences."

**Article #4                    January 2, 1980**

"U.S. Weighs Request To U.N. To Condemn Soviet Afghan Move: Support of Allies Reported Action in Assembly Is Suggested to Avoid Possibility of a Veto in the Security Council."

Paragraphs: 26    Neutral: 16    Positive: 8    Negative: 2

Deputy Secretary of State Warren M. Christopher believes there is a strong allied consensus for United Nations action

against the Soviet Union.

The issue linkage is unbelievable here! "In Teheran, about 2,000 demonstrators, many of them Afghan students and clerics, converged on the Soviet Embassy shouting slogans demanding that the Russians withdraw from Afghanistan. Iranian revolutionary guards fired into the air to disperse the crowd, which was then exhorted to move to the American Embassy to denounce 'imperialism'."

The U.N. Security Council is reported to be considering the crisis in Iran. "The Council is dealing with the question whether to impose economic sanctions on Iran if Secretary General Kurt Waldheim is unable to obtain the release of the American Hostages during his trip to Teheran. Mr. Vance was reported by and aid to believe that "The council's platter is already full."

Furthermore a critical point is made. On strictly Soviet-American relations President Carter has two difficult decisions to make fairly soon officials said. The first is what the Administration should do about the pending nuclear arms treaty. The Senate is to take up the treaty upon return from recess January 22. As of yesterday, the Administration was saying that it still supported the accord on the ground that it served United States' national interests."

There is also a question on grain sales. "Because of a deficiency in its harvest last fall, the Soviet Union is expected to buy about 34 million metric tons of grain in the 1979-80 year, the bulk of it from the United States. The Russians have been given permission to buy up to 25 million metric tons through September 30."

There is talk of possible retaliatory measures which the Administration may choose to take.

**Article #5                      January 3, 1980**

"Carter Seeks Treaty Delay; Recalls Envoy From Soviet Union Over Moscow's Afghan Role."

Paragraphs: 24    Neutral: 17    Positive: 6    Negative: 1

"Carter seeks delay of SALT II consideration and brings Mr. Watson ambassador to the U.S.S.R. home for "consultation" from Moscow."



**Article #6                      January 4, 1980**

**"President Obtains Support In Congress On Arming Pakistan: Carter Drafts Series of Measures Against Russians, Including Trade and Embassy Cuts."**

Paragraphs: 18    Neutral: 11    Positive: 7

"Mr. Carter approved urgent consultations with Congress about ending a prohibition on economic and military assistance to Pakistan. The prohibition was imposed last April because Pakistan refused to give "reliable assurances" that it would not develop nuclear weapons. The ban was required by legislation."

**Article #7                      January 5, 1980**

**"Carter Embargoes Technology For Soviets: Limits Fishing Privileges and Sale of Grain In Response To 'Aggression' In Afghanistan."**

Paragraphs: 34    Neutral: 16    Positive: 17    Negative: 1

Measures taken by the U.S. in response to the Afghan invasion;

- a) 17 million metric tons of American grain ordered by the Soviet Union will not be delivered.
- b) a halt to all high tech sales such as "advanced computers and oil-drilling equipment, until further notice."
- c) A "Severe curtailment of Soviet fishing privileges in American waters. White House officials said this would deprive the Soviet Union of about 350,000 tons of fish this year."
- d) "An indefinite delay in the scheduled opening of new American and Soviet consular facilities and a deferral of any new cultural and economic exchanges."
- e) Warning that the summer olympics could be jeopardized.
- f) "In addition , Mr. Carter said that the United States, along with other countries he did not name, would provide military equipment, food and other assistance to Pakistan to help that nation defend its independence and national security against the seriously increased threat it now faces from the North."

A link to the past again. It also becomes an editorial. "There have been Soviet actions in the past similar to the

Afghan intervention: most notably Hungary in 1956; the Berlin Wall in 1961; the Cuban missile crisis in 1962; and the Czechoslovak invasion of 1968. After each of those episodes, the United States and the rest of the world expressed considerable outrage and anger, but in the end could do nothing. There are those in Washington who still remember the anguished cries for help by the Imre Nagy Government in Budapest in the fall of 1956, the crushing of the liberal Prague voices in 1968. In both those cases, as in the current Afghan crisis, the United States dared not intervene militarily because it would run the high risk of a world war."

**Article #8                    January 5, 1980**

"Carter Outlines Limited Steps: They Leave Door Open For Thaw in Relations."

Paragraphs: 29    Neutral: 17    Positive: 10    Negative: 2

"Although there is a freeze currently in U.S. Soviet relations, the door is being left open for further talks and the avoidance of an ultimatum being issued to the Soviets."

**Article #9                    January 6, 1980**

"U.S. Warns Of New Responses To Soviet Over Afghanistan As Moscow Defends Its Role 'Not The Final Word': Added Steps Could Involve Cuts In Embassy Staffs And In Bank Credits."

Paragraphs: 12    Neutral: 8    Positive: 3    Negative: 1

The United States is confident that other countries will not sell grain to the Soviet Union. They are also dependent upon other countries to help with the technology embargo. The Soviets are given room in order to help them "come to their senses and pull out of Afghanistan."

**Article #10                  January 7, 1980**

Paragraphs: 23    Neutral: 9    Positive: 3    Negative: 11

"U.S. Suspends Trading In Grain In Wake Of Cutoff For Soviet, Assails Moscow In U.S. Debate: Market Calm Sought."

"Assistant Agriculture Secretary James Webster said that the halting of futures trading 'will give time for all market forces to cool off. There has been too much concern and emotion in the last 24 hours.' This grain embargo will hurt

farmers as 22 million tons of grain are not shipped to the U.S.S.R., however, it is rumored that the Administration will announce a plan to make gasohol from some of the grain."

**Article #11            January 7, 1980**

Paragraphs: 13    Neutral: 8    Positive: 4    Negative: 1

"U.S. Says Council Must Condemn Soviet To Protect Smaller Countries."

There is a call for all nations to condemn the Soviet move into Afghanistan.

This paragraph is an example of issue linkage. "In another development there, Secretary General Kurt Waldheim met with President Carter to discuss his mission to Tehran to try to gain the release of American hostages being held in Iran."

**Article #12            January 8, 1980.**

"Soviet Vetoes A bid By U.N. To Condemn Its Afghan Actions: But Security Council's Resolution Is Backed in 13-2 Vote Led by Third World Members."

Paragraphs: 20    Neutral: 11    Positive: 8    Negative: 1

"The vote in favor of the resolution was 13 to 2, but the Soviet Union, as one of five permanent Council members, was entitled to exercise a veto. Only East Germany joined Moscow in voting against the measure. The majority included all seven third-world members of the Council from Asia, Africa and Latin America."

**Article #13            January 8, 1980**

"U.S. Will Purchase Much Of The Grain It Denied Russians: Farmers and Markets Aided. Trading For Immediate Delivery At A Halt-Effect of Cut In Sales to Soviet Is Uncertain."

Paragraphs: 20    Neutral: 10    Positive: 9    Negative: 1

**Article #14            January 9, 1980**

"Carter, Under Pressure of Crisis, Tests New Foreign Policy Goals."

Paragraphs: 28    Neutral: 11    Positive: 1    Negative: 16

**Article #15            January 9, 1980**

"U.S., in New Reprisal Against Soviet, Delays Opening of Consulates."

Paragraphs: 16    Neutral: 13    Positive: 2    Negative: 1

**Article #16            January 10, 1980**

"Grain Prices Fall Maximum Limits As Trading Grain Prices Fall Maximum Limits As Trading Markets Are Reopened Further Drops Forecast."

"In Washington, White House officials said that the Carter Administration announced last week's curtailment of grain shipments to the Soviet Union without knowing for certain that most of the grain was owned by dealers, not farmers. The Administration, therefore, had to shift gears over the weekend, the officials said, and more quickly to protect the grain dealers."

**Article #17            January 10, 1980**

"Grain Prices Fall Maximum Limits As Trading Markets Are Reopened: Dock Union Bars Soviet Ships"

Paragraphs: 22    Neutral: 15    Positive: 1    Negative: 6

In this article the President is being completely undermined!

"The International Longshoremen's Association, characterizing the Russians as "international bully boys" and citing the Soviet Military intervention in Afghanistan, directed its members yesterday to stop handling Soviet ships and cargoes in ports from Maine to Texas and in Puerto Rico." A State Department spokesman said that the Carter Administration had made it clear that "We hope foreign policy decisions will be left to the chief executive and his branch of government and not be made outside of it."

**Article #18            January 11, 1980**

"Asians Say U.N. Will Back A Move Rebuking Soviet Over Afghanistan."

Paragraphs: 20    Neutral: 15    Positive: 5

The key passages say that the assembly ". . . strongly deplores the recent armed intervention in Afghanistan" and calls for the "immediate and unconditional withdrawal of all

foreign troops from Afghanistan in order to enable its people to determine their own form of government and choose their economic, political and social systems free from outside intervention, subversion or coercion or constraint of any kind whatsoever."

"There is confidence that the resolution will obtain a two-thirds vote needed for the resolution to pass."

**Article #19            January 12, 1980**

"No New Steps By U.S. On Soviet Envisioned: But Vance Leaves Open The Possibility of an Olympic Games Boycott."

Paragraphs: 15    Neutral: 9    Positive: 2    Negative: 4

**Article #20            January 13, 1980**

"Carter Is Preparing A New U.S. Doctrine To Contain Moscow: Plans a Major Policy speech Will Outline a Strategy to Counter Threats in Mideast and South Asia in Coming Decade."

Paragraphs: 23    Neutral: 7    Positive: 14    Negative: 2

President Carter senses a parallel to "President Harry S. Truman's stern reaction to Soviet threats to Greece and Turkey in 1947, which gave birth to the Truman Doctrine of containment against Soviet expansionism in the immediate post World War II period."

"Mr Carter, seriously disturbed by the long-range implications of the Soviet intervention in a nonaligned nation outside Eastern Europe, has sought to convince the Kremlin that he regards American interests in the Middle East as so great that he would not hesitate to take any action including military steps to protect them. . . . He is intent on maintaining maximum pressure on the Soviet Union to withdraw from Afghanistan. And, encouraged by the toughening public stance of France and other Western powers, he plans to send a high level envoy to Europe next week to marshal the Western allies for a concerted declaration to tell the Russians that if they want to convince the world they are not embarked on a new cold war, they will have to remove their forces from Afghanistan. . . . Although he has not yet said so publicly, Mr. Carter is opposed to holding the 1980 Olympic games in Moscow as long as Soviet forces are in Afghanistan."

"Generally, Mr. Carter is encouraged by the response of the nation to his actions and thinks that a national spirit of

self-sacrifice has emerged in the wake of the Iranian and Afghan crises, indicating that the public is coming out of the crisis of confidence that he described in a speech last July."

**Article #21            January 22, 1980**

"U.S. Offers Pakistan \$400 Million In Aid To Counter Economic and Military Help: Carter Sends 2 Officials to Europe to Discuss Further Measures on Afghanistan and Iran."

Paragraphs: 21    Neutral: 12    Positive: 8    Negative: 1

**Article #22            January 15, 1980**

"U.N. Votes 104-18 to 'Deplore Soviet Moves In Afghanistan; Demands Troop Withdraw: Moscow Not Named-- Margin Seen As Reflecting Third World's Dismay at Their Ally of Past."

Paragraphs: 20    Neutral: 13    Positive: 6    Negative:1

"By a vote of 104 to 18, the Assembly "strongly deplored" the intervention and called for "the immediate, unconditional and total withdrawal of the foreign troops from Afghanistan."

**Article #23            January 16, 1980**

"Poll Shows Carter Gaining Support On Afghan Moves, Slipping On Iran."

Paragraph: 18    Neutral: 6    Positive: 5    Negative: 7

This is an instance which nullifies the original assertion that there is linkage. Perhaps it is possible in some instances to have mixed public support over different issues.

"Half those polled back the President's steps against the Soviet Union, while a third want even stronger actions. This is a key finding at a time when the public shows dramatic support for increased military spending and appears, at least for now, to be turning its political attentions abroad and focusing less on domestic issues."

"Forty-six percent of the 1,468 voting age Americans who were polled said that they had felt that 'too little' was being spent on defense. Only 14 percent said 'too much' and 23 percent said the current amount was about right. NEVER SINCE GALLUP BEGAN ASKING THAT QUESTION IN 1960 HAS THE 'TOO

LITTLE' PERCENTAGE EXCEEDED THE 'ABOUT RIGHT' NUMBERS." The shift was clearly accelerated by the Soviet use of troops in Afghanistan, but it has been moving that way since at least 1976.

There was also a clear recent increase in the percentage of Americans who felt that this country should "get tougher in its dealings with the Russians." Sixty-seven percent of the public agreed with that view, as against 53 percent in June 1978. Mr. Carter's response to the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan seemed to be helping him in this area; 56 percent of the public approved of his handling of relations with the Kremlin, while in June 1978, only 37 percent approved."

**Article #24            January 16**

"Vance Sets Deadline For Soviet To Avoid Threat To Olympics: Afghan Pullout is Condition He Backs Boycott Unless Moscow Withdraws by Mid-February-Refusal Is Expected."

Paragraphs: 23    Neutral: 13    Positive: 8    Negative: 2

Again the Iran hostage situation is mentioned in the article.

"Vance states; 'I often wake up at night and wonder if there is some avenue we are not pursuing,' he said of the frustrating effort to find a negotiated solution to the Iran crisis, now in its 11th week. He said he made three secret trips to New York in the hope of working out a solution early in the crisis, one of several initiatives that failed."

**Article #25            January 18, 1980**

"Pakistan Dismisses \$400 In Aid Offered By U.S. As Peanuts."

Paragraphs: 17    Neutral: 14    Positive: 1    Negative: 2

"President Mohammed Zia Ul-Haq today dismissed the \$400 million that the United States has offered to Pakistan, in response to the threat from Afghanistan, as 'peanuts'."

**Article #26            January 19, 1980**

"U.S. Still Plans Aid In Spite Of Criticism By Pakistani Ruler: Vance To Seek Senate Action."

Paragraphs: 20    Neutral: 11    Positive: 4    Negative: 5

**Article #27            January 19, 1980**

"Olympics Aides Consult Vance, Resist A Boycott: Officials to Pull Athletes if U.S. Decides on a Ban."

Paragraphs: 20   Neutral: 10   Positive: 3   Negative: 7

"Top officials of the United States Olympic Committee, after meeting more than two hours with Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance and aides of President Carter, suggested today that they would not necessarily comply with a decision by the President to withdraw from the Olympic Games in Moscow this summer."

**Article #28            January 20, 1980**

"U.S. Will Purchase Much Of Grain Owed To Soviet But Halted At Docks."

Paragraphs: 16   Neutral: 7   Positive: 5   Negative: 4

Under a previous agreement the United States has an obligation to ship [around 8 million tons of grain regardless of the embargo] "The Administration 'regrets' the continuing refusal of the union to load the Soviet grain. Their actions are clogging the grain pipeline. An official spokesman states: 'We do not consider them to be in the best interests of the American farmer, this nation, or the President's tough steps toward the Soviet Union.'"

**Article #29            January 21, 1980**

"President Proposes Deadline of Month For Olympics Move: U.S. Panels Respond-- Leader Welcomes Time for Decision Through 'Proper Channels'."

Paragraphs: 22   Neutral: 12   Positive: 9   Negative: 1

The International Olympic committee, has the sole power to cancel the Olympics as it did during World War II. This point is one which is made to the White House.

**Article #30            January 21**

"President Proposes Deadline Of Month For Olympics Move: Soviet Threat Cited He Sets Mid-February for Russians to

Paragraphs: 19   Neutral: 13   Positive: 1   Negative: 5

**Article #31            January 21, 1980**



**Carter Bids Heads Of 100 Governments Back Olympic Stand: State Department Terms Support Encouraging, but Response Is Said to Be Fragmentary"**

**Paragraphs: 8 Neutral: 4 Positive: 2 Negative: 2**

"President Carter sent personal messages to more than 100 heads of government today seeking their support for his proposal that the Summer Olympics not be held in Moscow unless "Soviet troops are withdrawn from Afghanistan by Feb. 20 Administration officials said."

**Article #32 January 25, 1980**

**"U.S, In New Rebuff To Soviet, Announces It Will Sell China Military Support Equipment."**

**Paragraphs: 16 Neutral: 7 Positive: 6 Negative: 3**

"The United States, in a major POLICY SHIFT related to the Afghanistan crisis, announced today that it was willing to sell military equipment to China for the first time. The equipment, however, will not include weapons. The Pentagon statement, the latest American response to the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan, followed President Carters sharp warning last night that the United states was ready to use force if necessary to repel soviet moves in the Persian Gulf area. . . . "Although the Defense department said military sales to China would be limited at first to such basic support equipment as trucks, communications gear and early-warning radar, the decision to help the Soviet Union's major communist adversary with military equipment was meant to convey a warning to the Russians of further collaboration with the Peking government."

**Article #33 January 25, 1980**

**"Olympic Ban Backed House Votes 386 To 12 To Support President On A Boycott Of Games."**

**Paragraphs: 18 Neutral: 11 Positive: 7 Negative: 0**

"The House voted overwhelmingly today to support President Carter's request that the United States press for the transfer, cancellation or boycott of the Olympic Games in Moscow this summer"

**Article #34 January 27, 1980**

**"U.S. Olympic Board Backs Carter Call For Switching Site:**

**Panel Defers Decision on Boycott-- President Is Called Dubious on Soviet Troop Pullout"**

Paragraphs: 21 Neutral: 12 Positive: 6 Negative: 3

**Article #35 January 28, 1980**

**"A Counter-Olympics For U.S. Is Weighed: Event Might Be Held if Americans Pull Out of Games in Moscow."**

Paragraphs: 15 Neutral: 11 Positive: 4 Negative: 0

"The United States Olympic Committee will explore the possibility of staging a national sports festival or some other kind of major athletic event this summer if Americans do not compete in the Moscow Games."

**Article #36 January 29, 1980**

**"36 Countries Support A Resolution Demanding A Troop Withdrawal."**

Paragraphs: 9 Neutral: 2 Positive: 6 Negative: 1

"A conference of foreign ministers from Moslem nations approved a draft resolution early today calling for the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan. The ministers of 36 countries, claiming to represent 900 million people, and representatives of five Islamic groups also called on members of the Islamic world to take action to boycott the 1980 Olympic Games scheduled for Moscow."

**Article #37 February 1, 1980**

**"Argentines Expect Soviet To Buy Grain: Prices Soar as Government Balks at U.S. Request to Limit Sale."**

Paragraphs: 16 Neutral: 7 Positive: 0 Negative: 9

**Article # 38 February 2, 1980**

**"China Joins Boycott Of Moscow Olympics: Japan Also Supports It, Raising to 18 the Number Backing U.S."**

**Article #39 February 4, 1980**

**"Soviet Plane, Defying Port Authority, Lands At Kennedy Airport."**

Paragraphs: 16    Neutral: 12    Positive: 3    Negative: 1

"A Soviet airliner carrying 78 people landed at Kennedy International Airport yesterday afternoon despite instructions given by the Port Authority on Friday to have the plane land at Dulles International Airport near Washington. The alternative landing site had been ordered because unionized baggage handlers and other ground service employees at Kennedy had been refusing service to the Soviet airline, Aeroflot, since the Soviet Unions armed intervention in Afghanistan."

**Article #40            February 6, 1980**

"Paris And Bonn Ask For Soviet Pullout From Afghanistan: Want Action 'Without Delay' Statement Citing 'Grave Dangers' to Peace-- Is Tougher Position Than Either Took in Past."

Paragraphs: 14    Neutral: 4    Positive: 10    Negative: 0

**Article #41            February 6, 1980**

"Saudis Considering Military Tie To U.S.: U.S. Aides Tell of Desire to Offset Russian Move in Afghanistan."

Paragraphs: 15    Neutral: 9    Positive: 6    Negative: 0

"Saudi leaders told American officials today that they are now willing to consider closer military cooperation with the United States in the Persian Gulf region in order to offset the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan."

**Article #42            February 9, 1980**

France Won't Join Allied Conference On Afghan Problem: Vance Sought Meeting in Bonn to Coordinate West's Response to Intervention by Soviet."

Paragraphs: 22    Neutral: 10    Positive: 1    Negative: 11

"France in a statement today, affirmed that it 'is ready to pursue consultations with its partners on various aspects of the international situation' but that 'it is opposed to the holding of a joint meeting which is not of a nature to reduce international tension.' Diplomats here saw the statement by Elysee Palace as another mover to soften the impact of the tough anti-Soviet declaration made by President Valery Giscard d'Estaing of France and Chancellor Helmut Schmidt of West Germany after a meeting Tuesday."

**Article #43            February 10, 1980**

"U.S. Voices Concern On France's 'Shifts' Over Afghanistan: 'Puzzlement' in Washington-- High Official of State Department Says Plans for Consultations in Europe Will Go Ahead.

Paragraphs: 21    Neutral: 13    Positive: 4    Negative: 4

"The official said that the French, in an announcement yesterday, seemed to be trying to leave an impression that the United States was striving to press its allies into the Bonn meeting, scheduled for February 20. In reality, the official said, the Western Europeans themselves set up the meeting and chose the date. . . . Furthermore, the official said, the Administration is deeply concerned that the French action will give an exaggerated impression of western disunity to the Russians at a critical time."

**Article #44            February 11, 1980**

"Soviet Jetliner Ignores Agreement And Lands At Kennedy 2nd Time."

Paragraphs: 20    Neutral: 10    Positive: 6    Negative: 4

**Article # 45           February 13, 1980**

"U.S. Sees Possibility Of Olympic Change: Aides Say Panel 'Left Door Open' But That Boycott Plan Stands."

Paragraphs: 12    Neutral: 4    Positive: 2    Negative: 6

"Tonight the International Olympic Committee had 'left a door open' to reversing its decision today to let the Olympic Games proceed in Moscow. But they said the Administration had no choice but to go ahead with its plan to seek an American boycott of the Games."

**Article #46            February 13, 1980**

World Committee Reaffirms Moscow As Site Of Olympics: All Options Are Kept Open It Unanimously Rejects American Panel's Request to Postpone, Cancel or Move Games."

**Article #47            February 16, 1980**

"U.S. Supplying Afghan Insurgents With Arms In A Covert Operation."

Paragraphs: 10 Neutral: 10 Positive: 0 Negative: 0

"The CIA was assigned to carry out the covert mission, its first of this nature and magnitude since the Angolan civil war ended in 1976. The arms being sent to Afghan insurgent groups are largely of Soviet design, including Kalashnikov AK-47 automatic rifles, according to the official, who declined to specify whether the weapons were manufactured in the Soviet bloc or in China. Nor would they confirm reports that some of the arms might have come from stocks of Soviet weapons acquired by Egypt. . . . The weapons are shipped to the Afghan insurgents through Pakistan which shares a long frontier with Afghanistan through rough and populated terrain. On Wednesday the Egyptian Secretary of Defense announced that they had begun a military training program for Afghans opposed to the Soviet military intervention in their homeland and that Egypt would send them back with weapons."

**Article #48 February 21, 1980**

"As Deadline Passes, White House Says Its Olympics Decision Is Final."

Paragraphs: 14 Neutral: 7 Positive: 7 Negative: 0

"With the arrival of President Carter's deadline for withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, the White House reaffirmed today what officials termed a 'final and irrevocable' decision for the United States to boycott the Olympic Games in Moscow this summer."

**Article # 49 February 22, 1980**

"State Department Bars Soviet Scientists Invited To Two Technical Parleys."

Paragraphs: 15 Neutral: 9 Positive: 2 Negative: 4

**Article #50 March 22, 1980**

"Carter, In Plea To Athletes, Is Firm On Olympic Ban."

Paragraphs: 21 Neutral: 7 Positive: 12 Negative: 2

"The President has led a campaign to have the United States and other nations boycott the Moscow Games to protest the Soviet Unions military intervention in Afghanistan, where, Mr. Carter said today, Moscow has 105,000 troops and 'thousands of people's lives have already been lost.'"

**Article #51      April 5, 1980**

"Soviet Troops And Afghan Rebels Are Deadlocked, U.S. Aides Say."

Paragraphs: 16   Neutral: 16   Positive: 0   Negative: 0

**Article #52      April 13, 1980**

"U.S. Olympic Group Votes To Boycott The Moscow Games:  
Appeal by Mondale: Margin Is Overwhelming-- White House  
Indicated More Financial Aid.

Paragraphs: 23   Neutral: 15   Positive: 6   Negative: 2

"The vote was described as having been further influenced by a commitment expressed by Mr. Mondale . . . to increase financial contributions to the United States Olympic Committee to make up for its lagging fund-raising drive, and to come up with a 'suitable honor', perhaps a Congressional medal."

**Article #53      May 8, 1980**

"Muskie Asserts U.S. Must Clarify Status Of Soviet Relations."

Paragraphs: 19   Neutral: 15   Positive: 2   Negative: 2

Vance resigned as Secretary of State in April after American rescue operation failed in Iran. Vance is replaced by Muskie.

"To help learn the status of Soviet-American relations, the former Senator from Maine said he intended to meet with Foreign Minister Andre Gromyko in Vienna next week, thereby reopening the exchanges between the two powers that have been stifled since the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan in December."

**Article # 54      May 14, 1980**

Paragraphs: 20   Neutral: 17   Positive: 2   Negative: 1

"Muskie Reminds Allies Of Pledge For Sanctions On Iran: Officials Meet Today-- Afghanistan Called Test of U.S. Soviet Detente."

The hostage crisis in Iran is also brought up again in this article.

**Article #55            May 14, 1980**

**"NATO Agrees On Defensive Steps In Afghan Crisis."**

Paragraphs: 14    Neutral: 9    Positive: 4    Negative: 1

**Article #56            May 15, 1980**

**"NATO Accuses Soviet Of Imperiling Peace With Afghan Thrust: Defense Measures Approved-- Iran Also Rebuked over Hostages-- Muskie Condemns French Olympic Panel's Decision."**

Paragraphs: 21    Neutral: 11    Positive: 2    Negative: 8

**Article #57            May 16, 1980**

**"U.S. Is Skeptical On Afghan Plan And Wide Talks Held Friday."**

Paragraphs: 24    Neutral: 13    Positive: 2    Negative: 9

"Secretary of State Edmund S. Muskie who will confer with Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko here tomorrow, dismissed the Afghan withdrawal plan, which was conditioned on guarantees given by the United States, Iran and Pakistan to stop the infiltration and arming of rebels. Pakistan rejected any talks with Afghanistan until the Soviet troops had withdrawn. Mr. Muskie called the Afghan plan 'cosmetic and not a meaningful proposal,' and said it was designed more to influence a conference of Moslem nations convening in Islamabad, Pakistan than to serve as a 'serious response to our demand for withdrawal.'"

**Article #58            May 15, 1980**

**"Muskie And Gromyko Confer For 3 Hours Talk Termed Blunt: Brezezinski's Aides Kept Out: Before Seeing Russian, Secretary Gives Tough Speech Assailing Soviet's Afghan Thrust."**

Paragraphs: 19    Neutral: 11    Positive: 5    Negative: 3

The first high level discussions in 8 months held between Muskie and Gromyko.

**Article #59            May 20, 1980**

**"Giscard-Brezhnev Meeting Yields Little Progress On The Afghan Crisis: Positions Called Far Apart."**

Paragraphs: 13    Neutral:12    Positive: 0    Negative: 1

**Article #60            May 20, 1980**

"Giscard-Brezhnev Meeting Yields Little Progress On The Afghan Crisis: U.S. Stifling Its Irritation."

Paragraphs: 19    Neutral: 6    Positive: 1    Negative: 12

"The United States sought to avoid further public strains in the Western alliance today by stifling its irritation over the French-Soviet meeting in Warsaw and by reluctantly accepting the limited economic sanctions adopted yesterday against Iran by Western Europe's Common Market as the best that could be achieved. Administration officials were particularly upset by the decision of President Valery Giscard d'Estaing of France to see Brezhnev, without consultation with the allies."

**Article #61            May 24, 1980**

"U.S. To Press Talks With The Russians: Top Aide Says Afghanistan will Be Part of 'Continued Dialogue'."

Paragraphs: 10    Neutral: 8    Positive: 1    Negative: 1

**Article #62            May 25, 1980**

"Japanese Join U.S. In Olympic Boycott As Deadline Passes."

Paragraphs: 18    Neutral: 8    Positive: 6    Negative: 4

**Article #63            May 26, 1980**

"U.S. To Seek Backing For Olympic Boycott From Athlete Groups."

Paragraphs: 12    Neutral: 3    Positive: 7    Negative: 2

**Article #64            June 6, 1980**

"Vance Urges Senate To Back Arms Pact: Says Afghan Crisis Should Be No Bar To Vote On Weapons Curb."

Paragraphs: 16    Neutral: 4    Positive: 1    Negative: 11

Retired Secretary of State Vance, speaking at Harvard Commencement, urges Senate to un-link two issues.

**Article #65            June 8, 1980**



**"Muskie Says Delays On Foreign Aid Bills Undercut U.S. Policy."**

Paragraphs: 16    Neutral: 10    Positive: 2    Negative: 4

**Article #66            June 21, 1980**

**"Carter Tells Allies Actions By Moscow Endanger Detente: President, In Rome, Assails Belief Ties Can Improve With Soviet Soldiers In Afghanistan."**

Paragraphs: 16    Neutral: 10    Positive: 4    Negative: 2

**Article #67            June 23, 1980**

**"Allies React Warily To Report By Soviet On Afghan Pullout."**

Paragraphs: 19    Neutral: 14    Positive: 2    Negative: 3

**Article #68            June 23, 1980**

**"Afghan Ripples In Venice: Allies Pondering Motive For The Announcement."**

Paragraphs: 14    Neutral: 7    Positive: 3    Negative: 4

**Article #69            June 23, 1980**

**"Afghan Ripples In Venice: Soviet Seen Attempting To Sow Discord In West."**

Paragraphs: 14    Neutral: 6    Positive: 4    Negative: 4

Soviet announces vague withdrawal of " . . . some army units whose stay in Afghanistan is not necessary at present . . . "

**Article #70            June 24, 1980**

**"Schmidt Plans To Tell Brezhnev Moscow Cannot Divide The Allies."**

Paragraphs: 15    Neutral: 5    Positive: 5    Negative: 5

**Article #71            July 1, 1980**

**"Schmidt, In Moscow, Asks A Full Pullout From Afghanistan: He Also Calls For Talks On Missles In Europe But Brezhnev Seems Firm As Meetings Start."**

Paragraphs: 19    Neutral: 12    Positive: 4    Negative: 3

**Article #72            September 11, 1980**

"Two Panels Vote To Overrule Carter And Bar Atomic Fuel Sale To India."

Paragraphs: 22    Neutral: 13    Positive: 0    Negative: 9

The Administration had stated that because of the Soviet invasion into Afghanistan that it was important to stay on good terms with the " . . . most powerful country on the subcontinent." But since India was not complying with a law requiring nuclear safeguards, the Congressional committees recommended blocking sale.

**Article #73            September 17, 1980**

Paragraphs: 8    Neutral: 7    Positive: 0    Negative: 1

"Soviet In Kabul Bids U.S. Return Soldier-Defector."

**Article #74            October 17, 1980**

"Muskie Urges Arms Treaty Action Despite Soviet Role In Afghanistan."

Paragraphs: 22    Neutral: 11    Positive: 0    Negative: 11

**APPENDIX E**

**New York Times Articles Pertaining to Chapter VI, The Polish Crisis and the Chill in Superpower Relations**

**Article #1                    February 2, 1981**

"Polish Labor Union Calls Off a Strike Set for Tomorrow."

Paragraphs: 21    Neutral: 21    Positive: 0            Negative: 0

"The Soviet Government's newspaper Izvestia assailed Poland's independent trade union last night, portraying its leaders as reckless people leading the country to ruin."

**Article #2                    February 11, 1981**

"U.S. Doubts Moscow Will Invade Poland: Move is Called 'Neither Imminent Nor Inevitable' by State Department."

Paragraphs: 16    Neutral: 8            Positive: 1            Negative: 7

"We see no development that has caused us to change our assessment that the Poles are perfectly capable of handling their internal affairs without outside interference."

**Article #3                    March 6, 1981**

"Warsaw Pact Games Arouse U.S. Concern; A Warning is Issued."

Paragraphs: 20    Neutral: 18           Positive: 2            Negative: 0

"The concern expressed by the United States today resulted not only from the continued presence of hundreds of thousands of Soviet troops near the Polish border but also from statements in Moscow in the last few days during and just after the 26th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party. A statement issued yesterday after a meeting involving the leaders of the Soviet and Polish Communist Parties and Governments seemed more menacing to some American officials than any in recent months."

**Article #4                    March 11, 1981**

"A U.S.-Soviet Parley is Linked to Poland: Bonn Agrees to

Cooperate in Effort to Deter Russian Intervention."

Paragraphs: 15    Neutral: 10    Positive: 4    Negative: 1

"The United States and West Germany have agreed to try to use the interest expressed by the Soviet leadership in a summit meeting with President Reagan as a form of leverage to deter the Russians from intervening militarily in Poland. American and West German officials, separately discussing the results of Foreign Minister Hans-Dieterich Genscher's talks yesterday with Mr. Reagan and Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig Jr., said today that both sides were concerned about the latest developments in Polish-Soviet relations and the possibility of Soviet intervention."

**Article #5            March 18, 1981**

"U.S. Now Voices Reduced Concern That Russians May Invade Poland."

Paragraphs: 21    Neutral: 7    Positive: 1    Negative: 4

"The United States said today that intelligence information and Soviet assurances had reduced concern about possible Soviet military intervention in Polish affairs. A state department spokesman said: 'I'd say there is less concern right now about the possibility of outside intervention than there was a couple of weeks ago or in December.'"

In contradiction the Times prints in the same article, "Only last Friday, Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig Jr., in meeting with reporters, talked of 'huge' maneuvers and said: 'I think in light of recent events that the situation is somewhat more tense than it was three weeks ago.'"

The U.S.S.R. responded in the article that "the exercises would involve 'command and control' without the need for large numbers of troops. They said that they would not be of such magnitude as to require advance notification under the terms of the 1975 Helsinki accord. The accord requires notification three weeks in advance for maneuvers of more than 25,000 troops."

"Some officials in the State Department fear that the United States' latest apparent vacillation on a Soviet threat to Poland-- like crying 'Wolf!'-- may make it harder to attract attention the next time."

"Beginning in December, the United States has indicated alarm several times at the possibility of a Soviet military

intervention, only to say later that the danger seemed to have passed."

"Officials from both the Carter and Reagan Administrations insist that the public discussion has had a deterrent effect, but they acknowledge that this cannot be proven."

**Article #6                    March 27, 1981**

**"U.S. Warns Russians and Poles on Force Against the Unions: White House Voices Concerns."**

Paragraphs: 17    Neutral: 11    Positive: 6    Negative: 0

There was growing concern that the Soviet Union might crack down on the labor movements in Poland. "In the Reagan Administration's most serious statement about the situation, the White House said: 'Any external intervention in Poland, or any measure aimed at suppressing the Polish people would necessarily cause deep concern to all those interested in the peaceful development of Poland, and could have a grave effect on the whole course of East-West relations.'"

"The Warsaw Pact exercises in Poland, East Germany, the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia have been extended indefinitely, the American official said, 'and the Russians have the infrastructure to move into Poland very, very quickly.'"

"The White House statement, which was similar to warnings issued in December by the Carter Administration, was aimed at heading off bloodshed. It urged both the Polish government and the union to settle their differences peacefully and it held out the prospect of additional economic and financial aid if violence was avoided."

**Article #7                    March 30, 1981**

**"Haig is Troubled by Troop Moves on Polish Border."**

Paragraphs: 16    Neutral: 9    Positive: 7    Negative: 0

"Haig said today that 'the Soviet Union, East Germany and other Warsaw Pact nations had heightened preparations along Poland's borders for possible military intervention, but he added that there were signs that a major crisis could be avoided. . . . there were indications that fresh Soviet, East German and Czechoslovak troops have been introduced along the border as part of Warsaw Pact exercises. The maneuvers were supposed to have ended a few days ago, but

they have been prolonged indefinitely."

"Haig continues 'I think most of the worrisome signs involve readiness measures being taken along the Baltic military region, in eastern Germany and in some of the other satellite states,' he said. He said that along with these troubling developments there were also some 'good signs' that suggested that an invasion might not occur. He said that 'the moderate elements in the political structure of Poland seem to be surviving well at the current moment and maybe will continue to prevail.' He was referring to reports from the American Embassy in Warsaw about the split in the Communist Party leadership between 'moderates' led by Stanislaw Kania, the party leader, and 'hard-liners' who have publicly attacked the degree of freedom given the independent trade union organization Solidarity."

"Defense Secretary Casper Weinberger repeated what he had said Friday, that the Soviet military move into Poland 'would have grave consequences' for East-West relations. 'This would end any possibility of any useful or effective kind of arms limitation or disarmament talks,' he said."

**Article #8                    April 3, 1981**

**"U.S. To Aid Poland With Surplus Food Worth \$70 Million:  
New Concern About Troops."**

Paragraphs: 20    Neutral: 15    Positive: 3    Negative: 2

"The situation in and around Poland, however, continued to cause major concern to Administration officials. They said three developments were troubling them. The first was the fact that despite the decision Monday of the independent labor movement in Poland to put a general strike in abeyance, Soviet and other Warsaw Pact troops increased their movements near Poland and showed no signs of easing the pressure. The second was the attack on the Polish Communists by Pravda . . . which accused the Warsaw city organization of being ideologically weak. This suggested to some officials here that the Russians might be preparing to justify intervention on the ground that Poland is allowing "antisocialist" forces to gain too much influence. A third factor, officials said, was top secret intelligence information that indicated that Russians would move into Poland if they felt it necessary. The officials would not say, however, what the information was."

**Article #9                    April 4, 1981**

**"U.S. Asserts Soviet Steps Up Readiness to Move on Poland: Copters are Shifted."**

**Paragraphs: 21    Neutral: 16    Positive: 5    Negative: 0**

**"The State Department said 'Soviet forces were at a higher level of readiness for a possible intervention than they were last December, when the Carter Administration feared that a Soviet move might be imminent. . . . U.S. officials were reluctant to discuss details of the Soviet military preparations, but one aide said the Russians had now completed an autonomous communications network that bypasses the Polish military command. It would allow Soviet troops in Poland to maintain contact with those outside the country without the Poles knowing about it. Soviet units are also stationed in East Germany and Czechoslovakia. There were also reports that some airborne units in the western part of the U.S.S.R. had been placed on a high degree of alert. Soviet forces have also reportedly stockpiled fuel and other equipment along likely routes into Poland."**

**Article #10            April 5, 1981**

**"U.S. is Weighing Aid to China if Russians Act Against Poland."**

**Paragraphs: 19    Neutral: 14    Positive: 4    Negative: 1**

**"Buildup is Said to continue. Weinberger Speaks of Trade Curbs and Selling Arms to Peking if Soviet Union Intervenes."**

**Article #11            April 6, 1981**

**"Amid Lure of a Spring Sun, Poles Mutter of U.S. 'Game'."**

**Paragraphs: 18    Neutral: 9    Positive: 0    Negative: 9**

**"a Polish writer [states] that every hour on the hour he rises automatically to tune in the BBC and see whether the American Secretary of Defense, Casper W. Weinberger, has made a new comment about Poland."**

**"Statements by United States officials yesterday that an invasion no longer necessarily appeared imminent caused relief but also no small amount of anger. . . . A man-in-the-street theory is taking hold that Washington has become an unwitting dupe of Moscow in the war of nerves against Poland."**

**Article #12            April 6, 1981**

"A Reagan Note to Brezhnev Tells of Concern on Poland."

Paragraphs: 20    Neutral: 14    Positive: 4    Negative: 2

"President Reagan, using what an American official called 'strong language,' has sent Leonid I. Brezhnev a message expressing the Administration's extreme concern over the situation in Poland."

**Article #13            April 7, 1981**

"Weinberger Sees Poles Threatened With Soviet Invasion 'by Osmosis'."

Paragraphs: 17    Neutral: 9    Positive: 1    Negative: 7

"The Soviet Union is coercing the Polish people with 'an invasion by osmosis', Secretary of Defense Casper W. Weinberger said today as he continued a running commentary on Moscow's threat to Poland. By osmosis, Mr. Weinberger said, he meant 'a gradual filtering in' of forces and supplies that would be in addition to the two Soviet divisions that have long been in Poland. He said that the level of activity, which has included numerous aircraft flights from the Soviet Union to Poland, seemed to be the same as yesterday."

"He continues, 'It's very hard to tell whether there's going to be a standard, conventional invasion, so to speak, or an invasion by osmosis.'"

**Article #14            April 8, 1981**

"Soviet Intentions in Poland: Ex-U.S. Aides Gloomier Than Present Officials."

Paragraphs: 17    Neutral: 10    Positive: 1    Negative: 6

"The Reagan Administration publicly took the position today that despite all the worrisome signs, a Soviet invasion of Poland is neither imminent or inevitable. Others with long experience of Moscow's policies expressed serious caution about the outlook. They see the Kremlin either aiming to install tougher leaders in Poland or pressing the present leaders into a crackdown against the independent labor union, Solidarity, and inclined to resort to force if the Polish Communist Party does not take tougher action."



**Article #15            April 8, 1981**

**"State Department Says Soviet Intentions Remain Unclear."**

**Paragraphs: 9        Neutral: 7        Positive: 2        Negative: 0**

**"The State Department, reacting warily to President Leonid I. Brezhnev's remarks on Poland, said today that Soviet intentions remained unclear and that military activity by Warsaw Pact countries continued at 'unusual levels.'"**

**"Despite an announcement by Soviet and Eastern European press agencies that the Soviet-led Soyuz '81 military maneuvers of the Warsaw Pact had ended and that participating forces were returning to their bases, Mr. Dyess said that 'as of today, we continue to observe unusual levels of military activity in the area.'"**

**Article #16            April 12, 1981**

**"Haig Cautioned by Allies About Warnings on Poland."**

**Paragraphs: 10        Neutral: 4        Positive: 1        Negative: 5**

**"Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig Jr. returned here tonight after having been told by some European allies that they were concerned about the repetitiveness of the Reagan Administration's warnings that the Soviet Union might be preparing to intervene in Poland."**

**"The thrust of the allies views, as explained to reporters, was that by constantly drawing attention to the Soviet threat, the Reagan Administration ran the risk of inciting the Russians to intervene. As a result of the European concerns, Mr. Haig wants to make sure that the Administration is 'careful in addressing the issue of Poland and East-West relations in general'. . . American officials on Mr. Haig's plane said that some European officials were having some problems adjusting to the more confrontational tone of the Reagan Administration toward the Soviet Union."**

**Article #17            April 26, 1981**

**"Haig Says U.S. Will Cut All Trade With Soviet if It Moves Into Poland."**

**Paragraphs: 26        Neutral: 13        Positive: 10        Negative: 3**

**"President Reagan, who lifted the grain curbs yesterday, has said he opposed using a grain embargo alone as punishment**

for Soviet aggression because it made farmers bear the entire economic burden."

"Mr. Haig's statement was a reiteration of the position of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, whose members resolved in December that they would halt all trade with Moscow in the event of Soviet military intervention in Poland."

**Article #18            April 28, 1981**

"White House Takes Exception To View of Haig on Poland: Punishing Soviet is Disputed."

Paragraphs: 14    Neutral: 1    Positive: 2    Negative: 11

"Today, Larry Speakes, the deputy White House press secretary reminded reporters at a briefing that Mr. Reagan had repeatedly declined to say what options he would pick in hypothetical cases. He said Mr. Haig had cited 'one of the options, and I'm not going to rule any in or out or put priority on any option.'"

"A senior White House official said later that Mr. Haig's remarks put the Secretary 'somewhat out front' of Mr. Reagan on the issue, but he said there was no real disagreement between the President and the Secretary."

**Article #19            June 18, 1981**

"Deepening U.S.-Soviet Chill: Decision to Sell China Arms May Have Reduced Prospects to Deter Moves by Kremlin on Poland."

Paragraphs: 18    Neutral: 7    Positive: 6    Negative: 5

"Reagan's decision to supply arms to China and his comments on the situation in Eastern Europe have deepened the chill in Soviet-American relations and may have reduced the Administration's prospects for deterring Soviet military intervention in Poland.

"An added complication for Soviet-American relations was the disclosure that the United States and China had been jointly operating an electronic intelligence gathering station in western China to monitor Soviet missile tests."

**Article #20            September 5, 1981**

"U.S. Says Russians Withheld Data On Size of Maneuvers Near

Poland."

Paragraphs: 11    Neutral: 9    Positive: 2    Negative: 0

"State Department officials said today that the Soviet Union had withheld information on the number of troops involved in military maneuvers now being conducted in the Baltic region near Poland. Under the terms of the 1975 Helsinki accords, notification of major military exercises must include information on the strength of the forces involved. This is the first time that the Soviet Union has failed to provide such information."

"American officials also said that the maneuvers had been preceded by an unusual amount of publicity, for Moscow, including a public announcement of a call-up of reserves. But officials said the United States did not anticipate imminent Soviet military action against Poland, nor would they characterize the exercises as intimidation of Poland."

**Article #21            December 14, 1981**

"Poland Restricts Civil and Union Rights; Solidarity Activists Urge General Strike."

Paragraphs: 27    Neutral: 18    Positive: 9    Negative: 0

"Haig warns Soviet. He says U.S. is 'seriously concerned' and backs new Warsaw talks. . . . If the Soviet Union intervened in Poland, Mr. Haig said, 'the consequences would be very serious and long-lasting.'"

**Article #22            December 15, 1981**

"Widespread Strikes Reported in Defiance of Polish Regime; U.S. Postpones All Pending Aid: Further U.S. Help is in Abeyance Until Polish Situation is Clarified."

Paragraphs: 19    Neutral: 16    Positive: 3    Negative: 0

"The Reagan Administration said today that it was suspending economic assistance to Poland, including \$100 million worth of feed and food grains, in reaction to the military crackdown on the free trade union movement. . . . Food and humanitarian relief already in the pipeline will proceed. . . . President Reagan and Congressional leaders were low-key in their comments despite their surprise and dismay over the Polish Government's crackdown. Senator Percy, chair of the Foreign Relations Committee said 'the Polish Government had overreacted' and he called martial law an excessive step."

**Article #23            December 16, 1981**

**"Washington Says Risk is 'Grave'; Protests Over Police at Its Embassy."**

**Paragraphs: 18    Neutral: 11    Positive: 6    Negative: 1**

**"The Reagan Administration issued a strong warning to Poland today against further acts of repression. 'The use of violence against the Polish people by the Government would have extremely grave consequences,' said Larry Speakes, the White House deputy press secretary. 'Our actions will be decided as developments warrant.'"**

**"The United States on Monday suspended economic aid to Poland, including \$100 million in credits for feed and food grains, in reaction to Warsaw's military crackdown on the free trade union movement. Poland, under sever economic strains, had requested \$740 million in food aid for the next fiscal year."**

**Article #24            December 17, 1981**

**"Polish Diplomats Being Restricted By U.S. in a Retaliatory Measure."**

**Paragraphs: 18    Neutral: 12    Positive: 6    Negative: 0**

**"The State Department told the Polish envoy . . . that in retaliation for curbs on the movement of American diplomats in Poland, Polish diplomats in the United States were confined to the cities to which they are assigned."**

**"The United States today restricted the movements of Polish diplomats and told the Polish Ambassador of its concerns about the continuation of marital law and the isolation of Lech Walesa, the union leader."**

**"'It is our position that the Polish people should settle their current difficulties through a process of negotiation and compromise, without outside interference,' the State Department spokesman said. 'We have made these views known to the Polish authorities and to the Government of the Soviet Union.'"**

**Article #25            December 18, 1981**

**"President Says Moscow Supports Crackdown by Warsaw on Union."**

Paragraphs: 18    Neutral: 7    Positive: 11    Negative: 0  
"The President thus appeared to go further than anyone in his Administration in assigning blame to the Soviet Union for the recent actions by the Polish Government. He also seemed to go further in suggesting that the United States was ready to try to influence events by offering possible future aid. At this time, Mr. Reagan said, it would be 'impossible for us to continue trying to help Poland solve its economic problems while martial law is imposed on the people of Poland, thousands are imprisoned, and the legal rights of free trade unions previously granted by the Government are now denied.'"

**Article #26            December 22, 1981**

"President Weighs Steps on Poland: Allies Consulted on Sanctions for Warsaw and Moscow."

Paragraphs: 17    Neutral: 13    Positive: 4    Negative: 0

"President Reagan conferred with the National Security Council today on imposing sanctions against Poland and the Soviet Union if martial law in Poland is not eased soon, Administration officials said.

"Diplomats and Washington officials said the Reagan Administration was seeking a consensus to allow humanitarian food aid to continue to be sent to Poland under non-governmental auspices, but to cut back sharply on trade and financial concessions to Warsaw and Moscow if there is no indication that Polish authorities will release political detainees, especially Lech Walesa, the leader of the suspended Solidarity union."

**Article #27            December 23, 1981**

"Reagan Sees Pole Who Has Defected: They Meet at White House as U.S. Weighs Its Options."

Paragraphs: 25    Neutral: 14    Positive: 8    Negative: 3

"President Reagan held an emotional meeting today with the former Polish ambassador, who defected to the United States Sunday. And the Administration continued to discuss a range of political and economic sanctions against the Polish military Government and the Soviet Union in response to the crackdown in Poland. Larry Speakes, the deputy White House press spokesman, said that Mr. Reagan's eyes brimmed with tears and that Romuald Spasowski and his wife Wanda had both wept during the 15 minute session in the White House oval

office."

**Article #28            December 24, 1981**

**"Reagan Tells Polish Regime Its 'Crime Will Cost Dearly';  
Curbs Credit and Commerce."**

**Paragraphs: 37    Neutral: 18    Positive: 19    Negative: 0**

"In his sharpest condemnation of the events in Poland since the imposition of martial law December 13, Mr. Reagan said in a televised address from the White House, 'I want emphatically to state tonight that, if the outrages in Poland do not cease, we cannot and will not conduct 'business as usual' with the perpetrators and those who aid and abet them."

"After three days of intense discussions on what steps to take to try to restore Poland to the relative freedom that existed before the crackdown, Mr. Reagan avoided some of the harsher measures suggested by many members of Congress, such as a total ban on trade and the severing of economic ties with both Poland and the Soviet Union. In fact the only specific measures announced tonight were directed solely against the Polish government, which is headed by General Wojciech Jaruzelski. Nothing concrete was done against Moscow, although it received a sharp warning."

The sanctions against the Polish Government included these steps:

- Continuation of the suspension of American Government sponsored shipments of agricultural and dairy products to the Polish government until "absolute assurances" are received that distribution of these products is monitored and guaranteed by independent agencies.
- Halting the renewal of Poland's line of export credit insurance throughout the American Government backed Export Import Bank.
- Suspension of Poland's civil aviation privileges in the United States.
- Withdrawing the right of Poland's fishing fleet to operate in American waters.

"As for the Russians, the President declared: "The Soviet Union, through its threats and pressures, deserves a major share of blame for the developments in Poland, so I have also sent a letter to President Brezhnev urging him to permit the restoration of basic human rights in Poland as provided for in the Helsinki Final Act. In it, I informed him that, if this repression continues, the United States

will have no choice but to take further concrete political and economic measures affecting our relationship."

**Article #29            December 25, 1981**

"Haig Wants Allies to Act on Poland: Cites Need for Joint Pressure for End to the Crackdown."

Paragraphs: 20    Neutral: 10    Positive: 4    Negative: 6

"It is very important that we do what we can, not only in the United States, but together with the Western world, to apply whatever pressures we can to reinstitute moderation and continue the process."

**Article #30            December 27, 1981**

"Brezhnev Responds to Reagan Warning: U.S. Receives Letter on Poland-- Contents Not Disclosed."

Paragraphs: 21    Neutral: 21    Positive: 0    Negative: 0

" . . . the Administration official refused to say if Mr. Brezhnev's letter was consistent with the vituperative tone in the press or whether it departed in any way from Moscow's denial of any involvement in the events in Poland."

**Article #31            December 28, 1981**

"Polish Officials Express Concern on U.S. Actions."

Paragraphs: 17    Neutral: 12    Positive: 0    Negative: 5

"Sources said that the official view was that Mr. Reagan's restrictions on trade, Western credits and civil air rights agreements would further isolate Poland from the West and force it to turn even more to Comecon, the Soviet trading bloc . . . A major concern here was that Mr. Reagan's action would further reduce the living standard, leading to extensive unemployment and social unrest. 'This could mean that martial law will have to be prolonged, even perhaps for several years,' one Government source said."

**Article #32            December 28, 1981**

"Brezhnev Response to Reagan's Letter is Called 'Negative'."

Paragraphs: 24    Neutral: 15    Positive: 7    Negative: 2

"Neither Mr. Reagan nor other senior officials would divulge

the contents of Mr. Brezhnev's reply Friday night to Mr. Reagan's letter, which was sent late Tuesday. But aboard his Air Force plane en route to California, where he will spend the rest of the holidays, Mr. Reagan, when asked if the Brezhnev letter was positive or negative in tone, replied, 'With them, it's always negative.'

Also the article mentions that none of the allies have enacted sanctions. They are considering it, however, they are not doing it.

**Article #33            December 29, 1981**

**"U.S. Makes Decision to Punish Russians on Role in Poland."**

Paragraphs: 22    Neutral: 16    Positive: 6    Negative: 0  
"The decision to take measures against the Russians was made over the weekend, officials said, after the receipt on Friday night of a letter from Leonid I. Brezhnev, the Soviet leader, in response to Mr. Reagan's message last week warning him of economic and political measures if the military crackdown in Poland was not eased. Mr. Reagan said on Sunday that Mr. Brezhnev's letter was 'negative,' and a State Department official said today that 'negative is an understatement.'"

**Article #34            December 30, 1981**

**"Reagan Curtails Soviet Trade and Halts Technology Sales; Walesa Said to Agree to Talks: Curbs Over Poland."**

Paragraphs: 18    Neutral: 12    Positive: 2    Negative: 4

"President Reagan, in calling on the Soviet Union to recognize 'the clear desire' of the Polish people for a process of national reconciliation renewal and reform, took a series of actions:

- He suspended the issuance or renewal of export licenses for electronic equipment, computers and other high technology items.

- He postponed negotiations on a new long-term grain agreement to replace an accord expiring next September 30 although he left in place the current pact, under which the Soviet Union may buy up to 23 million tons of grain this year.

- He suspended talks on a new maritime accord and restricted access to American ports by Soviet ships.

- He barred new licenses for oil and gas equipment, including equipment for a natural gas pipeline from Siberia to Western Europe, while permitting existing



licenses to be honored.

-He suspended landing rights in the United States for Aeroflot, which flies twice a week between Moscow and Washington.

-He closed the Soviet Purchasing Commission, a New York agency accounting for roughly a third of the Soviet orders for American nonfarm products.

-He declared his intention not to renew exchange agreements in energy, and science and technology. There will be a complete review of all other U.S. Soviet exchange agreements."

**Article #35            December 30, 1981**

"Allies Moving Out of Step: Bonn Says Sanctions Are Not the Solution."

Paragraphs: 4      Neutral: 0      Positive: 1      Negative: 3

"West Germany's continuing official attitude on Poland is that the situation there remains too fragmented and uncertain for the West to draw conclusions about the country's fate and how to deal with it."

**Article #36            December 31, 1981**

"Soviet Said to Jam Radio to Warsaw: U.S. Asserts Voice of America Broadcasts are Blocked."

Paragraphs: 24      Neutral: 14      Positive: 5      Negative: 5

"The United States, seeking to emphasize Moscow's support of the military crackdown in Poland, accused the Soviet Union today of 'heavily jamming' the Voice of America's Polish-language broadcasts into Poland. . . . Alan D. Romberg, a State Department spokesman, noted that since August 1980 the Soviet Union has been jamming Voice of America broadcasts in Russian and other Soviet languages beamed to the Soviet Union."

## APPENDIX F

### New York Times Articles Pertaining to Chapter VII, The MX Debate

Article #1            April 3, 1983

"The President Out Front: Reagan, Taking the Offensive, Orchestrates Intensive Effort to Win Support for Policies."

Paragraphs: 14    Neutral: 7    Positive: 5    Negative: 2

"Last Christmas, President Reagan was feeling beleaguered by Democrats who were riding high after their November election victories. His programs were under wide attack, and he told aides he felt there was 'nobody out front' making his case. 'I want to get out there and tell my side of the story,' he declared."

"His speech on arms control today culminated an extraordinary personal effort over the last three weeks that stemmed from that frustration last December. Using the pulpit of the Presidency, Mr. Reagan has taken the political offensive and demonstrated his capacity to dominate the political arena on such issues as military spending and arms control, where his policies have been under fire. In what the White House acknowledges has been a deliberate barrage through the news media timed just before Congress's Easter recess to influence voters at home . . . He has gone on prime-time television promoting a futuristic missile defense plan."

"The latest public relations offensive reflects the rhythm of the Presidency: a low public profile in the long period of budget formulation in December and January followed by high visibility in the spring political battling. Mr. Reagan's timing also anticipates major battles in Congress over the military budget, the nuclear freeze, the MX missile and his nomination of Kenneth L. Adelman to head the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency."

"'He's deliberately on the offensive now because he wants to lay the groundwork for those major debates,' said David Gergen, the White House communications director. 'Look what's coming up after the recess; MX, . . . Military spending and the nuclear freeze.'"

**Article #2            April 3, 1983**

**"Soviet Reaction Unconstructive State Department Says."**

Paragraphs: 15    Neutral: 15    Positive: 0    Negative: 0

"The United States, in a prompt response to remarks by Andrei A. Gromyko, the Soviet Foreign Minister, said today that it was disappointed by what it called an 'unconstructive initial Soviet reaction' to President Reagan's latest arms control proposal. It said it hoped for a more flexible Soviet position when negotiations resumed in Geneva next month."

**Article #3            April 7, 1983**

**"Administration Hails New Draft of Arms Letter: Says Bishops 'Improved' the Nuclear Statement."**

Paragraphs: 14    Neutral: 12    Positive: 1    Negative: 1

"For months the Administration has criticized the earlier drafts of the proposed pastoral letter on the perils of nuclear war and other nuclear topics. But today the State Department said the latest revision, made public Tuesday, 'has been substantially improved over the previous versions.'"

**Article #4            April 10, 1983**

**"Officials Say MX Study May Lead to a New Arms-Control Strategy: Stress on Warhead Limits."**

Paragraphs: 16    Neutral: 16    Positive: 0    Negative: 0

A new approach to arms control is rumored to be contained in a "report, from the bipartisan Commission on Strategic Forces, [which] might move the arms control strategy form efforts to limit the numbers of missile launchers toward emphasizing limits on warheads and allowing more missiles if they have only one warhead each."

**Article #5            April 10, 1983**

**"Officials Say MX Study May Lead to a New Arms-Control Strategy: Bishops Cite Differences."**

Paragraphs: 16    Neutral: 12    Positive: 0    Negative: 4

"In a joint statement, Archbishop John R. Roach, president of the Conference and Joseph Cardinal Bernardin . . . said they 'could not accept any suggestion that there are relatively few and insignificant differences between U.S. policies and the policies advocated in the pastoral.'"

"Among the points in the letter that distinguish it from Administration policies, the churchmen said, are 'advocacy of a policy of "no first use" of nuclear weapons and support for early and successful conclusion of negotiations on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.'"

**Article #6                      April 12, 1983**

**"MX Panel Proposes Basing 100 Missiles in Minuteman Silos: Urges New Limit on Arms."**

Paragraphs: 27    Neutral: 25    Positive: 0    Negative: 2

"A Presidential commission today recommended basing 100 MX missiles in existing Minuteman silos and proposed 'new directions' for strategic forces and arms control through development of a new single-warhead missile for the 1990's."

"The Panel was appointed in January to help the Administration break the long political deadlock over a way to reduce the potential vulnerability of American land-based, intercontinental ballistic missile(ICBM) forces after Congress had rejected two Administration proposals for the MX, including the one recommended by the commission today. By drawing on four former Secretaries of Defense, two former Secretaries of State, and other high officials of four recent Administrations as members or advisers of the commission, the White House hoped to develop a package of recommendations that would gain political appeal among Democrats as well as Republicans in Congress."

"Commission members who insisted that their recommendations constituted an 'inseparable' package, made clear that they regarded the potential shift on arms control as a major selling point to persuade a skeptical Congress to vote for funds for deployment of the MX missile."

"Their report reversed a frequent theme of President Reagan by playing down the significance of the vulnerability of ICBM Missiles to Soviet Attack. In effect, they adopted the logic of the Carter Administration, which had argued that when taken in combination with American bomber and submarine forces, these missiles contribute to the overall American deterrent force despite their vulnerability."

"With its 10 warheads and greater accuracy than existing missiles, the MX is needed now to 'remove the Soviet advantage in ICBM capability' and to give Moscow an incentive to negotiate reductions in strategic forces, the report argued."

**Article #7                      April 12, 1983**

"MX Report: Dogma Ends-- Intent Was to Dispel Vulnerability Specter."

Paragraphs: 14    Neutral: 12    Positive: 0    Negative: 2

"The report of the Presidential Commission on Strategic Forces virtually repeals six years of dogma about the growing vulnerability of fixed land-based missiles to a Soviet attack and the consequent doubts about American nuclear deterrent power."

"As with John F. Kennedy's charge of a "missile gap" favoring the Soviet Union in the 1960 Presidential campaign, Ronald Reagan's campaign warnings about the 'window of vulnerability' have been transformed into a problem for the future."

"The bipartisan report states the vulnerability of land-based missiles is a problem and that 'reasonable survivability of fixed targets, such as ICBM silos, may not outlast this century.' But it cautions repeatedly that the full breadth of American nuclear power-- long range bombers, submarines launched missiles and land-based missiles-- guarantees deterrence, and that 'different components of our strategic forces should be assessed collectively and not in isolation.'"

**Article #8                      April 15, 1983**

"Atom Arms Freeze Gains in the House: Both Sides Predict Approval as Amendments Are Defeated."

Paragraphs: 18    Neutral: 15    Positive: 0    Negative: 3

"The first test today came when the House, by a vote of 229 to 190, defeated an amendment that called upon the President to propose to the Soviet Union that each nation be required to dismantle two nuclear warheads before deploying a new, more modern one. The amendment, known as the 'guaranteed strategic build-down,' was offered by Representative Elliott H. Levitas, Democrat of Georgia."

"The House also rejected an amendment offered by Hank Brown, Republican of Colorado, that emphasized the importance of reductions in nuclear weapons rather than a freeze. Reducing nuclear forces is the approach favored by President Reagan."

**Article #9                      April 15, 1983**

"Poll Finds Doubt Over Responses to Soviet Threat."

Paragraphs: 18      Neutral: 12      Positive: 1      Negative: 5

"The American people tend to accept President Reagan's description of a Soviet threat but reject this strategy for meeting it, according to the latest New York Times/CBS News Poll."

"By about 3 to 2, those interviewed saw the Soviet Union as a growing threat as well as an immediate danger. But by an even bigger margin, 2 to 1, the respondents felt that the American arms buildup would result only in a further buildup of Soviet arms and not in serious negotiations."

"The public's approach to preventing nuclear war and reducing nuclear arms-- by a margin of 64 percent to 25 percent, according to the poll-- was to seek a mutual freeze on nuclear weapons with the Soviet Union rather than a military buildup by the United States."

**Article #10                      April 15, 1983**

"A Big Victory for Reagan: President Hails 57-to-42 Vote as a 'Positive Step' Toward Consensus on Cutback."

Paragraphs: 19      Neutral: 12      Positive: 5      Negative: 2

"In a major victory for the President the Senate confirmed Kenneth L. Adelman today as the new director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. The vote was 57 to 42."

"The action followed strenuous Administration lobbying in behalf of Mr. Adelman. The result of the vote had been in doubt since late February, when the Senate Foreign Relations Committee refused to recommend that the 36-year-old Mr. Adelman be confirmed."

"President Reagan, appearing in the White House briefing room soon after the vote, said he was 'deeply gratified' that the Senate had confirmed Mr. Adelman. 'It's my earnest hope that this positive step will mark the beginning of a new

bipartisan consensus on the vital issue of nuclear arms reductions,' he said."

**Article #11            April 21, 1983**

"Panel Tells Reagan the Russians Seem to Have Broken Arms Pacts."

Paragraphs: 12    Neutral: 11    Positive: 0    Negative: 1

"An interagency committee has reported to President Reagan that it believes the Soviet Union has violated terms of the 1979 strategic arms accord, and the Administration is under pressure from conservative senators to make that finding public, officials disclosed today. . . . Officials said the new panel would examine 'a fairly long list' of potential violations under the 1979 strategic arms agreement, the 1972 Antiballistic Missile Treaty, the 1974 Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the 1976 Treaty on Peaceful Nuclear Exchange. Already, a political struggle is developing in Congress over how the U.S. should deal with possible Soviet violations of the second strategic arms limitation agreement. The treaty was signed, and although it was never ratified, both sides have said they will abide by it."

"Some conservative senators want to publicize possible Soviet violations to throw Moscow on the defensive in arms talks and to counter pressure for a nuclear freeze. Others are urging caution for fear of killing the second arms limitation agreement, disrupting the process of arms negotiations and even raising new tensions with allies in Western Europe."

On Monday, two conservative republican Senators, Orrin G. Hatch of Utah and Steven D. Symms of Idaho, reportedly pressed Defense Secretary Casper Weinberger to have the Administration publicly charge Moscow with violations. The Senators contended that this would strengthen the Administration's case for the MX missile and spur 'a public campaign to increase the defense budget.'"

**Article #12            April 27, 1983**

"Reagan Arms Policy Assailed by Mondale as 'Weakening' U.S."

Paragraphs: 13    Neutral: 9    Positive: 0    Negative: 4

"Mr. Mondale called the Administration's policies 'fundamentally flawed' in their emphasis on building new, highly sophisticated weapons and in what he said was a

rejection of real efforts to win accord on conventional and nuclear arms reductions."

"He backed a comprehensive and verifiable ban on developing nuclear weapons, including a freeze on nuclear weapons tests, and said the treaty to limit strategic arms negotiated by the Carter Administration in 1979 should be revised and resubmitted to the Senate."

**Article #13            April 30, 1983**

"Catholic Bishops' Panel, in Shift, Said to Urge 'Halt' on Atom Arms."

Paragraphs: 23    Neutral: 19    Positive: 1    Negative: 3

"When the third draft of the letter was released two weeks ago, it called for a 'curb' on the arms race, rather than the 'halt' that was urged in the second draft. Officials of the Reagan Administration, who had criticized the earlier draft, praised the third one. Speaking in New York Thursday, Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger said the Administration's policies were 'consistent with church teachings' as expressed in the third draft."

"It is also expected that the letter will be a significant force in international discussion about nuclear arms. A bishops' conference in France is preparing to express its views on nuclear war, and on Thursday the Conference of Catholic Bishops in West Germany made public a pastoral letter on the subject."

"It said that 'nuclear deterrence is not a reliable instrument for preventing war in the long run,' but it supported the Western allies' policy of 'flexible response,' which holds that nuclear weapons might be needed against an overwhelming conventional attack."

**Article #14            May 3, 1983**

"Roman Catholic Bishops Toughen Stance Against Nuclear Weapons."

Paragraphs: 18    Neutral: 8    Positive: 0    Negative: 10

"In a series of decisive votes on a proposed pastoral letter on the arms race, the nation's Roman Catholic bishops today toughened their stand against nuclear weapons and appeared to separate themselves further from Reagan Administration military policies."



"The 288 bishops overwhelmingly approved a proposal that concludes it is 'morally unjustifiable to initiate nuclear war in any form,' and in a change of wording from the draft drawn up by a committee, the bishops called for a 'halt,' not a 'curb,' in the production and deployment of nuclear arms."

**Article #15            May 4, 1983**

"Bishops Endorse Stand Opposed to Nuclear War: Approve Third Draft of Pastoral Letter, 238-9."

Paragraphs: 25    Neutral: 16    Positive: 0    Negative: 9

"The Roman Catholic bishops of the United States today ratified a broad-ranging pastoral letter that denounces nuclear war and calls upon Catholics to help rid the world of nuclear weapons."

"Referring to their response to this danger, they say 'In simple terms, we are saying that good ends, defending one's country, protecting freedom, etc., cannot justify immoral means, the use of weapons which kill indiscriminately and threaten whole societies. We feel that our world and nation are headed in the wrong direction.'"

"'The whole world,' they continue, 'must summon the moral courage and technical means to say "No" to an arms race which robs the poor and the vulnerable; and "No" to the moral danger of a nuclear age which places before humankind indefensible choices of constant terror or surrender.'"

**Article #16            May 5, 1983**

"House Approves Altered Version of Arms Freeze: Halt in Atomic Weapons Linked to Overall Cuts."

Paragraphs: 18    Neutral: 15    Positive: 2    Negative: 1

"The House tonight approved a substantially modified resolution that calls for President Reagan to negotiate a 'mutual and verifiable freeze and reductions in nuclear weapons' with the Soviet Union. the vote was 278 to 149."

"The relationship of the freeze to nuclear arms reductions has long been a critical element of the debate, with supporters of the Reagan Administration arguing that arms reductions should precede a halt in the development, testing and deployment of new weapons. The amendment would rescind the freeze unless arms reductions were won at the

negotiating table."

"The erosion of support for freeze advocates first became apparent when the House, on a 214-210 vote, refused to accept an amendment calling for arms reductions to come soon after a negotiated freeze."

**Article #17            May 11, 1983**

**"U.S. Said to Move Toward New Plan on Strategic Arms: Stress on Limiting Warheads, Not Launchers, Thought to Form Core of Proposal."**

Paragraphs: 14    Neutral: 11    Positive: 1    Negative: 2

"The Reagan Administration moved today toward adoption of a new negotiating position in strategic arms talks with the Soviet Union."

"The move was widely seen as an effort to placate Congressional critics of the MX missile. Congressional and White House sources said the National Security Council, at a meeting in the White House today, generally favored the concept that American negotiators should put more stress on limiting nuclear warheads and less on the number of missile launchers. But details of the new position are being worked out and a final decision awaits another meeting this month, the sources said."

"Until now, arms control talks have stressed the issue of how many launchers each side could retain. This has led to the production of large missiles with multiple warheads. If launchers are limited, a war planner can gain an advantage by building multi-warhead missiles."

"But these large missiles are considered dangerous, for two reasons. They increase the incentive to strike first, because it would be theoretically possible for an attacker to cripple a rival's arsenal by firing only a few missiles if they carry many warheads. Moreover the large weapons present a tempting target for a first strike because each one carries so many warheads."

"In theory, the shift to a smaller missile would eliminate both of these dangers. If each weapon has only one warhead, an attacker can knock out a rival's arsenal only on a one-for-one basis, and thus can gain no advantage by moving first."

"The new negotiating position would presumably be introduced

when the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks with the Russians, known as START, resume in Geneva next month."

"It was uncertain tonight whether the apparent move toward a shift on long-range missiles would also affect talks on medium-range weapons, which are also in excess. The Soviet leader, Yuri V. Andropov, offered May 3 to reduce medium-range forces in Europe to present NATO levels in numbers of warheads as well as numbers of missiles and planes."

"In the talks on strategic arms, the Administration's apparent decision to shift its negotiating position appears to be part of an effort to convince Congress that it is serious about arms reduction. Doubts about the Administration's intentions are probably the leading obstacle blocking approval of money for the MX, or Missile Experimental."

**Article #18            May 12, 1983**

"President Pledges to Shift Approach on Arms Control: Gains Victory on Missile."

Paragraphs: 20    Neutral: 13    Positive: 3    Negative: 4

"President Reagan sent letters to nine members of Congress today promising a new approach to arms control talks on strategic weapons. A key House panel then voted to release funds for the development of the MX missile, which had been frozen by Congress last year."

"The Defense Subcommittee of the Appropriations committee voted, 9 to 3, in favor of a resolution that would make \$560 million available for flight testing and engineering studies on the MX. Lawmakers said later that the margin had been enhanced by Mr. Reagan's letter, which arrived on Capitol Hill only minutes before the meeting began."

"In that letter Mr. Reagan said he was 'conducting a review' of his Administration's arms control posture 'with the intention of developing' new negotiating proposals, but specific details were still being worked out. Mr. Reagan also made other concessions in an attempt to persuade skeptical lawmakers that he was seriously committed to progress in arms control talks."

**Article #19            May 13, 1983**

"MX Plan Clears Another Hurdle by a 17-11 Vote: Reagan's Letter Is Seen as Swaying Senators."

Paragraphs: 20    Neutral: 8    Positive: 6    Negative: 6

"The MX missile survived another test vote today as the Senate Appropriations Committee voted to approve the release of \$625 million in development funds that Congress blocked last year.

The 17-to-11 vote came after President Reagan sent a letter to a group of influential Senators emphasizing his commitment to arms control and his qualified support for a negotiating proposal that the United States and the Soviet Union eliminate a set number of existing missiles for every new one they deploy."

"Although lawmakers say the resolution would release \$560 million, it would also free an extra \$65 million for flight testing of the missile. No funds have been approved for deployment of the MX."

"House Speaker Tip O'Neil, an opponent of the MX, admitted that the President's lobbying campaign might well have rescued the missile from defeat."

**Article # 20            May 18, 1983**

"MX Survives a Test in House After Lobbying by President."

Paragraphs: 17    Neutral: 12    Positive: 2    Negative: 3

"After President Reagan lobbied lawmakers with last-minute phone calls, the MX missile narrowly survived another test vote in Congress today and headed for a showdown on the floor of the House and Senate."

"Lawmakers generally attributed today's vote to an intense campaign by the White House aimed at persuading Congress that President Reagan is sincerely interested in promoting arms reductions."

**Article #21            May 25, 1983**

"President's Plan for Basing of MX Approved in House: Key Victory For Reagan."

Paragraphs: 21    Neutral: 9    Positive: 5    Negative: 7

"The House today approved President Reagan's plan to base 100 MX missiles in existing shelters under the plains of Wyoming and Nebraska. The vote, a major victory for the President, was 239 to 186."

"The vote reversed a decision by Congress last year to block funds for the huge weapon, which could deliver 10 warheads to Soviet targets with great accuracy. The key to the switch was an intense lobbying campaign by Mr. Reagan, who played on the inclination of many lawmakers to support the President in matters of foreign policy and national security."

"The measure approved today would release \$625 million for engineering and flight testing on the missile, funds that had been frozen by the lawmakers last year in disagreement with the Administration's plan for basing the missile in a closely spaced pattern known as 'dense pack.'"

"The resolution freeing the \$625 million is only the first hurdle facing the MX in coming weeks. The lawmakers must also vote on bills to authorize and appropriate \$4.8 billion for the actual procurement of the weapons, a reduction from the original Administration request of \$6.2 billion."

"In his lobbying efforts, the President portrayed the missile as the essential leverage in his search for an arms control agreement with the Soviet Union. In an article on the Op-Ed page of the Washington Post this morning, Mr. Reagan described the impending vote by saying, 'At stake is the future of arms reductions-- balanced, verifiable arms reductions that can make the world a safer place for all the earth's people.'"

**Article #22            May 26, 1983**

"Senate, by 59 to 39, Votes \$625 Million for Testing of MX."

Paragraphs: 21    Neutral: 13    Positive: 2    Negative: 6

"The Senate today gave final approval to a resolution endorsing President Reagan's plan to base 100 MX missiles in existing shelters and releasing \$625 million for development of the huge new weapon."

"Today's decision also appeared to end a 10-year search for a home for the weapon, the largest designed by the United States."

"The critical factor in this changed attitude was a report by a Presidential commission last month that packaged the MX plan with two other proposals. One was that the Administration would also develop a smaller and more mobile missile for deployment in the 1990's; the other was that Mr. Reagan would be more flexible in arms control talks with the

Soviet Union."

**Article #23            June 8, 1983**

"U.S. Plans to Shift Arms Bid to Soviet in Geneva Parley:  
Agencies Split on Detail."

Paragraphs: 17    Neutral: 11    Positive: 2    Negative: 4

"The Reagan Administration signaled its intention today to revise its proposal to the Soviet Union for cuts in strategic nuclear arms."

"Officials said there was disagreement between the State Department and the Defense Department over the revisions in the United States' position at the talks in Geneva on reducing strategic, or long-range, weapons."

"The Defense Department and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency reportedly favor the recommendation of the bipartisan Commission on Strategic Forces. It recommended eliminating such limits entirely to permit development and deployment of a new single-warhead missile. The idea was to move both sides away from multi-warhead missiles, now viewed as the most threatening weapons in the nuclear arsenals."

**Article #24            June 8, 1983**

"Aides Say Reagan Will Modify Plan on Strategic Arms: No Final Decisions Made."

Paragraphs: 21    Neutral: 18    Positive: 1    Negative: 2

"President Reagan indicated to top national security aides today that he would modify his proposal that the Soviet Union make deep cuts in long-range missiles, but continue to insist on a one-third reduction in missile warheads, according to Administration officials."

"The officials said it was their understanding that the President will propose a new limit for each side of about 1,200 deployed intercontinental-range missiles instead of his original ceiling of 850. This would be down from about 2,350 for Moscow and about 1,600 for Washington."

"At a National Security Council meeting this morning, the President thus adopted the basic arms control recommendation of his Commission on Strategic Forces, namely changing the negotiating emphasis from deep cuts in missiles to firm controls on missile warheads."

"The increase in the proposed missile ceiling potentially opens the way to deploying a large number of new small land-based missiles with single warheads, as recommended by the commission. The hope among White House officials is that the new arms control approach will also cement a Congressional majority for the new MX missile and other nuclear modernization programs."

"But the weight of expert opinion in the Administration seems to be that the new approach will do little to break the deadlock at the fourth round of Soviet-American talks on strategic arms reductions set to resume in Geneva Wednesday. Because Mr. Reagan remains firm on cutting each side's missile warhead total from about 7,500 to 5,000, no more than half of which can be carried by land-based missiles, Moscow would still be required to dismantle over half of its land-based missile force."

"The officials said the Mr. Reagan made no decision today on the issue of missile throw-weight or payload. Should he decide to couple his new missile ceiling with a formula for bringing down Soviet missile throw-weight to near American levels, this would necessitate even larger reductions in Soviet land-based forces."

**Article #25                  June 9, 1983**

"Reagan, Stressing Flexibility, Eases Arms Talks Stand: Geneva Sessions Resume-- President Still Asks Big Cuts in Warheads but is Willing to Raise Missile Limit."

Paragraphs: 16      Neutral: 12      Positive: 3      Negative: 1

"Reagan announced today that he was relaxing proposals that the Soviet Union scrap a substantial part of its long-range missile force, but he said he was maintaining his goal of obtaining large reductions in missile warheads in the strategic nuclear arms talks."

"The President spoke at the White House as talks with the U.S.S.R. on reductions in long range nuclear arms resumed in Geneva. He said that he was not changing his proposal for a limit on the number of warheads-- 5,000 on each side-- but that he would relax his proposed limit of 850 on the number of land and sea-based missiles. He did not give a figure."

"Administration officials said that beyond easing the proposed limit on deployed long range missiles, the President's modified proposal was notable mainly for a change in tone and promise of flexibility, a word he used

repeatedly in his statement. And with reference to the talks, he also said there was 'a new feeling of partnership' in the Atlantic alliance as well as a 'new spirit of bipartisanship' in Congress."

**Article #26            June 10, 1983**

"Moscow Says Shift in U.S. Arms Stand is No Basic Change: Commentary by Tass Asserts Reagan Still Seeks an Edge in Strategic Weapons."

Paragraphs: 15    Neutral: 14    Positive: 0    Negative: 1

"Tass said Mr. Reagan's decision to revise the proposal for a limit of 850 long-range missiles on each side 'does not in any way affect the essence' of his original offer, which was rejected by the Russians at talks in Geneva."

**Article #27            June 22, 1983**

"U.S. Presses Soviet for Big Reduction in Its ICBM Force: Proposal Is Linked To MX."

Paragraphs: 20    Neutral: 16    Positive: 2    Negative: 2

"The Reagan Administration plans to deploy 100 MX missiles unless the Soviet Union agrees to give up most of its 818 medium and heavy land-based strategic missiles, Kenneth L. Adelman, director of the Arms Control and Disarmament agency, said in a letter made public today."

"Mr. Adelman told Senator Charles H. Percy, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, that the MX was a response to 'a massive buildup' in Soviet intercontinental missiles. In an authorized statement, he said the Administration would go forward with MX 'unless the Soviets are prepared to reverse this buildup and forgo their heavy and medium ICBM's."

"One senior Administration official also said it was not 'realistic' to expect the Soviet Union to accept such terms to stop the MX, which had its first successful flight test last week."

**Article #28            June 23, 1983**

"4 Predecessors Assail Adelman on Missile Idea: Say ICBM Stand Could Hurt Talks in Geneva."

Paragraphs: 19    Neutral: 10    Positive: 1    Negative: 8



"Four former directors of the arms control agency today strongly criticized a statement by the present director that the United States would abandon the MX missile if the Soviet Union gave up most of its medium and heavy land-based strategic missiles."

"The weapons make up the bulk of the Soviet Union's nuclear arsenal. Answering questions at a hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the four former directors of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency said the proposal outlined by Kenneth Adelman would hurt United States negotiating efforts in Geneva on strategic or long-range missiles. But they disagreed on the relative nuclear strength of the United States and Soviet Union and on which nation bore responsibility for the stalled negotiations."

"At a news conference today, Secretary of State George Shultz went out of his way to play down the significance of Mr. Adelman's statement. It was contained in an unclassified letter to Senator Charles H. Percy, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, that was made public Tuesday."

"Secretary Shultz and other Administration officials said the letter did not reflect the United States' negotiating position, which they described as flexible. At the same time, Mr. Shultz said no significant progress had been made with Moscow on a variety of issues even though the United States was seeking to negotiate."

**Article #29            July 14, 1983**

"Soviet Broadens Arms Proposals, Raising U.S. Hope: Moscow Provides Details-- Elaboration of Russian View on Strategic Weapons Said to Open Way to Bargaining."

Paragraphs: 23    Neutral: 20    Positive: 2    Negative: 1

"Well placed officials said Soviet negotiators in Geneva last week spelled out new details of Moscow's position. They proposed to limit each side to a total of 1,200 land and submarine based multiple warhead missiles and strategic bombers armed with cruise missiles. Single warhead missiles were not covered by this limit."

"Nonetheless, the two sides remain far apart on the numbers of large land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles that would be permitted to the Soviet Union. Forcing a sharp reduction in these missiles, which are distinct from the intermediate-range nuclear forces subject to separate

negotiations, has been a major objective of the Reagan Administration."

**Article #30            July 20, 1983**

"Reagan Mounts New Phone Drive to Gain MX Funds in the House."

Paragraphs: 16    Neutral: 6    Positive: 3    Negative: 7

"President Reagan personally called wavering lawmakers today to appeal for the MX missile as Congressional leaders reported that the weapon system could be in trouble when the House of Representatives takes up the issue on Wednesday."

"As part of the Administration lobbying effort, Brent Scowcroft, the retired general who headed a Presidential commission on the MX, wrote a letter to Congress saying rejection of the missile would 'fracture the bipartisan consensus' that had developed in Congress on strategic issues and 'abort the progress' made recently in arms talks in Geneva.

"A commission appointed by President Reagan recommended basing 100 missiles in existing shelters, while research went forward on a new and more mobile missile. As part of this package, which the President embraced, the Administration also promised to accelerate its efforts to reach an arms control agreement with Moscow. The package of recommendations was approved by the House on May 24 by a vote of 239 to 186, releasing the funds blocked in December. Now Congress is considering a request to spend \$4.65 billion on the missile."

"Meanwhile, the MX debate continued in the Senate, where a loose coalition of legislators has blocked final passage of a \$200 billion military authorization bill for more than a week. The Senate majority leader, Howard H. Baker Jr. of Tennessee, filed a petition to limit debate. With the support of 60 Senators, this would cut off the filibuster."

**Article #31            July 21, 1983**

"House, by 220-207, Authorizes Funds for Making the MX: A Key Victory For Reagan."

Paragraphs: 20    Neutral: 15    Positive: 2    Negative: 3

"The Reagan Administration won a narrow but crucial victory tonight on the MX missile system. The House decided to

authorize \$2.6 billion in the coming fiscal year to produce the first 27 of the intercontinental nuclear weapons which are to be deployed in underground silos in 1986."

"Tonight's vote was far from the last that the MX faces. But it was one of the most important to date, particularly in the House, where the weapon is believed to be in more difficulty than in the Senate. MX supporters said tonight's victory provided momentum to insure not only that the MX program would be authorized but also that money for the system would actually be appropriated later in the year. MX opponents concluded otherwise, saying that in the last MX vote a number of months ago they had lost by more than 50 votes instead of the margin of 13 votes tonight."

## **APPENDIX G**

### **CODER RELIABILITY**

In order to examine the reliability of the coding process, as well as to try and minimize bias, a second coder was asked to code a sample of the articles. Thirty articles were randomly chosen, and assigned letters A through DD. The second coder was asked to use the same criteria for evaluation of media bias in each paragraph, and of course did not have access to the original coder's scores. These scores were then tabulated and compared to the original scores. The results are tabulated in Table 1.

Of the thirty articles only two, G and J, had a disagreement as to the sign (positive or negative) of the overall bias score, and in the case of J this was -1 as opposed to +1. This really represents a nearly neutral article, and therefore this was only slightly inconsistent.

Six of the articles were scored as 0 by one observer, but not the other. This does not represent a change in sign. In three of these cases, the other reader coded +1 or -1, and in one case -2, which represent essentially neutral articles. Thus, in only two cases did one observer find the articles significantly positive or negative while the other scored it as neutral.

In summary only three of the thirty articles were significantly different in scoring, articles G, T, and CC. This shows excellent reliability for the sample.

**Table 1**

**ARTICLE CODING CHART**

<u>Article</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u># Pos</u>	<u># Neu</u>	<u># Neg</u>	<u>Score</u>	<u>Coder #1</u>
A	6/20/79	3	10	5	-2	0
B	7/9/79	0	9	5	-5	-1
C	7/18/79	0	9	5	-5	-7
D	7/31/79	0	14	3	-3	-5
E	9/19/79	0	10	3	-3	-4
F	12/17/79	0	9	3	-3	-4
G	9/6/79	0	29	3	-3	+3
H	9/8/79	1	16	2	-1	-10
I	9/12/79	0	20	5	-5	-8
J	9/28/79	0	21	1	-1	+1
K	10/3/79	0	13	4	-4	-7
L	9/8/79	2	26	3	-1	-6
M	12/29/79	1	17	0	+1	+5
N	1/13/80	3	19	1	+2	+12
O	1/18/80	0	15	2	-2	-1
P	2/9/80	0	21	1	-1	-10
Q	2/10/80	0	20	1	-1	0
R	4/13/80	4	19	0	+4	+4
S	5/18/80	1	18	0	+1	+2
T	2/11/81	0	16	0	0	-6
U	3/11/81	1	14	0	+1	+3
V	3/18/81	0	19	2	-2	-3
W	3/30/91	1	15	0	+1	+7
X	12/22/81	2	15	0	+2	+4
Y	12/29/81	2	19	1	+1	+6
Z	4/3/83	3	10	1	+2	+3
AA	4/21/83	0	12	0	0	-1
BB	5/11/83	0	13	1	-1	-1
CC	5/13/83	4	15	1	+3	0
DD	5/18/83	3	11	3	0	-1

## APPENDIX H

### STATISTICAL ANALYSIS

In order to try and apply quantitative methods to the study, the bias scores were entered into a data analysis program, where an analysis of variance was performed.<sup>1</sup> Based on this analysis, bias scores for each article were divided into groups of data with statistically different mean bias scores. This allowed for the determination of curves representing the overall trends in the data (see Figures 12, 14, 16, 18, and 20). This is referred to as the smooth estimate of the curve, or trend. The dates separating the groups are referred to as cusps or break points, and are shown on both the "Bias Score Charts" (see Figures 11, 13, 15, 17, and 19) and on the smooth estimate charts. The groups of articles separated by the cusps each have a mean bias score and standard deviation which are shown in the captions of each figure. Also given is the overall significance or probability that the groups are separable. Because there are in some cases more than two groups identified, an *F* test was used. Included in the caption is the *F* value, given in the form:

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<sup>1</sup>Leland Wilkinson, SYSTAT: The System for Statistic, (Evanston: SYSTAT, 1989), Ver. 4.0.

$$F(a,b)=c, p=d$$

In this,  $a$  represents the number of groups minus one,  $b$  is the number of data points (articles) minus one, and  $p$  is the probability that the groups are separable statistically.<sup>2</sup>

Note that while the separation between groups is always significant, there are several mean bias scores whose absolute value is less than the standard deviation. For example, in Figure 10 it can be seen that the mean bias score for the second group of data is  $-0.02$ , whereas the standard deviation for that mean is  $0.05$ . This means that while the two groups are statistically separable (see that  $p=.003$ ), the second group only shows a negative trend, and cannot be said to be strongly negative.

The mean bias scores are simply a way to estimate the overall tone of the media over the periods represented by the groups. The fact that the scores can be divided into such groups allows one to argue that there are shifts in media bias, and that the positivity or negativity of the articles is not simply random.

During the course of the Carter Administration's push to gain Congressional approval of the SALT II treaty, two groupings of bias scores were identified (see Figures 11 and

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<sup>2</sup>For a discussion of the use of the  $F$  test in comparing groups of variables, see Marcia K. Johnson and Robert M. Liebert, Statistics: Tool of the Behavioral Sciences, (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1977), pp. 104-114.



12). Prior to July 18, 1970, the Times coverage of the event was weakly positive, however as time progressed a negative trend emerged and the articles became increasingly negative in tone. The probability that these groups are significantly different is over 99% ( $p=.001$ ).

With Cuba, analysis yields three groupings of bias scores (see Figures 13 and 14). Overall, the trend in the media was negative. This was by far the most negative event with 75% of the events articles possessing a negative bias score. During the first two days of the event, the press was positive, but after September 7 the tone was quite negative, with a mean value of  $-0.40$ , the most negative of any group in the entire study. The bias scores following September 23, 1979, were significantly less negative, although it was still in the negative range, with a mean of  $-0.18$ . For this event,  $p=.02$ , indicating that although the initial positive response was short-lived, and the standard deviation of  $0.24$  is only slightly smaller than the mean ( $0.27$ ), there is a real difference in media tone between the two groups of articles.

In the case of Afghanistan, one cusp was identified, dividing the data into two groups (see Figures 15 and 16). The analysis of variance indicated that the Times reported events relatively positively before February 6, 1980. However, the trend became slightly negative after that


point. The two groups are significantly separable, with  $p=.003$ .

Four groups of bias scores were identified in the case of the invasion of Poland (see Figures 18 and 19). The analysis of variance suggests that prior to April 5, 1981, the Times reports were positive, following which the curve became negative until April 28, 1981. After this point the media was positive until December 24, 1981, and then finally the curve became negative once more. These four groups are quite distinct, with  $p=.003$ .

In the case of the events surrounding the Reagan Administration's push for MX funding, analysis identified three different groups of bias scores (see Figures 19 and 20). There was more negative than positive press surrounding the event overall. Before April 10, 1983 the press was positive, followed by a negative curve, and then a more positive trend after May 5, 1983. For this event,  $p=.02$ .

## Bias Score Chart

### THE FAILURE OF THE SALT II TREATY



**Figure 11--Bias Score Chart**


Analysis reveals two statistically separable groups of bias scores.

group I	June 15 - July 18, 1979	Mean Bias Score	0.03
		Standard Deviation	0.05
group II	July 18 - December 17	Mean Bias Score	-0.21
		Standard Deviation	0.03

$$F(1,33) = 14.05, p=.001$$

## Estimate of Bias Trends

### THE FAILURE OF THE SALT II TREATY




**Figure 12--Estimate of Bias Trends**

Bias scores for each article (black line) and smooth estimate of the overall trend in bias (gray line). Abscissa is article number, ranked chronologically.

# Bias Score Chart

## THE CUBAN BRIGADE



**Figure 13--Bias Score Chart**


Analysis reveals three statistically separable groups of bias scores.

group I	Prior to Sept. 7, 1979	Mean Bias Score	0.27
		Standard Deviation	0.24
group II	September 7-23, 1979	Mean Bias Score	-0.40
		Standard Deviation	0.12
group III	After Sept. 23, 1979	Mean Bias Score	-0.18
		Standard Deviation	0.16

$$F(2,20) = 4.76, p=.02$$

# Estimate of Bias Trends

## THE CUBAN BRIGADE




**Figure 14--Estimate of Bias Trends**

Bias scores for each article (black line) and smooth estimate of the overall trend in bias (gray line). Abscissa is article number, ranked chronologically.

## Bias Score Chart

### THE INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN



**Figure 15--Bias Score Chart**


Analysis reveals two statistically separable groups of bias scores.

group I	Prior to Feb. 6, 1980	Mean Bias Score	0.18
		Standard Deviation	0.04
group II	After Feb. 6, 1980	Mean Bias Score	-0.02
		Standard Deviation	0.05

$$F(1,72) = 9.580, p=.003$$

## Estimate of Bias Trends

### THE INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN




**Figure 16--Estimate of Bias Trends**

Bias scores for each article (black line) and smooth estimate of the overall trend in bias (gray line). Abscissa is article number, ranked chronologically.



# Bias Score Chart

## THE POLISH CRISIS



**Figure 17--Bias Score Chart**


Analysis reveals four statistically separable groups of bias scores.

group I	February 2 - April 5	Mean Bias Score	0.09
		Standard Deviation	0.09
group II	April 5 - April 28	Mean Bias Score	-0.20
		Standard Deviation	0.10
group III	April 28 - December 24	Mean Bias Score	0.30
		Standard Deviation	0.09
group IV	December 24 - 31	Mean Bias Score	-0.10
		Standard Deviation	0.10

$$F(3,32) = 5.78, p=.003$$

## Estimate of Bias Trends

### THE POLISH CRISIS




**Figure 18--Estimate of Bias Trends**

Bias scores for each article (black line) and smooth estimate of the overall trend in bias (gray line). Abscissa is article number, ranked chronologically.

# Bias Score Chart

## THE MX DEBATE



**Figure 19--Bias Score Chart**


Analysis reveals three statistically separable groups of bias scores.

group I	Prior to April 10, 1983	Mean Bias Score	0.05
		Standard Deviation	0.05
group II	April 10 - May 5, 1983	Mean Bias Score	-0.21
		Standard Deviation	0.07
group III	May 5 - July 21, 1983	Mean Bias Score	-0.06
		Standard Deviation	0.08

$$F(2,28)=4.61, p=.02$$

## Estimate of Bias Trends

### THE MX DEBATE



**Figure 20--Estimate of Bias Trends**

Bias scores for each article (black line) and smooth estimate of the overall trend in bias (gray line). Abscissa is article number, ranked chronologically.

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